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ABSTRACT
During the past twenty years, scholars have posited 
the emergence of a legitimacy crisis in the American 
political system. Symptoms of the crisis were low voter 
turn out and a culture of withdrawal, cynicism, alienation, 
and a widespread perception of institutional incompetence 
and indifference. At the very least, the widespread mood 
of apathy and decline have been seized upon by various 
candidates seeking political office, in particular the 
presidency, who routinely engage in discourse targeting 
legitimacy restoration. This discourse echoed the general 
theme of the Jeffersonian Myth. This myth, which predates 
Jefferson in its old Roman roots, targets the citizen as 
the primary source of political power and moral authority.
Working from Habermas’ writings regarding legitimacy 
crises and his ideal speech situation, this study developed 
three legitimacy topoi which were used as a critical method 
for understanding candidate discourse. These topoi were 
used to explore the discourse of the 1992 televised 
presidential debates. The debates were selected because of 
their economy of statements and voter impact, and because 
legitimacy had become a central theme of the 1992 
elections.
The study found that the third party candidate 
indicted the legitimacy of the system and argued for 
restoration far more than the other two candidates. The
vii
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incumbent used legitimacy appeals the least. The exhaling 
Democratic challenger affirmed and vilified the legitimacy 
of the government showing that rhetorical strategy and 
logic do not always coincide.
viii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation deals with two subjects that have 
become increasingly related in scholarly literature: 
public debate and political legitimacy. In recent years 
political communication scholars as ideologically diverse 
as Kathleen Jamieson and J. Michael Hogan have lamented the 
death of genuine civic discourse. According to these 
scholars citizen deliberation has been replaced by media 
coverage of spin doctors and campaign managers. Extended 
argument and exposition has been replaced by advertising 
slogans, images, and sound bites. Polling has replaced 
public opinion. Further, they argue that commentary by 
journalists has preempted public discussion. Finally, they 
conclude that the vast bulk of citizenry have been shut out 
of meaningful participation in the political process. The 
dominance of mediated communication and the intersection of 
politics, marketing and advertising has threatened the 
legitimacy of the American political system, whose mandate 
to act rests upon the perception of the participation of 
the people and the expression of their will.
Since many scholars see the threat to political 
legitimacy as a communication problem, they seek answers in 
terms of improved communication. Their solutions are 
diverse, but they usually feature some means of directly
1
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involving citizenry in discussion or presenting the 
candidates in ways that subvert mediated formats and 
minimize the selective power of mass advertising and 
marketing. Hence it is no surprise that several of these 
same scholars should endorse some form of presidential 
debate as a vehicle for restoring political legitimacy. 
Despite heavy broadcast mediation political debating 
remains closer to the old ideals of civic discourse than 
any of the newer formats; it features rationality, 
extended argument, and open competition before an audience 
that appears to act in judgement.
This dissertation wishes to explore the connection 
between political legitimacy and debate in an even more 
organic way. It is a common place that presidential 
candidates are also knowledgeable about and sensitive to 
the perception of a crisis in political legitimacy. As 
early as 1976 the restoration of legitimacy became a major 
theme in President Carter's town meetings and "spontaneous 
visits" outside Washington. Carter professed to enjoy 
getting away from the experts of the capital in order to 
draw wisdom and virtue from the people. Accordingly, this 
dissertation proposes to study the attempts to restore 
legitimacy by analyzing the communication behavior of 
candidates within presidential debates.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
RISE OF DEBATES
In 1960, the first televised presidential debate took 
place between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon.
Sixteen years would pass before the American electorate 
would witness televised presidential debates again. Since 
1976, however, televised presidential debates have become a 
regular part of the presidential election process. The 
U.S. electorate has witnessed televised debates between 
presidential hopefuls in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and most 
recently in 1992. While each series of debates has 
differed in number*, format^, participants, and content, 
one consistent fact regarding televised presidential 
debates has emerged - they are an expected part of the 
election process. As early as 1986, with few televised 
debates having yet taken place, Auer (1986) stated that 
"the public has grown to expect candidates . . .  to engage 
in debates" (p. 216). Six years later Friedenberg (1994) 
wrote of the developing presidential debate tradition: 
"Debates have become an expected feature of our 
presidential elections" (p. 239). Jamieson and Birdsell 
(1988) noted that debates are more then just "expected" and
*The total number of televised debates in each 
election have ranged from 4 debates in 1960, 3 in 1976, 
only 1 debate in 1980, 2 in 1984, 2 in 1988, and 3 in 1992.
Formats have ranged through the years from a single 
moderator, to a panel of journalists asking questions, to a 
town hall meeting with citizens asking "anything goes" 
questions.
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have come to play a major role in election campaigns:
"Debate" has become a buzzword for serious 
politics . . . when debates are announced, 
movement in the polls slows, in anticipation, 
the electorate suspends its willingness to be 
swayed by ads and news. (p. 5-6)
Further, Jamieson and Birdsell contend that the increase in
debate popularity and the documented effect on voters
demonstrates that they have become the single most
significant event of the presidential campaign.
LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Crisis Emerges
At least since Watergate, political leaders have been 
developing a legitimacy rhetoric, replete with vilification 
and warnings. On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
delivered a dramatic television Jeremiad to the American 
people on the subject of the energy crisis. After a brief 
technical exposition, he expanded the scope of his topic 
and drew attention to "a subject even more serious than 
energy or inflation. . .a fundamental threat to American 
democracy." That threat, he said, was a "crisis of 
confidence that strikes at the very heart and soul and 
spirit of our national will." He pointed to a growing 
disrespect for government and emphasized that "the gap 
between our citizens and our government has never been so 
wide" (Lipset & Schneider, 1987, p. 13). In his address, 
President Carter referred to a legitimacy crisis in the 
American political system which had been growing for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
past twenty years. Lane (1965) explained that between the 
mid 1930's and 1965, with the growing prosperity and an 
increase in the proportion of the population that had 
completed high school or had gone on to college, more and 
more Americans said they liked their society and believed 
its political system was honest, effective, and responsive. 
However, between 1965 and 1980, Watergate, the deep 
division over Vietnam that ended in ignominious defeat, the 
constant scandals, the perception of governmental 
incompetence on the one hand and intrusive governmental 
intervention on the other, the decline of real wages, and 
the end of the social contract, led to a crisis of 
confidence in the state. However, while they assigned 
material cause to the decline of legitimacy, ordinary 
Americans defined the symptoms of decline and the solutions 
to the problem in terms of exclusivity and of closed 
communication behavior. Lipset and Schneider (1987) 
identified the rise in discontent through a series of 
extensive interviews and questions. The authors noted that 
from 1964 to 1970, the percentage of Americans who felt 
that "the government is pretty much run by a few big 
interests looking out for themselves rather than for the 
benefit of all the people" increased from 29 to 50 percent 
(p. 16). Support for the comment "people like me don't 
have any say about what the government does" rose from 36 
percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 1978 (p. 16). When asked
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6the question "over the years, how much attention do you
feel the government pays to what the people think when it
decided to do something?" those citizens who responded "A
good deal of the time" declined from 32 percent in 1964 to
11 percent in 1974, and those responding "Not much"
increased from 24 percent in 1964 to 28 percent in 1974 (p.
24). The authors reported that in the fall of 1980, the
highest level of mistrust appeared with an average of 67
percent —  that is two out of every three Americans —  who
distrusted the government (p. 18).
Yankelovich (1977) provided similar data and arguments
regarding the distrust of the government by the public.
Yankelovich explained:
We have seen a steady rise of mistrust in 
our national institutions. Trust in government 
declined dramatically from almost 80 percent 
in the late 1950's to about 33 percent in 1976.
More than 80 percent of voters say they do not 
trust those in positions of leadership as much 
as they used to. In the mid-60's a one-third 
minority reported feeling isolated and distant 
from the political process; by the mid 1970's 
a two-thirds majority felt what they thought 
"really doesn't count." Approximately three 
out of five people feel the government suffers 
from a concentration of too much power in too 
few hands, and fewer than one out of five feel 
that congressional leaders can be believed.
(P- 2-3)
Voter Discontent
One index of discontent is silence; another index is 
withdrawal. Evidence of the voters feelings of 
powerlessness is documented by their absence from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7ballot box. From 1958 to 1992, voter turnout at the polls 
had steadily declined with only 50 percent of Americans of 
voting age casting a vote in the 1988 presidential election 
(Pear 1992, B4). Dionne (1991) opined that the distrust of 
government is so severe that Americans have grown to "hate 
politics":
Over the past three decades, the faith of the 
American people in their democratic institutions 
has declined, and Americans have begun to doubt 
their ability to improve the world through 
politics. Americans view politics with boredom 
and detachment. For most of us, politics is 
increasingly abstract, a spectator sport barely 
worth watching. Election campaigns generate 
less excitement than ever . . . Voters doubt 
that elections give them any real control over 
what the government does, and half of them 
don't bother to cast ballots, (p. 10)
The political system is viewed as causing more strife and
divisiveness then it solves. Dionne (1991) stated:
Americans hate politics as it is now practiced 
because we have lost all sense of the public good.
Over the last thirty years, politics has stopped 
being a deliberative process through which people 
resolved disputes, found remedies and moved forward, 
(p. 332)
Rising voter discontent over the past three decades has 
been caused by the belief that American political 
institutions are less competent then formerly believed. 
Voters believe that the government is not providing 
services with the resources it consumes. However, as 
incidents such as the increase in crime and violence in 
the country, the unstable economy, and the growing number 
of corrupt politicians increase, voters no longer believe
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that the political institution is looking out for their
good and making their lives better. The public wants a
political system that is committed to the public good.
Dionne (1991) explained: "In the 1990's Americans are
seeking a politics that restores a sense of public
enterprise and mutual obligation" (p. 334). Finally, the
unique American faith in problem solving seems abated.
Many no longer believe questions of race, poverty, and
social order will ever be "solved" or even meliorated.
The decline in public confidence of the government,
combined with voter apathy at the ballot box, has led many
scholars to argue that the American political system is
facing a legitimacy crisis of substantial proportions.
Lipset and Schneider (1987) argued that the crisis exists
as a result of a damaged system. The authors contend:
Implicit in the decline of public confidence is a 
potential crisis of legitimacy. Severe critics of 
the American system believe that the decline in 
public support for government is a manifestation of 
a much deeper loss of institutional legitimacy that 
has resulted from basic flaws in the structure of 
our society, (p. 375)
The major thinker who coined the phrase, Jurgen Habermas
(1973a), has argued that the United States government is
merely suffering from the common disease of the West, a
crisis of legitimacy. Earlier than most intellectuals,
Habermas linked the fragmentation of popular culture with
the seizure of governance by professional elites
(marketing, advertising, law, etc.) and the rise of mass
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communication as the triple pillars of the assault on 
legitimacy.
Dye (1990) noted that "legitimacy is a belief that a 
system of decision making is 'right,1 or 'proper,1 or 
'just,' and therefore, one is morally obligated to accept 
its decisions" (p. 3). Thus, if more and more American 
citizens see the political "system" of the United States as 
being uninterested in what the people think and that most 
politicians are self-serving, then they no longer believe 
the system is "right" or "just." Habermas (1984) explained 
that a "crisis suggests the notion of an objective power 
depriving a subject of part of his normal sovereignty" (p. 
134). His diagnosis of the American case follows: The
U.S. public views the government —  in conjunction with 
media consultants and political professionals —  as 
depriving them of their normal sovereignty —  a democratic 
system designed to be controlled by the people —  resulting 
in a legitimacy crisis for the American political system. 
Jeffersonian Myth
Much of our sense of what is right and good 
(legitimate) is embodied in our cultural myths. Those 
myths act as morals exemplars, embodying communed order in 
a form that is coherent and dramatic. Thus, this crisis 
can be understood in terms of the folk myth that undergirds 
the principles upon which the Constitution of the United 
States was drafted. The American public believes that they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
elect representatives to office who will serve as agents of
the community. The welfare and moral ethos of the people
is supposed to guide their decisions and may be withdrawn
periodically. Lipset and Schneider (1987) identified the
source of this mandate: "The great majority of Americans
still adhere to views that can be traced to the Founding
Fathers and to events surrounding the creation of the
Republic" (p. 5). Because of the extensive role of Thomas
Jefferson in the framing of the Declaration of
Independence, the myth of the Democratic process of
representation by the people is often referred to as
"Jeffersonian ideology." Thomas Jefferson's Agrarian myth
articulated the ideal political process. Citizen farmers
discuss local problems, frame them through their
spokesperson who takes them to Congress for further
deliberation and action. The citizen originates and
initiates while government reacts and serves. Koch (1976)
noted that Jeffersonian ideology is based upon "the
principle that ultimate power, decision, and control should
belong to the people" (p. 43). And it is the hallmark of
democracy that all power not ultimately located in or
delegated by the people is illegitimate. Peterson (1976)
further explained:
Its primary purpose [Democratic governance] 
was to secure individuals in their natural 
rights and thereby to liberate them for action 
in society . . . Government should be absorbed 
into society, becoming truly self-government.
(P. 20)
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Since the Constitution was framed, the Jeffersonian 
myth has created the expectation of a social contract 
between the people and the elected officials that the will 
of the people should dictate the public agenda. In recent 
decades, the public no longer believes that "their will" 
generates political action or that politicians even feel 
accountable to their needs. Consequently, the myth has been 
challenged, the social contract broken, and with it the 
weakening of institutional legitimacy.
Voters no longer feel assured that the government is 
an extension of their will, but they have become a resource 
base of an unaccountable government. However, despite this 
perception of a reversal of roles, the public still clings 
to a restoration of the myth. The original system remains 
the norm, yet despite its gold standard stature it is 
simply being ignored by corrupt and power hungry 
politicians. Lipset and Schneider (1987) explained: 
"Americans still believe in the legitimacy and vitality of 
the American system. What bothers the public is the 
apparent growth of concentrations of power and the cynical, 
self-interested abuse of power by government officials" (p. 
409). The power of the political system has corrupted the 
elected officials and made them an elite group of 
"insiders" who claim to know what the people need. Kateb 
(1984) noted: "In the background of the legitimacy crisis
is the theory of democratic elitism" (p. 185). Elected
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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officials become the elite, the insiders, who believe that 
democracy is best when many do not participate and the true 
democrats are the few upon whom democracy rests.
Ironically, voter apathy at the ballot box feeds the 
elitist theory. It also reduces the perception of 
legitimacy by reducing voter participation.
Political Rationality
The legitimacy crisis presents an exigence for any 
potential elected official, and especially for the 
presidential hopeful who must gain the trust of the 
American public. Candidates must achieve political 
legitimacy to pacify voter discontent. Political 
legitimacy is achieved when the candidate can establish a 
relationship with the electorate which demonstrates a 
commitment to the Jeffersonian myth. Barker (1990) 
explained: "Political legitimacy is defined as an
historically observable set of justified relationships 
rather than a normatively awarded status" (p. 29). The 
candidate must eschew the image of elitism and create the 
image of an amicable relationship. As Barker (1990) has 
opined, "The conduct of government cannot be separated, 
though it may be distinguished, from that of those who are 
governed. Legitimate government is a relationship between 
state and subjects" (p. 2). Political legitimacy is 
achieved, therefore, when the candidate can convince the 
electorate that he/she is one of the people and will uphold
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the social contract of the Jeffersonian myth. Candidates 
must also possess a working knowledge of the political 
system into which they wish to be elected. The candidate 
must possess the expert knowledge of the political elite, 
but must be able to convey that knowledge to the general 
public without appearing to be a member of the elite. That 
is, the candidate must attempt to educate and empower the 
public and he/she must elucidate terms of accountability 
(i.e. at what point will a goal be achieved or a need 
addressed?). The candidate must develop what I will call a 
discourse of "political rationality." I derive this term 
from previous research in which former politicians' 
abilities to communicate "expert" scientific information to 
the lay electorate has been referred to as "technical 
rationality3." This study of televised debates examines 
the merger of two similar principles —  the political 
expert, with the lay electorate. Thus the term "political 
rationality" is appropriate. Political rationality 
attempts to express the communication norms of the 
Jeffersonian myth, thereby attempting to restore political 
legitimacy for the candidate.
STUDY QUESTION
The subject of legitimacy predates Habermas. Like so 
many enduring concepts it was pioneered by the great
3See Farrell & Goodnight (1981), Fisher (1984), Gross 
(1984), McGee & Martin (1983), and Zagacki & King (1989).
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sociologist Max Weber*. Despite its long history, however, 
it appears to have assumed a special importance today. 
Although scholars like Kenneth Cmiel (1990) assert that 
political legitimacy has been declining through the rise of 
scientific elites and the populist attack on citizenship 
for more than 100 years, and while Richard Davis (1994) 
lays the blame on the media as recent destroyers of civic 
discourse, there is a growing scholarly consensus that 
political legitimacy (its apparent decline and its possible 
restoration) is a central issue of our time because it is 
probably a result of a vast congeries of causes and related 
as much to urbanization and economics as to perceived 
failure of political behavior.
I will argue in this dissertation that legitimacy, 
long a significant theme in American politics, achieved 
central importance in the 1992 election. So constant were 
messages concerning the loss of institutional legitimacy 
and promises of its restoration that legitimacy could be 
said to be the "representative anecdote" of the campaign.
In Kenneth Burke's (1945) typology, the promise of 
perceived legitimacy repeated in many contexts would form a 
"text" or an admonitory representative anecdote5. This
*See Weber, M. (1946). Politics as a vocation. (A
speech delivered at Munich University in 1918) In H. Gerth
(Trans), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York:
Oxford University Press. pp. 127-156.
5See Burke, K. (1945). Grammar of motives. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press. pp. 319-326.
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admonitory text would give us a warning and a call to 
return government accountability to the will of the people.
. Accordingly, this dissertation has taken as its 
central task the study of the rhetorical construction of 
legitimacy among the three principle candidates: Incumbent
(George Bush), Challenger (Bill Clinton) and Outsider (Ross 
Perot). The campaign created a hermeneutic struggle over 
the saliency and substance of the time. Further, a careful 
study of competing messages will tell much about the 
rhetorical skill of the candidates and, beyond that, the 
ways in which a dominant text affected the presentation of 
presidential image and the format and stylization of 
presidential issues.
I will argue the most economical way of studying the 
campaign text is through the televised presidential 
debates, a format seen by Kathleen Jamieson and James 
Birdsell as a vehicle through which civic discourse, having 
legitimacy, might be increased. The debates provide a 
unique opportunity to compare the legitimacy of rhetorical 
construction strategies of each candidate in a single 
forum. The debates also represent a direct clash of 
messages and ideas. The candidates are forced in the 
debates to define issues and give their fullest exposition 
of their positions. The debates also provide the most 
coherent look at the rival images of the candidates as well 
as insight into how direct conflict defines the candidates'
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
images. Finally, the debates allow for the distillation of 
each candidate's basic defining messages.
THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Unique Campaign
The 1992 presidential campaign warrants examination
because of the significant impact which the election had
upon the American political process. Unique campaign
events and fluid polls encouraged rhetorical experiments in
abundance in the 1992 election. First, an Independent
candidate, Ross Perot, who claimed that he was running for
the presidency only because he had been placed on the
ballot by the American people, dropped out of the race in
July, and returned to the race in October, just one month
prior to the election. While his actions would normally be
considered political suicide, Perot was still able to
collect 19 percent of the popular vote.
In addition to the Perot factor, the electorate
appeared both confused and disillusioned by their options.
Prysby and Scavo (1993) explained this disillusionment:
Public opinion polls conducted in June [of 1992] 
showed that none of the candidates was a clear 
favorite. Each of the three [candidates] had 
between one-fourth and one-third of the electorate 
preferring him, depending on the poll. At least 
one poll had Perot first and Clinton third while 
another poll had Clinton first and Bush last.
(P- 4)
Past Voting Trends
A prevailing scholarly portrait of the American voter
is that he/she is poorly informed and apathetic. In
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addition, voters are said to feel shut out of
participation. As in earlier elections, the prognosis for
voter turn out looked grim. According to Sundquist (1987)
the prior patterns of voter apathy could be accounted for
in this way:
About 38 percent of American citizens are 
"core" or regular voters for major national 
and state office; another 17 percent or so 
are marginals who come to the polls only when 
stimulated by the dramas of presidential 
campaign politics; and 45 percent are more 
or less habitual nonvoters, (p. 98)
Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) expressed similar concern
regarding voter apathy trends in former elections:
The United States hovers near the bottom when
its voter turnout is compared to that of other
developed countries . . .  In 1984, for example,
44.8 percent of the citizens of voting age 
opted to let others decide whether Mondale or 
Reagan would inhabit the White House in 1985.
(P- 178)
Pear (1992) noted that 50 percent of the electorate stayed
away from the election booth in 1988 (p. B4). But 1992 was
to be different. The legitimacy crisis became a central 
theme of campaign discourse, and perhaps because of this, 
the long term decline was reversed.
1992 Voter Turnout
Given the dissatisfaction of candidate choice by the 
electorate as early as June, combined with the history of 
low voter turn out, a prediction might have seemed 
justified that the 1992 presidential election would draw 
few voters to the ballot box. The exact opposite took
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place. As Pear (1992) observed, "55 percent of the voting 
age population cast a presidential ballot" ending a 30 year 
decline in presidential election voter turn out (p. B4).
An election which appeared headed for disaster at the 
ballot box, attracted voters quite successfully.
The large voter turn out placed Bill Clinton in the 
White House. Clinton won 43 percent of the popular vote to 
Bush's 38 percent and Perot's 19 percent (New York Times. 
November 5, 1992, p. B4). While Clinton "won" the 
election, Prysby and Scavo (1993) argued that his victory 
was slightly tainted when compared to the 1988 election 
where Dukakis lost the election but still carried 46 
percent of the popular vote. Political pundits are quick 
to cite the presence of Ross Perot as the reason for the 
low victory percentage. Post election polls, however, 
challenge this argument. A general election exit poll 
conducted on November 3, 1992 by Voter Research and Surveys 
indicated that the Perot voters would have split evenly 
between Clinton and Bush if Perot had not been in the race. 
Prysby and Scavo (1993) noted that if the vote for Clinton 
and Bush was recalculated as a percentage of the two-party 
vote (i.e. exclude the Perot vote) Clinton received 53 
percent of the two party vote to Bush's 47 percent6. The
6The authors note, however, that the electoral college 
vote count was more decisive. Clinton captured 370 of the 
538 electoral college votes. Bush won the remaining 168 
votes, as Perot failed to carry a single state, (p. 9)
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presence of Ross Perot in the election did not necessarily 
place Clinton in the White House as many political critics 
claimed.
The 1992 presidential election contained some of the 
most unique variables in U.S. presidential election 
history. The American voter went from dissatisfied with 
their choices, to engaging in the largest voter turn out in 
30 years for a presidential election. Of the many 
variables involved in this unique election, the televised 
presidential debates served as one of the most important 
influences in the entire election.
THE 1992 TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 
Influence Upon Voters
The 1992 televised debates had a significant impact 
upon the campaign efforts by each candidate. CBS election 
coverage on November 3, 1992 reported that of all the 
possible influences on voters decisions, the presidential 
debates were the most important element. Researchers 
Sandell, Mattley, Evarts, Langel, and Ziyati (1993) agreed 
with the findings in the CBS report. In their study of the 
impact of the 1992 debates upon the electorate, the authors 
reported that when asked what influenced their decision in 
selecting a candidate, the most often cited response by 
voters was the economy (the central focus of all three 
debates) with the second most mentioned influence being the 
actual debates (p. 16-17).
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The influence of the 1992 debates upon the overall 
election is quite noteworthy since the 1960 debates are the 
only, other series of televised presidential debates to 
receive similar recognition. While the full extent and 
exact role the 1960 debates played in the election are 
subject to dispute, Windt (1994) has claimed that "the 
belief that without the debates Kennedy could not have won 
has been firmly established" (p. 1). Neither the 1976, 
1980, 1984, nor the 1988 televised presidential debates 
have attracted similar notoriety.
Large Numbers of Voters Who Watched Debates
The 1992 televised presidential debates also received 
a great deal of attention from the electorate. According 
to Carmody (1992), there was a significant increase in 
debate viewers over past televised debates: the first 1992
debate was viewed by 81 million people and the second 
debate increased to 93 million viewers. This was a 
substantial increase over the 1988 debates where only 74 
million viewers watched the first debate, dropping down. to 
72 million viewers for the second debate (p. Dl, D3).
The viewers of the 1992 debates watched with a 
specific agenda. Since television had brought the election 
into their homes and had made the candidates more personal, 
the members of the electorate turned to personal character 
traits as the overriding criteria for candidate selection. 
Sandell et.al. (1993) noted that when asked what they were
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looking for in a candidate, voters leading response was 
personal qualities or attributes (p. 18). Winkler and 
Black (1993) explained that the most frequently mentioned 
reasons for determining winners . . .  of the [first]
October 11 presidential debate were confidence, presence, 
honesty and trustworthiness (p. 84). All of the mentioned 
criteria are personal character qualities and attributes. 
Russakoff and Morin (1992) argued the increased emphasis 
upon candidate character and personal attributes by the 
electorate when they provided one viewer's response to the 
debates as "I'd like a deep feeling in my heart that I 
could trust somebody - that the person I vote for, they'll 
do good for this country" (p. Al). The electorate was 
clearly looking for a candidate who was a human being first 
and a politician second. They wanted a president who would 
give them an "image of themselves." The centrality of the 
debates as a source of influence and the voter concern with 
trust argue for the importance this sample of discourse is 
as an object of analysis. First, they were the single most 
important source of voter information. Second, they 
contained appeals about the restoration of trust for an 
audience dispelled to seek out trust.
DEBATES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
Candidate Image
Candidate image has become the most powerful influence 
in presidential elections for two reasons: 1) public
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involvement in the election process, and 2) the g'rowing 
role of the media. Prior to 1832, members of the Electoral 
College were selected by members of Congress or elected 
through a state district plan. Since 1832, however, all 
members of the Electoral College have been elected by 
popular vote (McClure 1905). As a result, the Electoral 
College has become more reflective of the popular vote and 
has gradually changed the character of presidential 
campaigns. Since the president is elected by both the 
Electoral College and the popular vote, candidates must pay 
close attention to the desires of the people.
In addition to the influence of public involvement in 
the election process, the importance of candidate image has 
been affected by the growing role of the media. Media 
involvement in early presidential elections was limited to 
newspapers and periodicals. Campaign rhetoric was often 
printed in newspapers and debated by surrogates.
Presidential candidates seldom debated an opponent 
publicly, and were rarely seen by large numbers of people. 
The candidates platform and ideas were widely discussed 
without the candidate ever having met most of the general 
public. His communication behavior and personal style 
remained largely unknown. However, the introduction of the 
electronic media altered that focus. Campaign speeches 
over the radio brought a human voice and glimpses of his 
personality to the minds of each listener. As television
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usage increased in political campaigns, a candidate's 
physical characteristics affected the candidate's image for 
the public. When presidential debates made their way onto 
the television screen, candidate image quickly overshadowed 
even the most important campaign issues. Televised debates 
brought each presidential candidate directly into the homes 
of the electorate. Even the most politically uninformed 
person was now able to evaluate and assess each candidate 
on the one thing that most individuals felt confident in 
assessing, personality. Lanoue and Schrott (1991) 
explained:
In reality, [televised debate] viewers are 
far more likely to use debates to gain insight 
into each candidate's personality and character.
A superior 'personal' presentation appears to 
be more important to voters than accumulation 
of issue-oriented debating points, (p. 96)
Thus the old indices of issues and personal style were
reversed, a candidate's personality became an important
basis upon which the electorate determined whether or not
an individual was presidential material. Jamieson (1987)
argued that as a result of this media-driven shift in voter
priorities, the image of the candidate has become the
litmus test for most voters. The author explained:
"Speaker image becomes central to the assessment of viewer
response. So central in fact that one can say the
candidate image is the issue in the campaign, the one and
only criterion every American voter feels qualified to
apply" (p. 74). Consequently, as Ansolabehere, Behr, and
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Iyengar (1993) have argued, "a politicians' ability to 
govern is increasingly intertwined with his or her public 
image" (p. 125)
Candidate Personality
What are the constituents of the newly important 
image? As voters evaluate candidates based upon image, 
personality traits such as honesty, warmth, and caring 
become central criteria for candidate selection. Leo 
(1984) discovered that "the communication of 'warm 
feelings' is three to four times more powerful than 
traditional candidate preference criteria such as party 
identification or issues" (p. 37). The electorates' 
"feelings" dictate decisions. Keeter (1987) explained: 
"Citizens may be forced to 'vote by feeling' because they 
feel they lack adequate information in an atomized 
political system and the search for 'truth' becomes a 
search for 'trust'" (p. 356). Scholars see this focus on 
emotion and personality as signs of the pathology of 
discourse. If no attempt is made to educate the voter, the 
voter will not participate in a meaningful way. And there 
are other problems with image politics. Candidate "trust" 
can be quickly violated as the electorate discovers that 
political campaigns and political governance can be two 
different issues. What candidates say, or the image they 
portrayed to gain the trust of the electorate, can often be 
abandoned by candidates out of necessity to function within
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the political system to which they were elected. As a 
result, voters develop a distrust for the entire American 
political process, something very vital to the democratic 
system. Finally, excessively mediated communication will 
continue to keep them out of the process and even of 
expressing their alienation.
Viewers Opinions Of Winners And Losers
The results of the debates indicated that no single 
candidate was able to persuade the electorate that they 
were the consistent winner of all three debates. Table 1 
shows the discrepancy in whom viewers determined to be the 
winner of each debate (Hahn 1994 pp. 194-207).
TABLE 1
Debate 1 Debate 2 Debate 3
Clinton 30% 58% 28%
Bush 16% 16% 28%
Perot 47% 15% 37%
Perot was clearly perceived to be the winner of the first 
debate. Clinton, however, made a substantial jump in the 
polls to win the second debate. Bush was able to use the 
third debate to improve upon his rating from the first two 
debates. However, Bush still scored poorly in all three 
debates. If any conclusions can be drawn from the debate 
results, it is that Bush performed poorly in all three 
debates.
It is not, however, the purpose of this dissertation 
to determine the "winner" of the debates in any traditional
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sense. The debates are a particularly ideal format for 
studying legitimacy appeals. First, the campaign is 
comprehensive and offers a comparison of all three 
candidates across all major issues. Second, the campaign 
offers a distillation of the messages and hence of the 
primary legitimation strategies of the candidates. Third, 
the debate not only features explicit attempts at the 
restoration of legitimacy but the implicit appeals - those 
that are embedded in the exposition of issues, analysis of 
solutions, and the refutation of counter proposals by the 
candidates.
STUDY SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the results of a study of this 
nature are numerous. First, a better understanding of the 
contemporary meaning and experience of political legitimacy 
can be determined. Second, the status of the clash between 
expert and Jeffersonian dialogue can be determined. Third, 
the outcome of this struggle has important consequences for 
our political system and our image of America as a polity. 
Fourth, as a result of the validation and support of the 
methodological criteria used in the study, critics are 
provided with additional tools for assessing future 
televised debates. With a wider and much stronger 
repertoire of critical filters to use, researchers can 
better isolate and critique those variables unique to their 
specific study. The larger selection of filters will
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result in better and more complete studies of televised 
debates. As a result of better studies, a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of presidential elections 
will transpire.
Fifth, political pundits and consultants will have an 
increased knowledge base to work from when preparing future 
political candidates. Prior knowledge of what constitutes 
an effective debate in the minds of the electorate will 
allow campaign strategists to prepare candidates for those 
debates.
The final benefit of a study of this nature is that 
voters can become more critical and informed decision 
makers while engaging in the political process. The 
inoculation of the electorate regarding candidate 
strategies allows for greater listener discernment when 
watching televised debates. Increased knowledge in 
potential candidate tricks or event manipulation will allow 
the voter to have a better informed, much more intelligent 
assessment of the debate as well as the overall election 
process.
STUDY OUTLINE
Chapter one of this study has provided an overview of 
the current legitimacy crisis in the American political 
system. The use of "political rationality" as an ideal 
type of discourse reflecting Jeffersonian political 
ideology was described and argued to constitute a set of
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discourse categories through which the 1992 televised 
debates could be evaluated. The significance of the study 
was also argued.
Chapter two will explain the larger rhetorical form in 
which the appeals are elucidated. It will acquaint the 
reader with the rhetorical form in which the legitimacy 
appeals are embedded. Accordingly it will present a 
general overview of relevant scholarly literature regarding 
televised presidential debates. The literature which will 
be reviewed will include research regarding physical 
delivery, the effects of television coverage on debates, 
arguments that debates are not true debates, content 
analysis of several debates, and the formation of issues 
and images in televised debates.
Chapter three will provide a much more detailed 
examination of how televised debates function in 
presidential election campaigns and how their enactment is 
related to legitimacy. The expected nature of debates, the 
impact of debates upon elections, the effects of televised 
debates upon voters, the effects of journalist's comments 
on perceived debate outcome, the negative effects of 
debates upon political campaigns, and the overall effects 
of debates on elections will be reviewed.
Chapter four will outline a critical filter for this 
study based upon Habermas's theory of legitimacy crisis and 
its application to rhetoric. A set of legitimacy topoi,
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derived from Habermas' ideal speech situation, will be 
introduced and explained.
Chapter five will provide an analysis of the attempts 
at political rationality by the candidates in the 1992 
televised presidential debates in order to restore 
legitimacy.
Chapter six will evaluate the rhetorical constructs of 
legitimacy and determine its effects upon the 1992 election 
and its legacy for subsequent political elections.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have proposed a study of political 
rationality in the 1992 televised presidential debates.
This proposal was precipitated by an explanation of the 
significant influence which the 1992 televised debates had 
upon the 1992 presidential election. A brief 
outline/summary of each of the five chapters were presented 
to provide a brief theoretical overview of the study. 
Finally, several future benefits and contributions to 
political communication research resulting from this study 
were provided to identify the potential significance for a 
study of this nature. In the next chapter, I will review 
relevant literature regarding televised presidential 
debates. From this review, a framework for the study of 
televised presidential debates will be established.
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION
. As I noted in Chapter One, some scholars see the mere 
staging of debates as a step toward the restoration of 
legitimacy. Thus, it is important to situate this form in 
contemporary political discourse as an established genre 
before going on to analyze legitimacy appeals embedded in 
particular specimens of discourse. Further, before 
examining the 1992 televised presidential debates (a micro 
perspective), the role of televised debates in all 
presidential elections (a macro perspective) warrants 
attention. An understanding of the macro research, will 
provide the foundation for the proposed micro study.
Chapter two will review literature pertaining to televised 
debates as a genre. Chapter three will examine the effects 
debates have had upon past presidential elections.
Since 1960, televised presidential debates have 
attracted the attention of communication researchers from a 
wide variety of areas. In this review of literature, the 
areas of research have been categorized according to the 
following divisions: Physical Delivery, Role of Television
Coverage, The Debates as "Debates", Content Analysis, and 
Image-Issue formation. The research in each of the 
categories will be reviewed and interpreted with regards to 
their overall contribution to the understanding of
30
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televised presidential debates. The studies are 
predominately technical. That is, they are concerned with 
matters such as speaker effectiveness or audience 
retention. However, some studies are concerned with 
philosophical matters of governance. All in all, the 
literature provides a firm foundation for the present 
study, one that lies at the intersection of rhetorical 
practice and civic ideology.
PHYSICAL DELIVERY
Beginning with the 1960 televised presidential debates
between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, communication
scholars paid close attention to the effect of physical
delivery particularly as it related to dimensions of
competence and trust. Powell (1968) noted that Kennedy
spent a great deal of time working on his delivery skills
prior to the debate, taking voice and speaking lessons to
learn diaphragmatic breathing (p. 59). A skilled college
debater (Nixon 1978 p. 150) Nixon prepared for the debates
to a lesser extent. Speaking styles also received
attention. The works of Highlander & Watkins (1962)
represents an example of this research:
Nixon was more controlled in his style and 
delivery. Speaking at a slower rate than 
his opponent, Nixon did not strive 
deliberately for figurative style where 
Kennedy did. Nixon was sincere and 
straightforward, but not very inspiring.
Nixon spoke more directly to the cameras and 
thus had more eye-to-eye contact with the 
audience than did Kennedy. The men revealed 
their most observable and commented upon
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differences in the area of style and delivery.
Nixon was much more traditional in his manner 
of presentation, and both his style and 
delivery were smoother than Kennedy's.
Kennedy's style and delivery, however, 
effectively reinforced the image of vitality 
he presented, (pp. 46-47)
Tiemens (1978) stated that "the 'image' of Kennedy, 
projected by the medium [T.V.], was more influential in 
gaining him votes than what he said about the issues" (p. 
362). Thus, despite Nixon's attempt to be sincere and 
straightforward, Kennedy was able to convey a more 
youthful, vibrant image which may have assisted him in 
winning the overall election. Everyone knows the anecdote 
about Marshall McLuhan sensing that Nixon had lost because 
television had allowed the people to "see" the hunger for 
the office. In Jeffersonian ideology, the candidate should 
not hunger for the office, but be "called" to it. In 
Weber's terms, Nixon damaged his political legitimacy by 
displaying his careerism and personal ambition.
The debate over candidate delivery style and image 
have prompted some researchers to argue that the debates 
may actually do very little to promote a candidates 
position on a particular issue or inform the public about 
campaign concerns. According to Kraus (1962) the debates 
appeared to display more showmanship than statesmanship.
He concluded that "The results of the televised debate 
[Nixon/Kennedy] showed that voters were more interested in 
how the candidates looked than what they said" (p. 232).
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The emphasis upon physical delivery and appearance have 
lead other researchers to suggest that Nixon's alleged loss 
to Kennedy in the first televised debate was attributed to 
Nixon having a "five o'clock shadow" (Tiemens 1978, p.
362) .
Whether or not a single physical feature or delivery 
style allowed Kennedy to win any or all of the televised 
debates between the two candidates and place him in the 
White House is uncertain. What is more certain, however, 
is that the 1960 televised debates set a precedent for 
separating image and issue, a breech that has been healed 
since then. Analysts separated the candidates' image from 
their issues. Nimmo (1970) declared that "They [1960 
debates] were not arguments on issues, but confrontations 
of images . . . what the candidates say is less significant 
than how they look. Style, not content, prevails" (p.
159).
After reviewing the 1960, 1976, and 1980 televised 
debates, Martel (1983) maintained that even something as 
simple as a candidate's smile "is important in 
communicating confidence, control, and friendliness and 
that smiles . . . contributed to Kennedy's success against 
Nixon in 1960"(p. 83). A dichotomy developed between 
delivery and content. While critics indicted the 1960 
debates for initiating the emphasis upon delivery over 
content in a presidential campaign, candidates subsequently
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echoed the same criticism. Richard Nixon's (1978)
complaint is characteristic:
I doubt that they [televised debates] can 
ever serve a responsible role in defining the 
issues of a Presidential campaign. Because 
of the nature of the medium [of television] 
there will inevitably be a greater premium 
on showmanship than on statesmanship, (p. 221)
The 1980 televised debates between President Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan evoked similar criticism regarding
the candidates' physical delivery as did the 1960 debates.
Upon examination of content, delivery, the voters
perceptions of the candidates, and the eventual outcome of
the election, Berquist and Golden (1981) drew a Mcluhanesq
conclusion:
The [1980] presidential debates were electronic 
media events in which a speaker's delivery, 
appearance, and overall manner —  as filtered 
through the television screen —  proved to be more 
important than substance, (p. 132)
Researchers have routinely reported the predominance of
ethos and pathos over logic. Martel (1983) argued that
Reagan's smile in the debates "communicated confidence,
control, and friendliness and played a large role in
Reagan's strong performances over Carter" (p. 83).
Studies evaluating the importance of kinesics,
gestures and oral style have continually reinforced
previous assumptions concerning the importance of physical
delivery in the debates. In the 1984 debates, the
nonverbal communication of emotions and feelings played a
decisive role in audience response. Shields and MacDowell
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(1987) examined the display of emotions, or emotional 
behavior, in a political debate and concluded that affect 
is a key ingredient in the success or failure of a 
political candidate. Masters, Sullivan, Lanzetta, McHugo,
& Englis (1986) examined the role of a political leader's 
facial displays as determinants in rallying public support. 
They argued that a political leader's ability to display 
facial emotions of warmth, sincerity, caring, and kindness 
were crucial to that candidate's success.
In the 1984 televised presidential debates, Ronald 
Reagan appeared far more successful than Walter Mondale in 
communicating the appropriate emotions. Masters, Sullivan, 
Feola, and McHugo (1987) noted that "Mondale was 
ineffective in communicating warm, reassuring reactions 
through his facial displays during the debates" (p. 121). 
Sullivan and Masters (1988) extended Masters, et. al. 
argument by claiming that "Mondale's displays of warmth and 
reassurance produced less favorable reactions in [debate] 
viewers than did those of Reagan" (p. 345).
Additional studies have elaborated upon the role of 
physical delivery by Mondale and Reagan in the 1984 
televised debates as a means of communicating emotions and 
feelings to elicit a particular response from debate 
viewers. Researchers Patterson, Churchill, Burger, and 
Powell (1992) reported that debate viewers who claimed that 
Mondale lost the debates argued that Mondale was less
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expressive [emotionally] and less physically attractive.
The study also claimed that Reagan possessed the greatest 
advantage in terms of communicating the proper emotions 
nonverbally. The authors further argued that the nonverbal 
cues administered by the candidates contributed more 
significantly to viewers interpretation of who won or lost 
the debates. Reagan emerged as the most successful 
candidate in conveying warm feelings through nonverbal cues 
and was more often declared the winner of the debates.
Leo (1984) interviewed subjects after they had watched 
the debates and found that the communication of "warm 
feelings" was three to four times more powerful than 
traditional candidate preference criteria such as party 
identification or issues. Additionally, Researchers 
Husson, Stephen, Harrison, and Fehr (1988) attempted to 
discover what major issues acted as preferences when 
selecting a candidate. The authors discovered that the 
candidate's interpersonal communication skills predicted 
candidate preference after observing the debates. Reagan 
was able to nonverbally communicate a more positive 
interpersonal image and was preferred by most subjects as 
the winner of the debate. Finally, Jamieson (1988) argued 
that Reagan's victory on election day was closely tied to 
his televised debate victories. In the debates, Jamieson 
noted that Reagan's speaking style communicated important 
relational messages concerning trust, affection, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
similarity. Later scholars, however, have tended to 
conflate image and ideological positions, noting that the 
personality of a candidate is a better predictor of action 
than issues which are fleeting. Bruce Gronbeck and Ted 
Windt have been zealous in exploding the issue/image 
dichotomy.
The 1988 televised presidential debates generated
little research in terms of the physical delivery of the
candidates. However, the research which was conducted
centered upon each candidate's ability to use his delivery
skills to portray himself as a "likeable" person. Oft-Rose
(1989) stated that "It is easy to say that likability was
important to the voters in the 1988 debates" (p. 197). The
author further claimed that likability was situational and
fluctuating. It was a "thin" perception, based on observed
communication behavior:
Although Dukakis seemed more at ease during 
the first debate, it was Bush who appealed 
most to the audience in the second debate 
through the use of active and natural body 
movement and gestures, and a style of delivery 
that was enthusiastic and calm. (p. 197)
Stengel (1988), writing in Time magazine, also noted Bush's
ability to use his nonverbal skills to create a "likeable"
persona by debate viewers. His view reflected the popular
conception that the ersatz and the real are one and the
same in a carefully orchestrated campaign: "Although most
watchers of the first presidential debate said the debate
was a draw or gave the slight edge to Dukakis, it should be
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noted that Bush was rated more likeable by the same voters 
who gave the win to Dukakis, (p. 20)
Pfau and Kang's (1991) study of relational messages in 
the 1988 debates produced similar data regarding candidate 
likability. The authors found that the candidate's smile 
played a large role in whether or not the candidate was 
liked by the debate observer. Most subjects preferred 
Bush's smile and therefore found him more likeable. These 
same subjects claimed that Bush had won the debate they 
observed.
Finally, d a y m a n  (1992) discovered that in the 1988 
debates, the candidate who possessed the ability to 
generate the most applause was usually determined the 
winner of the debate. Further, the candidate who could 
generate the most applause turned out to be the most 
likeable candidate.
To date, no research has been generated from the 1992 
televised presidential debates regarding physical delivery. 
The studies regarding the effect of physical delivery on 
the outcome of televised presidential debates have ranged 
from Richard Nixon's "five o'clock shadow" to George Bush's 
smile. Whatever the specific physical component under 
examination, there is consensus among researchers that 
televised debates have increased the importance of a 
candidate's ability to "appear" to be the better candidate 
in order to win an election.
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EFFECTS OF TELEVISION COVERAGE
At first, the 1960 televised presidential debates were 
welcomed as a way of allowing the entire nation to watch 
candidates clash over election issues side by side.
However, as post 1960 debate research began to indicate, 
the television medium also introduced an increased 
awareness of delivery and appearance of the candidates by 
the viewing and voting public. This new awareness led 
political pundits and researchers to fear that televised 
debates might hurt American presidential campaigns more 
than help them.
The 1976 televised debates generated a great deal of 
research regarding the overall effect of television as a 
medium upon the debates. After examining the editing 
choices made by the television director of shot-by-shot 
decisions in the 1976 debates between Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter, researchers Messaris, Eckman, and Gumpert (1979) 
argued that "the televised versions of the three debates 
presented an image of direct, explicit conflict which was 
an exaggeration of the state of affairs of the live event" 
(p. 359). The authors contended that the editor's 
decisions regarding camera angles appeared to be made with 
the specific intent of creating a more entertaining show 
for television viewers. Thus debates made matters of 
degree seem like deep divisions, not a healthy expression
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of systematic legitimacy, and a condition that depended on 
commonly respected public virtue.
Tiemens (1978) argued that not only did the camera 
angles and shots fabricate tension and conflict but that 
the pictorial treatment of the candidates [which candidate 
had more "positive" angles and eye contact] tended to favor 
Carter. Consequently, due to the visual composition, 
camera angle, and screen placement, Gerald Ford was unable 
to maintain as much eye contact with the cameras as Carter. 
The importance of maintaining constant and consistent eye 
contact with the television camera was established by Davis 
(1978). Upon surveying subjects who had watched the 
debates, Davis found that the candidate whom the viewer 
believed maintained the most eye contact with the camera 
(and thus the television viewing audience) was also the 
candidate whom the viewers declared to be the winner of the 
debate.
While the use of television as a medium was accused of 
creating conflict which did not exist in the 1976 debates, 
television was criticized for the opposite effect in the 
1980 presidential debates between President Jimmy Carter 
and Ronald Reagan. After conducting an extensive visual 
analysis of the Carter-Reagan debate, Tiemens, Hellwig, 
Kipper, and Phillips (1985) argued that "the restrictions 
upon the event itself and the television medium through
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which it was transmitted contributed very little toward 
establishing any confrontational results" (p. 42).
The role of television in the debates however, was 
credited with providing Reagan an edge in the debate and 
therefore the election. Blankenship, Fine, and Davis 
(1983) argued that television camera angles, shots, and the 
debate commentators all favored Reagan. The authors 
reported that various medium effects such as camera angles 
portrayed Reagan in a more positive light. The study 
cataloged numerous examples during Reagan's speeches.
Carter was usually missing from view. However, during 
Carter's speeches, Reagan could be seen on the television 
screen in the background, sometimes in cinematic reaction 
shots. This visual edge allowed Reagan more "air time" as 
well as the opportunity to respond nonverbally to Carter's 
statements in a way with which Carter was not provided.
The authors contended that this type of media manipulation 
made Reagan the central focus of the debate and ultimately 
of the election.
In the 1984 televised debates between Walter Mondale 
and Ronald Reagan, Morello (1988a) examined the visual 
syntax of the debates as a factor in the perception of 
clash. His findings were similar to those of the 1980 
studies. Television angles and visuals used in the debate 
cxearly favored Reagan over Mondale, again placing the 
central focus of the debate, and the election, upon Reagan.
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Morello also noted that the visual structuring of the 
debates made Reagan appear to have more "clash" in his 
responses, when Mondale was the candidate who actually 
expressed more verbal conflict and ideological differences
(p. 286).
In the 1988 televised debates between George Bush and 
Michael Dukakis, television angles and shots were found to 
have other unexpected consequences. Television shot 
sequences were found to fabricate debate content which did 
not exist. Morello (1992) examined the visual structuring 
of arguments in the debates and found that the certain 
television shot sequences were employed by the camera 
directors in order to "visualize" the clash transpiring in 
the debate. Upon concluding his study, Morello argued that 
television camera angles misrepresented the incidences of 
verbal clash in the debate, gave preference to ad hominem 
attacks as a verbal cue to cut to a reaction shot of the 
other candidate, and offered opportunities for nonverbal 
refutation of opposing arguments unfairly for one candidate 
over another.
The various studies conducted concerning the role of 
television upon the effect and outcome of presidential 
debates has drawn much criticism from communication 
researchers. Given their historic bias toward logic, 
evidence and issues, and their relative innocence about 
non-verbal behavior, this is not surprising. Traditional
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rhetors, Berquist and Golden (1981), were typical critics
of televised presidential debates. Noting the increase in
the importance of delivery over content in the debates
[reviewed earlier in this chapter] the authors were
unsparing: "Presidential debates are electronic media
events in which a speaker's delivery, appearance, and
overall manner —  as filtered through the television screen
—  proved to be more important than substance" (p. 132).
Berquist and Golden concluded their essay by arguing that
"television and the media have contaminated presidential
debates" (p. 137).
Morello (1988b) examined the visual structuring of the
1976 and 1984 televised presidential debates and argued
that "the shot pacing was substantially quicker in 1984"
and appeared to change at critical junctures in the debate
(p. 242). From his research, Morello argued that something
as simple as shot pacing contaminated the presidential
debates because
the changes potentially interfered with the 
comprehension of verbal content of the debates, 
undermined the political purpose of the 
encounters, and promoted unequal visual 
treatment of the candidates, (p. 243)
Jamieson (1987) expressed additional concern regarding 
the potential damaging effect which television can bring to 
a presidential debate. Since television clearly places a 
greater emphasis upon delivery over substance, Jamieson 
opined that "voters can be seriously misled by the
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nonverbal communication on which television dotes and 
toward which viewers involuntarily gravitate" (p. 32).
Pfau and Kang (1991) echoed Jamieson's concerns in 
their study on the impact of relational messages in 
televised debates by noting that television shaped what was 
being communicated to viewers. Since television was able 
to control variables such as viewers access to facial cues 
—  which actually had the ability to influence viewers 
perceptions of who won the debate —  the authors criticized 
television for creating a new "eloquence of style" required 
of all presidential hopefuls (p. 117).
In recent years, critics have continued to level 
criticism regarding the negative effects which television 
has brought to presidential debates. Hellwig, Pfau, and 
Brydon (1992) have contended that the visual component of 
television communication continues to dwarf the verbal 
dimension. Their study denigrates televised presidential 
debates as nothing more than looks and image, a dumb show 
lacking significant content.
Finally, researchers Donsbach, Brosius, and 
Mattenklott (1993) identified differences between observing 
a speech in person versus observing a debate or speech on 
television. The author's argued that the differences are 
so vast that television drastically effects the viewing of 
political activities such as debates and creates an
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entirely new medium which candidates must prepare for and 
cater to.
Presidential debates were originally created to inform 
voters regarding candidates positions on crucial issues 
effecting the nation. Prior to 1960 that objective was 
probably accomplished quite often. However, with the 
introduction of the television camera in the 1960 debates, 
presidential debates were redefined and became more public 
spectacle and entertainment then a political dialogue.
DEBATES NOT TRUE DEBATES
Due to the redefining nature of television, televised 
presidential debates have been criticized by debate 
researchers as lacking the characteristics of a true 
"debate." Time constraints, debate moderators, and 
television producers' desire to provide "entertainment" 
have created a "format" for the debates which does not 
allow for any real debating. Halberstam (1981) noted that 
Richard Salant, vice-chairman of the Board at NBC, had 
candidly remarked: "Because of the format of television,
we go [with a debate format] with attacks and 
counterattacks. And because we go with them, that usually 
means we get them" (p. 8). Due to the industry guided 
debate format, televised presidential debates have become 
regarded as being anything but debates. Auer (1981) 
supported this criticism: "The formats of the debates make
them anything but a debate" (p. 21).
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Highlander and Watkins (1962) noted that the debate
formats used in the 1960 debates for the sake of television
placed severe limitations upon the candidates as debaters.
Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) not only echoed this criticism
but provided specific examples of how the format hindered
each candidate. In summary, the authors noted:
The question-and-answer format [often used in 
televised debates to involve special guest 
panelists or audience members] is not conducive 
to substantive debate. The structure places 
irreconcilable demands on the candidates.
(P- 165)
Jamieson and Birdsell argued that Richard Nixon, having had 
extensive intercollegiate debate experience, was a much 
better and a more skilled debater than Kennedy. 
Consequently, Nixon approached the 1960 debates as debates 
and tried to act like a debater and lost as a would-be 
president.
As the inaugural televised presidential debates, the 
1960 debates between Kennedy and Nixon have often been 
referred to as "The Great Debates" (Krauss 1962). However, 
after examining the structure, format, and presentation of 
the 1960 debates, Kerr (1961) argued: "The 1960 'Great
Debates' were neither 'great' nor 'debates'" (p. 9)7. The 
author claimed that the debates were superficial, that they 
substituted personality for serious examination of issues, 
and that the format forced candidates to shift rapidly from
7See also Seipmann (1962) for similar arguments.
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one question to another without providing them an 
opportunity to state fully their perspective. At the time, 
the author also suggested that future televised debates 
develop a format which would allow candidates to confront 
one another more directly. Auer (1962) went so far as to 
call the 1960 debates the "Counterfeit Debates" and titled 
his critical essay by that title. Reiterating the numerous 
criticisms regarding the contamination of political debates 
by television, Highlander and Watkins (1962) complained: 
"The 'Great Debates' of 1960 were better television shows 
than they were well developed and significant discussions 
of vital issues [affecting the presidency] between 
candidates" (p. 48).
Unfortunately, calls for a better "debating" format in 
future debates went unheeded in the next televised debates, 
in 1976. Once again, television production dictated the 
format and the debates were heavily criticized. In his 
review of the 1976 Carter-Ford debates, Salant (1979) 
argued "The 1976 debates were not debates any more than the 
Kennedy-Nixon 'events' in 1960 were debates. They [1976 
debates] were nothing more than joint interviews" (p. 175). 
Bitzer and Rueter (1980) claimed that the use of panelists, 
journalists, and moderators in the 1976 debates created a 
format which suffocated productive inquiry and created 
nothing more than an interview environment. Frustrated 
with the lack of any real discussion, the authors borrowed
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Auer's 1962 term and titled their book Carter vs. Ford:
The "Counterfeit" Debates of 1976. Meanwhile, Tiemens,
Hellweg, Kipper, and Phillips (1985) concluded:
The degree and intensity of confrontation 
[in the debate] was unquestionably minor . . . 
there is no question that lack of confrontation 
in the debate was attributed in part to the 
format. The Carter-Reagan debate was highly 
structured, giving no opportunity for direct 
confrontation, (pp. 40-41)
To support their criticisms, the authors provided the
following example of what happened in the 1980 debate to
prevent a real debate from taking place:
The restrictive nature of the format was 
clearly illustrated when Reagan addressed a 
question to Carter: "I would like to ask the
President why it is inflationary to let the 
people keep more of their money and spend it 
the way they'd like, and it isn't inflationary 
to let them take that money and spend it the 
way he wants?" At this point, the moderator,
Howard K. Smith, interrupted with "I wish that 
question need not be rhetorical, but it must 
be, because we've run out of time on that.
Now, the third question . . . "  (p. 41).
In a similar study examining the absence of opportunities
for Carter and Reagan to engage in direct clash and
confrontation, Rowland (1986) argued that the structure and
format of the 1980 debates prevented the event from being a
debate.
The controversy over debate format became a central 
issue in the 1992 presidential campaign. Gersh (1993) 
reported that two months before the election, Bush and 
Clinton had not yet agreed to a format for a debate (p.
18). Since the candidates could not reach an agreement on
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a format in a timely fashion, the first scheduled debate 
was forced to be cancelled.
Confrontation is fundamental to debate. Contrasting 
ideologies and personalities, traditional elements of true 
debate, can only be revealed through the exercise of 
confrontation between participants. Due to the need for 
fairness in representation, the role of moderators, the 
presentation of questions from guest panelists and audience 
members, time constraints, and other format constraints, 
televised presidential debates have become anything but 
debates. To researchers, televised presidential debates 
become nothing more than what Ranney (1979) referred to as 
"televised joint appearances" (p. vii), or what Drucker
(1989) called "electronic public space" (p. 7).
CONTENT ANALYSIS STUDIES 
Researchers have attempted to evaluate the contents of 
televised presidential debates to assess possible 
rhetorical styles or patterns. This type of scholarship 
has proven problematic in that no two debates have ever 
been the same. The six presidential campaigns which have 
included televised debates have always involved different 
opponents and each campaign has addressed different issues.
In the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates, Samovar (1962) 
argued that the candidates' statements during the debates 
consisted largely of ambiguous and unequivocal passages.
The candidates merely reinforced previously known positions
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on particular issues. When new issues were raised in the 
debate, the candidates responded with ambiguous or vague 
answers which allowed them to avoid taking a public 
position on a new issue. In a follow-up study, Samovar 
(1965) reiterated the presence of ambiguity on significant 
topics to an extent that threatened the perception of clear 
differences between candidates.
Rowland (1986) challenged the conventional wisdom 
regarding the content of the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate. He 
noted that the 1980 debate had been criticized by 
commentators who believed that Reagan's style defeated 
Carter’s substance in the debate. Formerly, critics had 
accused the media of catering to Reagan's "on camera" style 
and strengths in order to cover up for his poor substance. 
However, after an extensive analysis of the text, Rowland 
concluded that Reagan, not Carter, won the debate on the 
issues.
Other researchers have examined the content of 
televised debates and have provided a wide variety of data. 
Mortensen (1968) noted that content analysis of several 
debates revealed sharp differences between political 
telecasts which simply employ a rally format and those in 
which the candidate faces a panel of questioners. This 
finding reinforces previously reviewed research regarding 
the contaminating effects which the televised debate 
formats have upon the actual debate.
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Pfau and Kenski's (1990) study across several debates 
revealed a large number of "attack messages." Candidates 
spent a considerable part of the debate attacking their 
opponent rather than providing concrete answers to 
questions directed at them or clarifying positions on 
various issues. The authors noted that "these 'attack 
messages' were negative in focus and were designed to call 
attention to an opponent's weakness" (p. 25).
Murphy (1992) argued that it is very difficult to 
isolate any particular rhetorical style or content as 
indigenous to any single debate. Thus in order to 
understand the full political and rhetorical significance 
of any presidential debate, the contest must be studied 
within the rhetorical context created by previous campaign 
discourse. Murphy explained that "the arguments candidates 
use may reflect underlying traditions of discourse, such as 
populism or progressivism, that influence ongoing social 
disputes" (p. 228).
Jackson-Beeck and Meadows (1979) provided some of the 
most successful research regarding the study and/or 
analysis of presidential debate content. After examining 
the contents of the 1960 and 1976 televised presidential 
debates, the authors developed a fourfold scheme for 
classifying communication content including both verbal and 
nonverbal dimensions. The scheme consists of the following 
criteria: Speech content 1. Includes manipulated verbal
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messages; 2. Sometimes entails unintentional message 
transmission; 3. reflects unconscious use of speech; and 
4. May occur nonverbally (pp. 324-325). Using this method, 
the four types of communication content could be analyzed 
one-by-one or in combinations to arrive at a more extended 
treatment of debate content data.
ISSUES AND IMAGES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 
AND TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Candidate issue positions and image formation serve as 
the best determinants of electorate decision making in a 
presidential election. As Joslyn (1984) explained: 
"numerous studies have found issue positions and candidate 
images to be two equally important predictors of voting 
behavior" (p. 36). Weiss (1981) argued that in political 
debates "issues and images are a practical fact overlooked 
and . . . they intertwine in all manner of convolutions and 
mutually affect one another in countless ways" (p. 22). 
Weiss named this mutual relationship as the "issue-image 
interface."
Issues
Issues in a presidential campaign are identified by 
the electorate on two levels. For many voters, the first 
level of Issue assessment involves party affiliation and 
perceived incumbent success. Researchers Edwards (1990), 
Jacoby (1990), Kenski (1992), Lodge & Hamill (1986), Sears
(1990), and Squire & Smith (1988) argued that while 
[political] party identification has declined since the
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mid-sixties, it is still a potent factor in voter decision
making. Party members tend to absorb party positions on
various issues. Kenski, Walkosz, and Reichert (1993) noted
that "partisanship is not only important in campaigns, but
later in the White House itself" (p. 8). If the Republican
Party has taken a particular position on an economic issue,
then the electorate from that party will generally
subscribe to a similar position. However, when the
Republican candidate is elected into office, that candidate
will be expected to fulfill the party's promise. In the
next presidential election the incumbent's ability to
identify with issue fulfillment will become a major factor
in the incumbent's re-election. Elliot (1989) explained:
Voters make voting decisions on the basis of 
a general assessment of the party performance 
of the party in power. If, on a set of salient 
issues, the assessment is positive, voters 
will tend to support that party. If the 
assessment is negative, they will support the 
opposition, (p. 8)
To this argument Wattenberg (1991) added:
For presidential incumbents it is not issues 
per se but rather voter perception about 
presidential performance on issues that is 
the single most important voter consideration. 
Perceptions of a president's policies may be 
the primary basis upon which voters decide 
whether they approve of his performance, (p. 141)
In a televised presidential debate where an incumbent is
involved, an effective attack by a challenger would be to
address the performance of the incumbent regarding party
goals.
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After decision making based upon partisanship, the
next level of issue consideration for the electorate
involves specific types of issues. Stokes and Dilulio
(1993) noted:
The two kinds of issues that matter in 
presidential elections are position issues 
and valence issues. A position issue is one 
on which the rival parties or candidates reach 
out for the support of the electorate by 
taking different positions on a policy question 
that divides the electorate. Valence issues 
are issues in which voters distinguish parties 
and candidates not by their real or perceived 
difference in position on policy questions 
but by the degree to which they are linked in 
the voters' minds with conditions, goals, or 
symbols that are almost universally approved 
or disapproved by the electorate. (pp. 6-7)
Abortion or Health Care is a prime example of a position
issue. The electorate will identify with a candidate who
has taken a position on abortion which is consistent with
the party's position on abortion. The electorate may have
already identified with a particular party because of that
party's position on the issue. The candidate will be
expected to support that position and will thus gain the
support of like-minded voters.
The economy would be an example of a valence issue. A
challenger would have an opportunity to link poor economic
conditions with the incumbent's performance in office,
while being somewhat vague about potential and painful
policy remedies.
In the 1992 election, it would be the electorate's
dissatisfaction with the economy which the Democrats were
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able to blame upon the Bush administration and the
Republican party's handling of the economy for the past 
twelve years.
Issues are very important to voters. However, the 
importance of certain issues has varied from election to 
election and from study to study. Conover and Feldman
(1989) argued that domestic [economic, race, social issues] 
and foreign affair issues were key factors. However, 
researchers Jacoby (1990), Kinder, Adams, & Gronke (1989), 
Kenski (1992) and Lockerbie (1989) all identified various 
socioeconomic issues as key considerations in the voting 
booth.
While every presidential campaign has addressed 
specific issues, the introduction of televised debates has 
made issue consideration more prominent in voters' 
decisions. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) explained: 
debate increases the likelihood that a candidate will take 
a specific stand on an issue, and will specify the ways in 
which goals would be reached" (p. 128). With a challenger 
able to cross examine and press another candidate on a 
particular issue on television in front of millions of 
viewers, candidate commitment to issues is heightened 
allowing for increased voter knowledge. As the electorate 
becomes more informed, candidate issue position becomes 
much more important in the election.
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Elliot (1989) identified the various issues affecting 
voting behavior in presidential elections involving 
televised debates from 1976 to 1988 (pp. 38-116). Table 1 
identifies Elliot's findings:
TABLE 1
Year Issue
1976 Inflation, Crime, Unemployment
1980 Inflation, Iran, Unemployment, Defense
1984 Budget Deficit, Unemployment, Fear of War
1988 Budget Deficit, Trade Deficit, Economy
In the 1992 presidential election, Bush focused upon his 
foreign policy exploits during the previous four years, 
while Clinton and Perot both focused upon the economy. The 
electorate cared little about foreign affairs and were more 
concerned about issues such as how to pay their medical 
bills. The issue of the economy had appeared in every 
presidential campaign since 1976, yet as Hahn (1994) noted 
"Bush stated 5 times in the first debate [alone] that the 
economy was 'not that bad'" (p. 191). Hahn also explained 
that Bush's emphasis on foreign policy made him appear as 
if he did not care about the general electorate, something 
both Clinton and Perot targeted. The economy became a 
central issue in the 1992 election and Bush's apparent 
insensitivity towards it contributed to his demise.
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Images
In addition to campaign issues, candidate image plays 
an equally, if not more, important role in voter decision 
making. Barber (1985) explained: "voters don't vote for
issues, but for people" (p. 139). Windt (1994) stated a 
similar position: "it should be remembered that in any
presidential campaign the central issue is leadership . . . 
People vote for a person, not a set of policy statements" 
(p. 7). Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) also noted: "when
asked what they liked and disliked about presidential 
contenders . . . the American public reported that they 
liked such personal traits as warmth, honesty, or 
intelligence" (p. 140). The qualities described are the 
traits of a good human being but not necessarily the traits 
of a good politician. A candidate's image must convey him 
as being a quality human being who is able to do the job. 
Ansolabehere, Behr, & Iyengar (1993) added that "the 
politician's ability to govern is increasingly intertwined 
with his . . . public image" (p. 125). The President of 
the United States is the highest position in this country 
and has generally fostered a great deal of respect. Past 
Presidents were held in high regard and assumed to possess 
integrity. However, events in the past fifty years such as 
the Watergate scandal have created a cloud of suspicion to 
hang over the Oval office. The electorate has become 
concerned with the type of person they are placing into
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that office. Quite often when assessing character, voters
have little to rely upon other than their gut feelings.
Keeter (1987) identified the potential struggle which this
conundrum can create for the electorate by noting that
"citizens may be forced to 'vote by feeling1 because they
feel they lack adequate information in an atomized
political system . . . [and] the search for 'truth' becomes
a search for 'trust'" (p. 356).
Televised presidential debates provide the forum
through which many voters can develop their "gut feeling"
about a candidate. Keeter (1987) explained: "television
provides the candidate as a person" (p. 345) rather than a
politician. How the candidate acts and responds under
pressure can reveal numerous "signals" to the electorate as
to the type of person the candidate is. Lanoue and Schrott
(1991) explained:
Viewers are far more likely to use debates to gain 
insight into each candidate's personality and 
character . . .  A superior "personal" presentation 
appears to be more important to voters than 
accumulation of issue-oriented debating "points."
(P. 96)
The use of televised debates by the electorate to 
evaluate a candidate's image is easily identified. After 
examining the 1980 televised debates between Ronald Reagan 
and Jimmy Carter, Martel (1983) contended that "Reagan's 
television personality was so warm and humane that Carter 
could not make his anti-Reagan charges believable" (p. 49). 
Leon (1993) noted that in the 1992 televised debates "the
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analysis of each candidate’s character [by the electorate 
in the debates] showed that Bush could not do what a 
president was supposed to do as well as the other 
candidates" (p. 100).
Several researchers have concurred that personal 
traits are the most important [criteria] in the decisions
ft
made by voters . Voters watch and assess candidates and 
attempt to determine what type of person the candidates 
are. The specific character qualities and traits which are 
important vary from voter to voter. However, numerous 
studies have found that voters organize their thoughts into 
broad categories of schema9. Wattenberg (1991) has 
assessed the studies regarding voter schema and noted that 
"personality evaluations of presidential candidates has 
clustered on the factors of competence, integrity, 
reliability, charisma, and personal attributes" (p. 8)
Trent and Friedenberg (1991) identified several image 
strategies that can be employed in a political debate in 
order to foster the schema identified by Wattenberg. The 
authors identified three crucial strategies:
8See Conover & Feldman (1989), Downs, Raid, & Ragan
(1990), Fiske (1982), Gopoian (1982), Graber (1987), Graber
(1992), Kinder (1978), Kinder (1986), Kinder, Peters, 
Abelson, & Fiske (1980), Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk 
(1986), and Sullivan & Masters (1988).
9See Kinder (1978), Kinder (1986), Kinder, Peters, 
Ableson, & Fiske (1980), Lau & Sears (1986), Lodge & Hamill
(1986), Milburn (1991), Miller (1990), Miller, Wattenberg,
& Malanchuk (1986), and Squire & Smith (1988).
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The principle image strategies that can be 
utilized in political debating include 
development of a leadership style, personi­
fication, and identification. Political 
figures can develop an activist leadership 
style or a passive leadership style. The 
activist is just that. In a debate, activists 
consistently refer to their actions, their 
initiatives, their effect on events. Passive 
leaders are cautious. They do not speak of 
their initiatives, but rather portray themselves 
as reacting to events. In personification, 
the candidate attempts to play a definite role 
determined by his campaign platforms. In 
identification, debaters [candidates] attempt 
to symbolize what they believe are the principle 
aspirations of their audience and play to those 
aspirations, (pp. 226-227)
Through these strategies, presidential candidates can
address the personality schema deemed most valuable by the
electorate and establish their desired image. The
candidate who can convey the right image and persuade the
electorate to respond to that image will have the greatest
chance of winning the election.
Issues Are Images And Images Are Issues
While Weiss (1981) argued that the relationship
between image and issue was an "interface," other
researchers see the connection between the two variables as
much more than that. The candidates images and issues are
one and the same. Jamieson (1987) explained:
speaker image becomes central to the assessment 
of viewer response. So central in fact that 
one can say the candidate image is the issue 
in the campaign, the one and only criterion 
every American voter feels qualified to apply.
(P. 74)
If a member of the electorate does not feel they can trust
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a candidate based upon the image they have observed, any 
position the candidate takes on any issue will become 
suspect. Even if the voter agrees with the candidates 
position, the image will tarnish the issue and inhibit the 
decision at the ballot box.
Hinck (1993) views presidential debates as a chance 
for candidates to enact character dramatically. In so 
doing, however, the enacted "character" becomes the 
"argument" in the debate. Hinck explained that "in a 
political debate, an audience deliberates about the 
qualities of the candidates, not their programs" (p. 4) and 
as a result, character and argument are related. The 
candidate's perceived character creates the candidate's 
potential presidential ethos. Based upon a candidate's 
potential ethos, voters will agree or disagree with whether 
or not a candidate's position upon a specific issue is 
valid or can be trusted. The "issue," in and by itself, is 
not enough to carry a presidential campaign. It must be 
joined with the right image. Therefore, image and issue 
blend together so much, that the two become one.
Friedenberg (1994) opined that candidates contribute 
to the elimination of the boundaries between images and 
issues. The author explained: "candidates frequently
respond to issues in ways designed to advance one or more 
of the [numerous] image related goals that characterize 
contemporary political debates" (p. 244). When addressing
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an issue, a candidate may process their answer in such a 
way as to manipulate the presentation of a particular 
image. As a result, each variable is intricately related. 
Issue-Image Summary
Despite the role of image in a presidential campaign, 
not everyone believes issues are insignificant. While 
voters may feel far more comfortable assessing a 
candidate's image, issue acquisition does transpire.
Debates force candidates to take public stands on specific 
issues and explain ways in which they want to accomplish 
their goals while in office. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) 
noted that debates allow candidates to address and specify 
issues in much more detail than regular campaign speeches 
or advertisements. Debates also allow candidates to become 
clearly associated with a specific stand on a specific 
issue. Barber (1985) noted the value of this type of 
public exposure and association because "character theories 
recognize that voters don't vote for issues but for people, 
and in many cases, for people who espouse certain stands on 
[specific] issues" (p. 139).
Finally, Chaffee (1978) summarized a number of studies 
and found that "viewers do indeed acquire political 
information from watching televised presidential debates 
and that viewing debates did have substantial benefits for 
voters concerning campaign issues" (p. 346).
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CONCLUSION
This review of literature has examined the research 
conducted by communication researchers on televised 
presidential debates. The research was found to involve 
the study of the physical delivery by the candidates in a 
debate, the effect of television as a medium upon the 
debates, televised presidential debates as true debates 
with regard to format and structure, the analysis of the 
content of various debates, and the role of image-issue 
formation in televised debates.
It also revealed a number of features with 
implications for the maintenance of legitimacy. The 
perception of enhanced conflict and issue polarity —  to 
have a single feature —  has implications for the 
traditional roles of the citizen and the concept of a 
larger public good that are troubling. However, many 
aspects of debate are clearly amenable to a Jeffersonian 
norm of legitimacy, enhanced information, direct (if 
mediated) address to all the people, and questions by 
citizen-surrogates.
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CHAPTER 3
TELEVISED DEBATES AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
INTRODUCTION
Televised presidential debates have had controversial 
effects upon presidential elections. Every presidential 
campaign has a communication trajectory. It begins with 
face to face appeals to local constituencies and local 
supporters. Later it seeks to address a set of dispersed 
core constituencies during the early presidential 
primaries. Those candidates still standing at the end of 
the primaries produce messages that increase in volume and 
range as they attempt to address the concerns of a major 
political party. If the party nominates the campaigner as 
its candidate there is further escalation of message making 
as ever more diverse constituencies are addressed in an 
ever greater variety of formats. Within the past thirty 
six years (largely in the past twenty) the presidential 
debate has become the central event in the campaign wherein 
both or several (1980, 1992) candidates struggle for the 
minds and hearts of the total electorate.
Over the past thirty five years, the presidential 
debate has evolved as a genre; it has begun to establish 
its own norms of performance, its own format, and its own 
set of viewer expectations. Despite its relative coherence 
and stability as a discourse event, the presidential debate 
is neither a static nor unitary event. Its formats have
64
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been altered from election to election; candidates and 
producers have experimented with it and its conventions 
have been modified over the years . Thus, any study of a 
particular debate or set of debates must take account of 
the antecedent formats to obtain a deep understanding of 
the event. Further, presidential debates are merely one 
discourse event, however major, in the total campaign.
Accordingly, this chapter will review the major 
research of the past thirty five years on presidential 
debates. This review will attempt to detail scholarly 
inquiry into the expectations that have developed about the 
meaning of debates for voters, their function within the 
larger campaign, their impact upon voting behavior, and 
their effect upon political discourse for good or ill. 
Because scholars are divided in their assessments of these 
matters, I will attempt to detail those conclusions that 
are both significant and consensual. Do debates as debates 
help to restore legitimacy to the election process? The 
evidence is mixed.
TELEVISED DEBATES DIFFICULT TO STUDY
Through the years, televised presidential debates have 
proven to be problematic to study. Every debate has 
contained its own unique set of variables which make it 
difficult to identify a genre or consistent theme 
throughout all of the debates. Patterson (1980) identified 
several of the many problems researchers confront:
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It is difficult to draw strong conclusions 
about debates. First, each debate is different.
It involves different candidates, different 
offices, different issues, different audiences, 
different press coverage, different formats, 
and a host of other differences. Hence to 
talk about the specific effects of debates 
is virtually impossible, for no two will be 
identical, nor will their effects be identical.
Second, debate effects cannot be isolated from 
the effects of all the other communication that 
voters receive during the campaign. Individuals 
may be exposed to a dozen messages about the 
candidates on the very day of the debate.
Finally, unlike laboratory experiments, 
scientists cannot control political debates.
(P. 229)
Because of the constantly changing variables and numerous 
information messages surrounding an election, scholars such 
as Murphy (1992) have argued that a single debate cannot be 
examined for its effect upon the overall election process. 
Issues such as underlying traditions of discourse or 
ongoing social disputes must be included in the assessment 
of a debate. As a result, the debate becomes nothing more 
than a single text within a larger context.
Perhaps the most problematic variable in studying 
televised debates is the influence of television upon the 
debating process. Debates have been a part of the 
political process in this country since the inception of 
elections. However, the introduction of televised debates 
has brought the candidates and the issues of the election 
into the homes of the American voter. This personalization 
of presidential candidates has redefined how voters assess 
and elect a president. Elections are no longer left to the
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political insider. The average voter, who may know very 
little about actual political issues, is now able to assess 
a candidate based upon the one criteria they feel qualified 
to critique —  their character and personality. As Keeter
(1987) noted "television [presents] the candidate as a 
person" (p. 345). Recent research by Kenski (1992) has 
identified personal traits as the most important criteria 
in decisions made by voters*®. By televising the 
presidential debates, voters have a chance to sit in their 
living rooms and watch a candidate and decide whether or 
not they like him.
As candidate personality has begun to play a larger 
role in voter decision making, voters have begun using 
personality semantics to explain their voting decisions.
Leo (1984) noted that voters identified "the communication 
of 'warm feelings' as being three to four times more 
powerful than traditional candidate preference criteria 
such as party identification or issues" (p. 37). Jamieson 
and Birdsell (1988) added: "When asked what they liked . .
. about presidential contenders, approximately one-fourth 
of the American public has reported such personal traits as
10Kenski cites studies such as Conover & Feldman 
(1989), Downs, Raid, & Ragan (1990), Fiske (1982), Gopoian 
(1982), Graber (1987), Graber (1992), Kinder (1978), Kinder 
(1986), Kinder, Peters, Abelson, & Fiske (1980), Miller, 
Wattenberg, & Malanchuk (1986), and Sullivan & Masters
(1988) to support his argument.
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warmth and honesty" (p. 140). Voters want a human being as
president, not a politician.
The personification of presidential candidates to
require the display of warmth and honesty has redefined the
American political process. Historically, presidential
candidates have attempted to be "all things to all people."
They are often forced to withhold their personal belief or
opinion and favor the belief or opinion which will secure
votes. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) noted this long held
political tradition:
Promising all things to all people is a long 
lived tactic memorialized by Machiavelli, who 
recommended that a Prince be a great "feigner 
and dissembler." The move has been recognized 
by political theorists through the history of 
campaigning. Indeed, ambiguity may be the 
mainstay of effective politics. No man who 
fully and frankly expressed his real 
convictions, made manifest exactly the way he 
felt and thought on public matters, could 
possibly be elected to any considerable 
office in the United States. (p. 128)
However, with televised debates requiring the candidates to
bring "warmth and honesty" into the homes of the
electorate, candidates must either be completely honest and
risk losing votes, or attempt to lie while appearing
truthful and risk being caught and labeled a charlatan.
The current trend appears to be that of requiring
candidates to be honest and be human.
DEBATES EXPECTED 
After closely examining the 1960 televised 
presidential debates, Sidney Kraus (1964) prophetically
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stated that "There is no doubt in this writer's mind that 
debating on television by presidential candidates will 
eventually become an integral part of political campaigns" 
(p. 220). It was sixteen years before the next set of 
presidential debates appeared on television in 1976, but as
Kraus predicted, debates have not only been a part of every
presidential election since 1976, but have even become 
expected events in American politics. Ritter and Hellweg 
(1986) noted the increased frequency and importance of 
debates:
Presidential candidates participated in more 
televised debates in 1984 than occurred in the 
entire 1980 presidential campaign. Televised 
debates have become more popular at all 
electoral levels since the 1976 presidential 
campaign. (p. 1)
Televised presidential debates have become a mainstay
in American politics due to voter expectations and
candidate campaign strategy. Friedenberg (1994) noted the
fruition of Kraus' 1964 prophecy when he stated the
"Debates have become an expected feature of our
presidential elections, and the risks involved, in rejecting
debates has outgrown the risks involved in debating poorly"
(p. 239). Not only have debates become expected but they
are believed to exercise a substantial effect on the course
of the election. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) believe that
debates now play the central role of the campaign:
"Debate" has become a buzzword for serious
politics . . . when debates are announced,
movement in the polls slows, in anticipation,
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the electorate suspends its willingness to 
be swayed by ads and news. (p. 5-6)
The rise in popularity of televised debates, however,
does not appear to be due to the role which the debates
play in the election process. Berquist (1994) argued that
televised debate popularity is due to the mentality of the
American voter. The "mediated contest" is a particularly
resonant form:
There continues to exist in America a remark­
able mythology about presidential candidates 
debating before a nationwide audience . . .
One of American television's legacies in the 
game-show-sporting event mentality. Viewers 
are conditioned to expect a winner and a 
loser. As a result, millions of Americans 
readily assume a presidential debate is a 
sort of political game, which lends itself 
to instant analysis and the awarding of a 
decision, (pp. 35-36)
The televised debate format provides the "arena" where the
voter can watch their "gladiator" engage in combat and
emerge the victor. This sporting mentality by the American
voter has forced presidential candidates to engage in a
televised event which may actually provide few benefits to
the overall election. It may be that due to the "sporting
mentality" which the public brings to presidential debates,
public expectations have forced candidates to debate rather
than appear "weak" or be accused of having something to
hide by refusing to debate. Auer (1986) noted this
pressure upon candidates when he stated that
The public has grown to expect candidates for 
major office to engage in debates. By 1984 
public expectations had grown so strong that
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some have argued that incumbent Ronald Reagan, 
holding a commanding lead in the polls, never­
theless risked debating because he felt that 
not to do so would create a greater problem 
for him than any possible error he might make 
in debating, (p. 216)
Friedenberg (1990) echoed Auer's arguments about the power
of public expectation:
In recent years incumbents have come to fear 
that their failure or obvious reluctance to 
debate will be interpreted extremely negatively 
by the public to mean that they are weak and 
unable to defend their own positions and 
policies. (p. 216)
While the combination of public expectations and the
sporting mentality surrounding debates complicate the
decision to engage in debates, other issues are also
important. To illustrate the types of issues a candidate
and his advisors would need to study prior to engaging in a
debate, Friedenberg (1979) provided six questions which a
candidate must assess in determining whether or not to
engage in a debate:
First, is this likely to be a close debate?
Second, are advantages likely to accrue to me 
if I debate? Third, am I a good debater?
Fourth, are there only two major candidates 
running for the office? Fifth, do I have 
control of all the important variables in 
the debate situation? And sixth, is the 
field clear of incumbents? (pp. 214-216)
Only the 1988 presidential election allowed candidates the
opportunity to positively answer all six of Friedenberg1s
questions. The 1980, 1984, and 1992 election failed to
provide the opportunity to address all six questions
positively by any of the candidates.
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Despite these difficulties, candidates have routinely 
elected to participate in presidential debates. There are, 
of course, potentially positive benefits. The positive 
impact which televised debates can provide for a candidate 
will be reviewed in the next section of this chapter.
IMPACT OF DEBATES UPON ELECTIONS 
Candidates Gain Exposure
While only one presidential election has been argued 
to have been directly affected by the televised debates, 
political communication scholars have argued that debates 
have an impact upon presidential elections in a number of 
ways. The initial impact of a televised debate for a 
presidential candidate is exposure. In a single setting, a 
candidate can gain exposure to millions of voters in a way 
which other media vehicles do not provide. Researchers 
Patterson, Churchill, Burger, and Powell (1992 p. 232) 
noted that televised debates provide numerous benefits not 
only for the candidate who gains increased exposure, but 
benefits are also provided for the electorate as well. 
Voters have an opportunity to see the candidates side-by- 
side and directly compare and contrast the candidates 
opinions and viewpoints. The televised debate allows each 
candidate an opportunity to expand and develop their 
opinions on various issues in a way which campaign speeches 
do not allow. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988 p. 132) have
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noted the limitations of the stock campaign speech. It is
formulated and superficial.
Large Numbers of Voters Watch the Debates
A televised debate, on the other hand, allows
candidates to address issues at greater length and gain
exposure to more potential voters then any other forum.
The need for increased exposure in a presidential election
is explained by Ritter and Hellweg (1986) who noted:
With the decline of party identification by 
voters, candidates in presidential . . . 
debates must appeal beyond the active members 
of their own party. Debates reach a national 
audience that transcends party divisions. In 
short, presidential debates have emerged as a 
national forum for political debates in the 
United States, (p. 1)
The amount of exposure a candidate receives from a 
televised debate is quite significant. Since the first 
televised debate in 1960 the number of viewers has steadily 
increased. Katz and Feldman (1962) noted that "over 60% of 
the adult population —  an average of 77 million 
individuals —  watched the first Kennedy-Nixon debates" (p. 
120). Since the first debate was a novelty for American 
politics, the audience numbers declined slightly for the 
last three debates. Windt (1994) noted however, that the 
numbers were still extremely significant. The author 
explained that the second debate drew 61 million viewers, 
the third debate 70 million viewers and the fourth debate 
attracted 63 million viewers (p. 20). While debate 
viewership has fluctuated over the years, the number of
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viewers has increased steadily and represent a significant
number of votes. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) identified
the amount of people who have watched the televised debates
over the years:
Where six out of ten watched in 1960, that 
number became seven of ten in the first two 
debates of 1976, dropping back to the 1960 
average for the third Ford-Carter encounters.
More than 120 million viewers saw the 1980 
Carter-Reagan debate. But four years later, 
the numbers were down. In 1984 the general 
election debates drew 85 million viewers.
(P. 120)
These figures indicate that for the 1960 televised debates, 
90% of American households watched at least some of the 
Nixon-Kennedy debates. In the 1976 Ford-Carter debates the 
figure was 83% of American households11.
Debates Do Not Influence Voter Decision
Although various arguments have been made regarding 
the value of exposure from a televised presidential debate, 
only one election, the 1960 campaign, permitted analysts to 
frame a cause-effect argument between the debates and the 
outcome of the election. The 1960 race for the presidency 
was the closest margin of victory in U.S. history. Windt
(1994) explained that "the election was decided by only .2% 
of the popular vote —  a margin of about 112,000 out of 
almost 69 million votes cast" (p. 1). White (1961) and
^Statistics from With the whole nation watching:
Report of the twentieth century fund task force on 
television presidential debates. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Press, 1979, p. 42.
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others attributed Kennedy's narrow margin of victory to the
televised debates:
When the debate began, Nixon was generally 
viewed as being the probable winner of the 
election contest and Kennedy as fighting an 
uphill battle; When they [the debates] were 
over, the positions of the two contestants 
were reversed. (pp. 290-291)
Chester (1969) provided statistics to support White's
claim. Chester noted that "going into the first debate,
Gallup Polls reported Nixon with a 47 to 46 percent lead in
the polls. But after [the debates] Kennedy took a lead of
49 to 46 percent" (p. 295). Windt (1994) noted that even
Kennedy attributed his victory to the debates. After the
election Kennedy stated the "It was TV more than anything
else that turned the tide" (p. 1). Lang (1987) echoed
these same sentiments when he argued that "a strong case
can be made that without the televised debates in 1960 . .
. Kennedy would not have been elected" (p. 211). Samovar
(1965) further supported this argument by stating that "the
Nixon-Kennedy debates were the really decisive factor in
the [1960] election" (p. 211). Windt summarized the
present consensus about the Kennedy-Nixon debates:
In some campaigns, debates have had minimal 
or no impact on the election. For better or 
worse, that was not true in 1960. The belief 
that without the debates Kennedy could not 
have won is fairly established" (p. 1 ).
The 1960 presidential race is the only election to
have been directly effected by televised debates. With so
many millions of voters watching televised debates, the
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question arises as to why only one debate out of six has
been influenced by an event which has become expected by
the voting public. Lichtenstein (1982) analyzed the
audience demographics of several televised debates to
suggest a more refined concept of their role:
A substantial proportion of voters formed 
opinions and made decisions about the election 
prior to viewing the debates. The debates 
did not, therefore, generally alter or form 
references but, rather, reinforced existing 
predispositions and made voters more sure of 
their choice. Debates mainly reinforce both 
the standing party allegiances and the candidate 
preferences built up over many prior months of 
campaigning, primary elections and convention.
(p. 298)
Six years later Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) reached a
similar conclusion:
Debates do reinforce the dispositions of those 
who have already decided how to vote. In the 
typical election, about two-thirds of the 
electorate has decided its November vote by 
the end of the party conventions" (p. 127).
Even though several million viewers watch televised
debates, the telecasts tend to only attract those voters
who are already involved in the campaign. Those
individuals who could benefit the most from the debates are
least likely to watch. Citizens who do not plan to vote in
the election, whether from apathy or mere lack of knowledge
regarding the issues, simply do not watch the debates.
Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) explained that "debates give
more to the information rich than to the information poor.
The debates make the most sense to those already
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knowledgeable and the least to those most in need of 
information" (p. 173). Researchers McLeod, Bybee, and 
Durall (1979) found that in the 1976 debates "those 
initially most interested in politics spent more time 
watching the debates" (p. 487). As a result, televised 
debates tend to have nominal impact upon the eventual 
outcome of an election.
Debates Can Be Beneficial
Even though televised debates may not alter the 
outcome of a presidential election, Trent and Friedenberg
(1991) argued that "contemporary political debates are 
extremely valuable" (p. 208) for the larger political 
process. Televised debates are valuable because they 
provide exposure for each candidate, force candidate 
accountability, and do inform the voters regarding 
significant issues surrounding the debate.
A presidential candidate is physically limited to the 
number of cities he can visit, speeches he can give, and 
hands he can shake. Therefore candidates often must rely 
upon media coverage of their activities for exposure to 
those voters not present at a particular rally. However, 
as Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) noted "television news 
tells people little about the issues in a campaign" (p. 
125). While the media may provide exposure for a 
candidate, that exposure is limited to sound bites and 
video clips, none of which provide any substance regarding
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a candidate's platform. Radio and television commercials 
are limited mediums and do not permit candidates to fully 
explain their positions on various issues. Televised 
debates provide a candidate with an extended period of time 
to present their plans and programs. Jamieson and Birdsell 
(1988) explained that "the debates offer the longest, most 
intense view of the candidates available to the electorate" 
(p. 126). From this increased exposure, voters are able to 
gain some type of increased knowledge of the candidates1 
positions. Katz and Feldman (1962) noted that in the 1960 
debates "voter exposure to the debate was associated with 
learning about the issues and changing attitudes toward 
political candidates" (p. 89). Even if a televised debate 
will not earn a candidate needed votes, it can provide much 
needed exposure which can result in increased support from 
constituents.
Televised debates also provide an opportunity for 
voters to assess each candidate in terms of job 
accountability. Rosenberg and Elliot (1987) noted that 
"the existing evidence points to possible debate 
influences, particularly on variables that allow subjects 
to directly compare candidates on factors related to job 
performance" (p. 57). Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) 
extended this argument by stating that "debates provide 
opportunity to underscore the criteria by which the 
presidency will be assessed" (p. 156). Researchers Lang
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and Lang (1962) argued that the 1960 televised debates 
provided voters with the opportunity to assess the 
candidates specifically for their "President like" 
qualities. The authors stated that "the 1960 presidential 
debates provided information viewers used to evaluate the 
candidates' ability to perform in office, their fitness for 
political office, and their qualities as human beings" (p. 
330). Voters have preconceived opinions of how a President 
should speak and act. By observing presidential 
candidates' behavior in televised debates, voters are 
provided with an opportunity to assess each candidate to 
see if they fulfill the expected criteria. Berquist (1994) 
noted that voters may tune in to the debates, or at least 
the first debate if there are several debates scheduled, to 
use the debate as a measuring stick for the candidates.
The author stated that "in the five sets of televised 
presidential debates America has witnessed since 1960, most 
observers view the first encounter as the acid test of a 
candidate's fitness for high office" (p. 39).
Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) have also argued that 
"debates heighten the candidate's responsibility to engage 
the issues considered central by the other side" (p. 131). 
In debates candidates address questions viewed as central 
by their opponents in an environment in which the 
electorate can compare the answers. Consequently, debates 
are able, although they do not always do this, to produce a
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clarity and specificity otherwise absent in campaign 
discourse. This rhetoric differs from typical campaign 
discourse. In a campaign speech candidates may tend to 
attack and criticize their opponents. However, in a debate 
with an opponent present and the threat of an instant 
rebuttal imminent, candidates tend to focus their debate 
discourse on case building and refutation.
Televised presidential debates serve perhaps their 
greatest function in that they inform voters. Even though 
the "information rich" may comprise the majority of the 
viewing audience, researchers Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon
(1992) argued that "debates are informative for the 
electorate" (p. 45). Chaffee and Choe (1980) noted that 
during the 1976 election "a study of Wisconsin voters found 
that during the debates the percentage of viewers who could 
not report candidate positions declined from 20% to less 
than 10%" (p. 52). Miller and MacKuen (1979) argued that 
not only are debates informative, but they "are a source of 
information for all classes, educational levels, and races" 
(p. 345) and that in the 1976 election "those individuals 
who watched the debates exhibited a heightened political 
awareness at exactly the time when political information is 
crucial - shortly before an election" (p. 346).
Researchers Lemert, Elliott, Nestvold, and Rarick 
(1983) revealed that "watching a televised debate . . . can 
increase respondents' [voters] interest in, and knowledge
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
about, the campaign" (p. 155). While not every voter can 
attend a candidate's election rally, most voters do have 
access to a television set and can become involved in the 
election by watching the debates. Wald and Lupfer (1978) 
found that "the ability of viewers to comment sensibly on 
the candidates and their stands on issues increases with 
debates" (p. 342).
The ability of debates to inform viewers has been 
supported by several studies. Desmond and Donohue (1981) 
found that after examining the information debated in the 
1960 televised debates and viewers' recall of that 
information after the debates that "the [I960] debates were 
instrumental in the formation of viewers' impressions of 
both the personality and the expertise of the candidates" 
(p. 302). Miller and MacKuen (1979) examined the amount of 
information retained by viewers of the 1976 televised 
debates and concluded that "the important effects of 
political debates on individual cognition or stored 
information about political [issues]" obtained from viewing 
the debates (p. 346).
Even though televised debates may have little effect 
in changing the outcome of an election, debates do have a 
significant impact upon presidential campaigns by providing 
increased exposure for the candidates, forcing candidate 
accountability, and informing voters regarding issues 
relevant to the election.
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DEBATE EFFECTS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR 
Viewers Do Not Change Minds
Scholars have claimed that televised presidential 
debates have been argued to have either no effect upon 
voters' decisions or merely invoke a slight change. No 
research has yet argued that a significant number of voters 
have ever changed their candidate preference due to a 
televised debate.
After evaluating the effects of the 1960 debates upon 
viewers, Kane (1966) concluded that "the majority of voters 
were not influenced by the programs [debates] . . . Only a 
very few had switched from one candidate to another" (p. 
96). Gallup (1987) echoed this argument: "presidential
debates have tended to reinforce the convictions of voters 
who were already committed. They have caused few people to 
change their minds" (p. 34).
Since most debate viewers are information rich, they 
watch the debates with predispositions which tend to 
"poison the well" when evaluating debate outcome. Sears 
and Chaffee (1979) illustrated this problem when they 
explained:
the information flow stimulated by debates 
tends to be translated by voters into 
evaluations that coincide with prior political 
dispositions. They perceive their party's 
candidate as having "won" and they discuss 
the outcome with like-minded people, (p. 255)
Researchers Sigelman and Sigelman (1984) found the issue of
political predisposition to effect viewer opinion in the
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1980 presidential debates. After interviewing numerous 
voters who had observed the debates, the authors discovered 
that :
voter intention was the strongest predictor 
of who won the 1980 presidential debate between 
Carter and Reagan among decided voters and that 
political ideology among the undecided voters.
(p. 628)
Pfau and Kang (1989) conducted a similar study with the 
1988 televised debates and found similar results: the
debates served to do little more than to "primarily 
reinforce existing attitudes" (p. 16). Research on the 
effects of televised debates indicates that very few voter 
opinions are ever changed by a debate. This means that if 
a voter has already decided to vote for candidate "X" prior 
to watching the debate, then candidate "X" will win the 
debate in that voter's opinion. Furthermore, if a voter 
has not selected a particular candidate yet but is loyal to 
a particular party, then the candidate representing that 
party will most likely win the debate in that voter's 
opinion.
Slight Changes In Voter Opinion
While a large number of voter's opinions may not be 
changed by a televised debate, research tends to indicate 
that some moderate shifts in voter decisions can take 
place. Swanson and Swanson (1978) revealed that after 
watching the first Ford-Carter debate in the 1976 election, 
"the debate effected the opinion of college students on
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certain issues" (p. 353). During the 1980 televised
debate, Ritter and Henry (1994) discovered that "6% of
those voters who had watched the debates reported a change
in their vote because of the debate" (p. 86). The authors
noted however that the shift reflected undecided voters who
were won over by Ronald Reagan and that no one had really
"changed their mind." During the same 1980 election
campaign and debates, Ritter and Hellweg (1986) noted that
in one study, "viewers of the debates had changed the way
in which they thought about a [particular] candidate" (p.
7) but they were not planning to change how they were going
to vote in the election.
A Debate "Win" May Not Sway Voters
Candidate loyalty and party preference are difficult
to change through the medium of televised debates. Since
only those voters who are information rich and already
heavily involved in an election campaign tend to be the
ones who watch the televised debates, candidates have
little chance of winning large numbers of new voters by
participating in the debates. Smith and Smith (1994)
illustrate the difficulty of swaying voters in a debate:
After the first debate in 1984, a Harris Poll 
revealed that 61% of the viewers said that 
Mondale had won the debate and only 19% said 
that Reagan had won the debate. However, 
despite this apparent victory by Mondale, 
candidate preference remained virtually 
unchanged. Prior to the debate, 54% of the 
voting public planned to vote for Reagan and 
only 42% planned to vote for Mondale. After 
Mondale's "victory" in winning the first
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debate by such a large margin, candidate 
support remained virtually unchanged. Post 
debate polls found 53% of voters still planned 
to vote for Reagan and only 44% now planned 
to vote for Mondale. (p. 107)
Effects of Debates On Specific Elections
Since each presidential election involves different
candidates and different issues, each televised debate can
be assured of being different. Therefore an assessment of
each election debate by year for effects on voters seems
appropriate.
As has been argued previously in this chapter, the
1960 presidential election appears to be the only election
in which there is any scholarly agreement about the
significant impact of televised debates. Researchers have
offered several explanations for the effect of this
particular debate on the election. The 1960 campaign was
unique in that Kennedy, as the challenger, was young, a
devout Catholic, and not as well known as Richard Nixon.
Windt (1994) explained that getting the two candidates to
debate was problematic:
Kennedy as challenger in the campaign had 
little to lose by debating, and much to gain.
Kennedy desperately wanted to debate, whatever 
the circumstances. Nixon's decision was more 
complex. Nixon's advisors argued that in the 
practical sense there was little to be gained 
since he was the better known of the two 
candidates, (p. 3)
Knowing that he was the challenger, Kennedy prepared
diligently for the debates. Powell (1968) noted that
Kennedy took voice and speaking lessons prior to the
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debates to learn diaphragmatic breathing. Kennedy also 
spent several days prior to the debates in seclusion, 
preparing for the debates with his advisors by studying 
trunk loads of data and material. Nixon spent the day of 
the first debate on the campaign trail and had given 
several speeches. Nixon arrived exhausted and as Tiemens 
(1978) noted, he spoke with a five o'clock shadow and 
looked old and tired (p. 59). As a result, Kennedy 
appeared full of energy and vitality which was reflected in 
his delivery style to the television viewing audience 
(Highlander & Watkins, 1962, P- 46-47). The differences in 
presentation style have been identified by researchers as 
the crucial ingredient affecting voter decisions at the 
ballot box. Researchers Tannenbaum, Greenberg, and 
Silverman (1967) argued that due to their images "Kennedy 
did not necessarily win the debates, but Nixon lost them"
(p. 286). Highlander and Watkins (1962) noted that Kennedy 
strengthened his campaign because of his strong physical 
appearances in the debates. The author's claimed that 
"Kennedy picked up support [from voters during the 
debates]. But this may not have been so much support taken 
away from Nixon as the re-establishment of support that was 
wavering from Kennedy" (p. 47-48).12
12Tradition has argued that there was an extreme 
difference in opinion between voters as to who won the 
debates based upon whether the voter watched the debates on 
television or listened to the debates on the radio. 
Arguments have been made that those voters who watched the
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Arguments regarding the effects of the debates upon
voter decisions in the 1976 presidential campaign are
conflicting. Witcover (1977) noted that Jimmy Carter felt
he benefited greatly from the debates and it was because of
the debates that he won the election:
Carter himself said . . . 'If it hadn't been 
for the debates, I would have lost. They 
established me as competent on foreign and 
domestic affairs and gave the viewers reason 
to think that Jimmy Carter had something to 
offer" (p. 687).
Schram (1977) provided statistical data which indicated
that Carter may have been hurt by the debates more than
helped by them. Schram explained that "Ford closed
Carter's 30 point lead [in public opinion polls] during the
period of time when the debates were being held, eventually
losing by only 2 percent of the vote" (p. 436). If Carter
had performed in the debates as well as he claimed he did,
it is unlikely that voters would have shifted so much
support toward Ford. While the debates alone cannot be
proven to be solely responsible for the shift in popular
opinion, a cause and effect argument can be made that since
debates on television favored Kennedy as the victor 
[possibly influenced by what they "saw" in terms of a 
young, energetic Kennedy]. Those voters who listened to 
the debates on the radio and could only base their decision 
on the content of the debates favored Nixon as the victor 
of the debates. However, after an exhaustive review of all 
the available material and research data gathered at the 
time, researchers Vancil and Pendell (1987) stated that 
"after examining the historical evidence on audience 
response to the 1960 televised debates, we conclude that 
the alleged viewer-listener disagreement is unsupported"
(P- 16).
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the shift took place during the debates, that the debates 
did play a role in that shift.
In the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate delivery 
style seemed to have the most influence upon voter decision 
making. Carter's pollster, Patrick Caddell, viewed debates 
as vehicles for promoting challenges. He therefore advised 
Carter not to debate Reagan and avoid the risk of appearing 
on the defensive (Jordan, 1981, p. 96). Mayer (1980) 
explained that a further variable which Carter had to 
evaluate was independent candidate John Anderson:
The Carter camp was scared to death of Anderson 
because he was viewed as taking voter support 
away from the Carter campaign. Therefore, when 
Carter did finally did agree to debate Reagan, 
he insisted that Anderson not be included 
(p. 2 1 )
Reagan, aware of the support Anderson might pull away from 
the Carter campaign, insisted that out of fairness,
Anderson be included in the debate. Carter prevailed and 
Anderson was not allowed to participate in the debate 
(Mayer 1980 p. 21)
Because of his background in radio, television, and 
films, Reagan had a great deal of experience with 
presentation skills. Reagan was able to present himself to 
the television viewing audience with such skill that 
critics such as Martel (1983) were led to claim that "even 
his smile communicated all of the necessary ingredients"
(p. 83). It would be those skills that lead to Cater's 
demise. Ritter and Henry (1994) argued that "Reagan won
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the audience through his superior television presentation 
style" and that Reagan's success in the November election 
could be directly attributed to his ability to attract 
voters with his debating style (p. 70). Martel (1983) 
noted that Reagan's smile alone contributed significantly 
to his strong performances in both the debates and the 
election (p. 83).
In the 1984 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan had 
little need of a debate to help him win the November 
election. Smith and Smith (1994) noted that pre-debate 
polls made it clear that Reagan was preferred by enough 
people in states with enough electoral votes to win the 
election (p. 105). However, debates had become expected in 
presidential elections by the American public and Reagan 
could not refuse to debate and risk the appearance of 
trying to hide something. Public interest in the campaign 
was high with 81% of the nation's registered voters 
watching all or part of the debates. Throughout the 
debates Reagan was able to maintain his lead and Smith and 
Smith (1994) argued that "the presidential debates did not 
have a major impact on the [1984] election outcome" (p.
115).
The 1992 presidential campaign provided a first for 
televised presidential debates. For the first time in the 
history of the debates, three candidates would participate 
at the same time. Overall, the debates were the most
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helpful for independent candidate Ross Perot. Researchers 
Zhu, Milausky, and Biswas (1994) noted that the first 
televised debate proved extremely helpful in providing 
voters with information regarding each candidate's position 
on issues. After watching the first debate, the authors 
argued that "viewers knew, on average, 34% more about 
Bush's issue position, 24% more about Clinton's, and 39% 
more about Perot's" (p. 319). The authors also stated that 
"the debate helped Perot improve his image considerably"
(p. 325). The audience learned the most about Perot who 
was the least known candidate of the three. This 
information surge may account for why Perot was declared 
the winner of the first debate and the loser in the second 
debate. Hahn (1994) noted that when asked who won the 
first debate, 47% of the viewers selected Perot, 30% 
selected Clinton, and only 16% selected Bush. However, 
after the second debate Perot dropped to last with only 15% 
of the viewers declaring him the winner whereas 58% 
selected Clinton, and 16% selecting Bush (p. 187). Based 
upon the results from just the first two debates, the 
effects of the debates upon viewer perception could be 
attributed to the audience merely learning the most about 
an unknown candidate in one debate and then fading in 
interest by the second. However, as Hahn (1994) explained, 
in the third debate Perot was again selected the winner of 
the debate by 37% of the viewers. Bush and Clinton tied,
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each being declared the winner by 28% of the viewers (p. 
187). Voter opinion appeared to have been swayed through 
the course of the debates. The overall effects of the 
debates upon the general election can be identified in the 
final results. Clinton won the election but did so by only 
receiving 43% of the popular vote, Bush 38%, and Perot 
attracting 19% (Prysby & Scavo, 1993, p. 9)13. With the 
tremendous rise and fall in candidate popularity during the 
debates and the low vote percentage victory by Clinton in 
the overall election, it appears that there may be numerous 
variables involved in televised debates which have yet to 
be identified.
The effects of televised debates upon voters is vast 
and as of yet, not completely understood. Debates do 
appear to increase voter knowledge of a candidates position 
on issues relative to the campaign, but that knowledge 
seems to have little effect upon changing voters minds on 
election day. More research is still needed before the 
exact role of televised debates upon election outcomes can 
be assessed.
11“ Clinton's victory is tainted when compared to the 
1988 presidential campaign where Dukakis lost the election 
but still carried 46% of the popular vote. However, one 
positive variable of the 1992 election is that 55% of the 
voting age population cast a presidential ballot. Not only 
was this a substantial increase over the 50% turnout in 
1988, but represented a reversal of a 30 year decline in 
voter turn out at the polls (Pear, 1992, p. B4).
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EFFECTS OF MEDIA COMMENTARY ON DEBATES 
Presidential debates are not only "mediated" by 
television; they are also "mediated" by network analysts 
and commentators. Research on the effects of declaration 
of winners and losers, criticism and interpretive 
commentary by network analysts is still fragmentary and 
anecdotal. However, it is beginning to emerge as a 
coherent area of study. Studies of post-debate 
analysis by media journalists have linked it to voter 
perception of debate outcome. The 1976 televised debates 
between President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter inspired the 
first studies of commentator effects. Lang and Lang (1979) 
conducted a study with two different groups of debate 
viewers. One group watched the first debate and was asked 
to determine who won the debate immediately after the 
debate was over. The second group also watched the debate 
but was not asked to determine a winner of the debate until 
several days after the debate. The first group which 
responded immediately after the debate declared Carter the 
winner by a 7-4 margin. The second group which did not 
respond until several days later and had access to media 
input declared Ford the winner by a 7-4 margin. The 
authors argued that since the media had declared Ford the 
winner of the debate in the days following the debate, a 
probability existed that intervening media commentary had 
changed the judgement of the members of second group.
 _____     flgaMBgwGaaK"*"
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In another study of the 1976 televised debates, Lupfer 
and Wald (1979) reported a similar conclusion. The authors 
found that after watching the debates, a group of viewers 
found no differences in candidate image immediately 
following the debate. However, one week later, the same 
viewers rated Ford more positively in areas such as 
honesty, fairness, and effectiveness during the debate. 
Lupfer and Wald concluded the change was a result of 
exposure to post debate commentary from network analysts.
Steeper's (1978) study identified specific media 
influence in viewer perception in the second 1976 televised 
debate. During that debate, President Ford mistakenly 
stated that Eastern Europe was not dominated by the USSR. 
While the statement was clearly an error, the average 
American viewer failed to notice it as such. Steeper 
monitored one group of debate viewers during the actual 
debate. Subjects were asked to rate each candidate 
randomly during the debate. At the time when Ford made his 
flawed statement, no one in the sample group noticed the 
error and all participants rated Ford as "OK" at that point 
in the debate. In addition, Steeper monitored a second 
group of viewers and tested them immediately following the 
debate. The viewers declared Ford the winner of the debate 
by a margin of 44 to 35. Furthermore, when the viewers were 
asked to comment on whether or not the candidates performed 
well in the debate, most commented that Ford had performed
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well. The day after the debate, however, the media flooded 
the electorate with information regarding the flawed 
comment. When Steeper tested the second group on the 
following night after the debate, the viewers declared 
Carter the winner over Ford by a 61 to 19 margin. When the 
group was asked again to comment on whether or not the 
candidates performed well, this time 20% of the viewers 
stated that Ford did not do well and cited the flawed 
comment as the reason why. Steeper argued that the extreme 
reversal in viewer opinion was a direct result of the media 
criticism of Ford's mistake, a mistake most viewers 
initially missed. The author concluded that the "public 
did not know that Ford had made an 'error' until they were 
told so by the news media during the following day" (p.
82).
Patterson (1980) provided evidence of the media's 
influence in another study of the 1976 debate. A majority 
of viewers who were asked within 12 hours after the debate 
to declare a winner selected Ford. However, viewers who 
were asked after the 12 hour time period to declare a 
winner consistently selected Carter. Patterson could find 
no credible alternative to media exposure that could 
explain the shift in opinion. After reviewing all three of 
the 1976 debates, authors Sears and Chaffee (1979) asserted 
that the media had unduly influenced viewer perception.
The authors noted that judgements about the debaters were
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based on information obtained prior to the event. Their
research found that viewers did not find the content of the
debates useful in forming a judgement about the winner:
The perception of a winner is determined 
mostly by information other than the direct 
experience of watching a debate itself. Prior 
preferences seem to have guided immediate 
judgements very heavily, and the post-debate 
media interpretations subsequently swayed voters 
away from this immediate partisan division.
(p. 240)
Chaffee and Dennis (1979) also linked media statements and
shifts in viewer judgement in yet another study of the 1976
debates. Attempting to match the media's statements and
viewer opinion shifts, they concluded that commentary had a
substantial influence:
It may well be that the press's interpretation 
of the debate, based on its initial information 
as to the apparent victor, is more important 
in determining the impact on the electorate 
than is the debate itself. (p. 85)
In the first 1984 televised debate between Ronald
Reagan and Walter Mondale, researchers Abrahamson, Aldrich,
and Rohde (1986) argued that post-debate media analysis
directly influenced viewer opinion of who won the debate.
Polls on the night of the debate found viewers declaring
Mondale a winner over Reagan by only 9 percent. For two
days following the debate, the media contended that Mondale
had indeed won the first debate. When follow-up polls were
taken two days after the debate, viewers now declared
Mondale the winner by over 49 percent. The authors
concluded that the media was responsible for Mondale's 40
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percent in his margin of victory. Geer (1988) also found 
evidence that the media influenced viewer perception in the 
first 1984 televised debate. He noted that immediately 
after the contest, 43 percent of the respondents in a 
CBS/New York Times poll thought Mondale had won, while 34 
percent thought Reagan emerged victorious. Yet two days 
after the debate, Mondale was perceived by 66 percent of 
the respondents as the winner, while Reagan's share 
declined to 17 percent. The author explained that "this 
large shift toward Mondale is surely attributable to the 
media's verdict that Mondale had bested Reagan" (p. 488).
Researchers Lowry, Bridges, and Barefield (1990) also 
discovered a significant link between media commentary and 
viewer perception for the first 1988 televised debate 
between Ronald Reagan and George Dukakis. The authors 
explained that an experimental examination of different TV 
exposure groups following the [first] debate found that 
post-debate commentary primarily reinforced voting 
predispositions. A control group that saw and reacted 
immediately to the debate was most likely to find the 
debate interesting, to report change in the intensity of 
their candidate choice, and to judge Bush's performance 
highly. However, the authors explained that "the group 
that viewed the results of an instant poll by ABC 
indicating that Dukakis had won the debate seemed to be 
influenced by the poll results" (p. 814).
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Lanoue's (1991) study of the second 1988 televised 
debate between Reagan and Dukakis revealed a similar 
pattern. Lanoue explained that "the media portrayals of 
the debate did seem to color subjects' views about who won 
the encounter" (p. 85). He reported that subjects who 
viewed the debate and then completed posttest 
questionnaires immediately after the event chose Bush as 
the winner over Dukakis by a margin of 44 percent to 30 
percent. The group that filled out the surveys after four 
days of exposure to media commentary declared Bush the 
winner by a 52 percent to 8 percent margin.
In a similar examination of the 1992 televised debates 
researchers Zakahi, Hacker, & Baker (1993) noted that 
"participants who viewed [post debate commentary] 
immediately following the debate, had significantly 
different opinions about who won the debate than those who 
did not watch the commentary" (p. 10).
In summary, although earlier research had established 
that televised presidential debates have very little effect 
upon voter candidate selection, the studies of media 
interpretation of debates has revealed a very different 
result. However, over the past two decades, sufficient 
data has been undertaken to make probable the claim that 
media post-debate analysis can have a significant influence 
upon viewer opinion of candidate performance in a debate.
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DEBATES NEGATIVE EFFECT UPON POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
The relationship of the debates and their contribution 
to political legitimacy is a complex matter and scholars 
are divided in their assessment. My personal judgement is 
that debates come close to approximating the agrarian civic 
ideal, adapted of course to an urbanized and necessarily 
mediated form of mass communication. Subtract the 
soundbites and political knowledge is obtained from 
headlines, fragmented news stories, talk radio, and 
sessions on the internet. Clearly the debates present 
candidates in their own words making extended arguments in 
paired comparison with other candidates, point by point and 
issue by issue.
Communication researchers have been much concerned 
with the decline of the quality of civic discourse. Not a 
few have seen presidential debates as symptomatic of this 
decline, accordingly several researchers have argued that 
debates are unable to accomplish the task they are designed 
to do and that televised debates are a negative influence 
on the American political system.
Selecting a candidate to serve as the leader of one of 
the most powerful nations in the world is a task which 
should not be taken lightly. Voters need to be able to 
assess an individual's ability to work within a large 
bureaucratic system such as the United States Government. 
However, researchers argue that the large array of talents
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and skills needed to accomplish that job cannot be revealed
by a candidate in a debate. Polsby’s (1979) criticism of
debate as a template of presidential leadership is typical:
The ability to stimulate a bureaucratic 
apparatus to bring forth alternatives, while 
no doubt related to an ability to imagine 
alternatives in the first place, requires a 
large panoply of talents and disciplines that 
are not so easily revealed by the debate 
format. The capacity to pick correctly among 
alternatives, to understand the reasons for 
picking one alternative and not another, the 
capacity to see whether the selected alternative 
is being pursued by a government agency —  
these managerial talents are quite inexpressible 
through debate, (p. 179)
Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) have produced similar 
criticism at greater length. Despite their far greater 
experience with the arts of rhetoric in general and debate 
in particular, their reaction of debate performance as a 
guide to presidential selection is even more thorough­
going:
Debates fail to elicit or provide a means of 
evaluating some of the skills central to 
conduct in office [as President of the United 
States] including an ability to ask significant 
questions, a talent for securing sound advice, 
a disposition to act judiciously, and a capacity 
to compromise without violating conscience or 
basic social principles, (p. 181)
Other scholars have argued that debates have fallen 
short of their early promise of informing voters about 
issues and have instead become forums exhibiting 
entertainment and production values. Highlander and 
Watkins (1962) strongly criticized the first televised 
debates in 1960 and predicted that the media would
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contaminate the election process. The authors argued that 
televised debates are "better television shows than they 
are well developed and significant discussions of vital 
issues" (p. 48). Berquist and Golden (1981) supported and 
extended the Highlander and Watkins criticisms. They 
charged that television shifted the attention of viewers 
away from the political process and onto issues such as 
each speaker's delivery, appearance, and overall 
presentation skills —  issues not vital to executing the 
office of President (p. 132). Berquist and Golden 
concluded their study by declaring that "televised debate 
formats currently in use favor perceived candidate 
advantage rather than the public interest" (p. 135).
From the beginning, evidence of the manipulation of 
presidential debates by television to produce a "show" 
rather than a true political confrontation has led many 
researchers to claim that televised debates are anything 
but "real" debates and hurt rather than help the election 
process. When the first televised debates in 1960 were 
labeled "The Great Debates" (Kraus 1964), researchers such 
as Kerr (1961), Siepmann (1962), and Auer (1962) were quick 
to argue that the debates were neither "great" nor 
"debates." Sixteen years later when the second televised 
debates took place in 1976, Kraus (1979) once again used 
the term "great debates" in a derogatory way when assessing 
the debates. Salant (1979) argued that not only were the
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debates not "debates," but they were more "joint
interviews" than anything else (p. 175). Bitzer and Rueter
(1980) were so disillusioned by the inadequacies of the
format that they referred to the encounters as "counterfeit
debates." In their assessment of the 1980 televised
debate, researchers Tiemens, Hellweg, Kipper, and Phillips
(1985) also argued that, as with previous debates, the
"debate" was not a "debate" because of the lack of
confrontation between the candidates. The authors stated
that "There is no question that lack of confrontation in
the debate was attributed in part to the format. The
debate was highly structured, giving no opportunity for
more direct confrontation" (p. 41).
Auer (1962) explained why televised presidential
debates are not debates:
A true debate is 1)A confrontation 2)in 
equal and adequate time 3)of matched contestants 
4)on a stated proposition 5)to gain an audience 
decision . . . Each of these elements is essential 
of we are to have true debate. Insistence upon 
their recognition is more than mere pedantry, 
for each one has contributed to the vitality 
of the debate tradition, (p. 146)
Despite constant revision of the format with each election,
televised presidential debates still possess very few of
Auer's criteria. In order to make televised debates more
of a show and to maintain the interest of the viewers,
televised debate formats have become highly structured,
focusing upon questions and answers, generally engaging
some type of moderator, and often involving questions taken
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from guest panelists or audience members. While this 
format may not create a true debate, producers and 
political consultants seem to believe that it does help 
create a more entertaining television show. Jamieson and 
Birdsell (1988) argued that this highly structured format 
contaminates the debates because "the formats do not ask 
the right questions, the question-and-answer format is not 
conducive to substantive debate, and the structure places 
irreconcilable demands on the candidates" (p. 165).
An even more serious charge is that the analysis of 
the debate may contaminate the entire election as well. 
Researchers have argued that the media is more concerned 
with identifying a winner and a loser of each debate rather 
than be concerned about the content. Jamieson and Birdsell 
(1988) argued that "by focusing on who won and who lost 
rather than on the positions revealed and clarified, press 
coverage also reinforces the views that elections are 
"horse races," not processes of preparing the electorate 
for informed decision making" (p. 171).
While the identification of a winner and a loser may 
sell more newspapers or attract more viewers, it creates a 
misguided focus both among the electorate and within the 
industry. When a winner is not clearly present, the media 
may feel it necessary to declare a winner in order to keep 
the horse race alive. Berquist and Golden (1981) explained 
how the media attempts to fulfill this role in that "when a
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victor is not at once apparent, television commentators and 
analysts fill the vacuum by playing the dual role of 
referee and final judge" (p. 125). The danger is that 
media will preempt public discussion. As Desmond and 
Donohue (1981) pointed out "often, audience members do not 
reach final judgement [of who won] until they have 
discussed the debate with others and have observed the 
media reaction" (p. 306).
Earlier, I reported the existence of studies about the 
influence of the media upon voters perceptions. It has 
been argued that media commentary may contaminate the 
political process. If the electorate is no longer 
listening, thinking, and critically assessing issues, but 
waiting to be told how to think by the media, then civic 
discourse has been impoverished. Chaffee and Dennis (1979) 
noted that "a growing body of data suggests that the 
voters' shifting perception of the candidate's success in a 
debate is shaped not by actual debate performance but by 
the media call of who won or lost" (p. 171). Should the 
media be at a loss for a winner or loser, Berquist and 
Golden (1981) noted how the media may manipulate 
circumstances and "attempt to establish public expectations 
regarding the probable outcome of a political debate" (p. 
125). Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) further noted the 
obsession of the media with the outcome of the debates 
rather than the content:
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In 1984, both Time and Newsweek delayed 
publication by 24 hours to carry accounts of 
the final Mondale-Reagan debate. The headlines 
dramatically illustrated the concern analysts 
have about press reports of debates. The 
covers read: "Who Won and Why?" (p. 170)
In a study of the 1976 televised debates, Berquist
(1994) studied the effects of time on viewers' opinions.
After viewing the debates and selecting a winner on their
own, Berquist discovered that those viewers who were
exposed to input from the media regarding the outcome of
the debate were more prone to change their opinion of who
won than those viewers who were not exposed to media input
(P. 36).
Other researchers worry about presidential candidates
shaping the form and content of their message to
accommodate media norms. Zarefsky (1992) argued that
rather then engage in detailed explanations or provide
complete and thorough answers to questions and attacks,
candidates provide dialogue which is more adapted to the
evening news:
We have debased political debate . . . the 
debates have been formatted for television 
. . . [and as a result] thwart sustained 
discussions of serious issues and encourage 
one-liners and canned mini-speeches. The 
focus in political debates is on winning by 
not losing, or by cleverly scoring a hit 
against the opponent, (p. 412)
Candidates need to create one-liners and to score hits
because that is what the media will use in determining a
winner or a loser. The small shards of information which
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the candidates provide will become the lead-in for the 
evening news. Sigelman (1992) noted that "between 1968 and 
1988 the average sound bite on network newscasts shrank 
from 43 to 9 seconds" (p. 407). Candidates in televised 
debates accommodate the media by giving them their "9 
seconds worth" of campaign information. Such practices may 
weaken the political process they are alleged to save if 
debates fail to promote a true political process, and the 
debate format developed for television not only 
contaminates the entire process but turns the debates into 
"non-debates." We must alter the format or revise our 
notion of the meaning of political discourse.
DEBATE BENEFITS
While the evidence against debates providing any 
significant benefit to televised debates is quite 
extensive, some studies indicate redeeming qualities. One 
of the most extensive, recent studies, that of Trent and 
Friedenberg (1991), argued that there are seven effects of 
debates upon a political campaign (pp. 229-236). While the 
proposed seven effects are not necessarily "bad," they are 
not all necessarily "good" either. Some of the proposed 
effects are just that —  "effects" —  and should be 
evaluated as such.
Effect 1: Increased Audiences. Political debates
attract large audiences. Debates generate audiences far 
larger than those that are generated by any other
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communication activity during the campaign. Larger 
audiences are good for the overall political process 
because the more people who watch, the more likely they 
will be to get involved in the campaign at some level.
Effect 2: Audience Beliefs are Reinforced. While
debates do not provide substantial shifts in voter 
position, they at least reinforce the positions held by 
candidate partisans. This reinforcement helps to solidify 
a voter's support for a candidate and strengthens that 
candidate's foothold in an election.
Effect 3: Shifting Limited Numbers of Voters. While
political debates do not normally result in massive shifts 
of votes, some voters may shift. In a close election, the 
numbers who shift as a consequence of the debates might be 
decisive. Even if electorates make no shift in votes, the 
party solidarity obtained from the reaffirmation to a 
particular candidate can only help the overall political 
process.
Effect 4: Debates Help Set Voters' Agenda. Even if
voters succumb to the media's influence and allow the media 
to tell them what is important, at least some type of 
agenda has been set. Voters can now identify with a 
particular issue or issues and vote accordingly.
Effect 5: Debates Increase the Voters’ Knowledge of
Issues. Studies have indicated that voters do seem more 
knowledgeable as a consequence of watching political
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debates. Any increase in voter awareness and knowledge of 
election issues is good for the political process.
Effect 6: Debates Modify Candidate's Images. When a 
candidate is not well known, the debate increases the 
publics awareness of that candidate. Voters are also able 
to assess the general character, personality attributes, 
and general competency of a candidate. All of these 
variables are beneficial to the political process.
Effect 7: Debates Build Confidence in U.S. Democracy.
Televised presidential debates may be unparalleled in 
modern campaigning as an innovation that engages citizens 
in the political process. Debates provide voters with 
greater exposure to information about candidates, which 
possibly results in a certain degree of commitment to the 
election process. It is always a positive contribution 
whenever the democratic process is nurtured.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the role of televised 
debates in the presidential election process. Televised 
debates have become an expected, even mandatory event in 
modern presidential campaigning. Media analysis of debate 
was found to have a significant impact upon the election 
process. Further, they provide vastly needed exposure for 
candidates and heighten interest in the election. Numerous 
researchers have argued that televised debates are not true 
debates and that this hybrid media form has contaminated
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the entire process. Finally, researchers have argued that 
whatever its shortcomings, the debates provide several 
benefits to presidential elections and to the democratic 
process. Having reviewed televised debates from a macro 
perspective, the remainder of this study will concentrate 
on a micro perspective —  an examination of the 1992 
televised presidential debates.
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CHAPTER 4 
HABERMAS AND LEGITIMACY TOPOI 
INTRODUCTION
The examination of any rhetorical artifact requires 
the appropriate lens. An examination of the 1992 televised 
presidential debates for their relationship to the 
legitimacy crisis in the American political system requires 
a filter which allows the critic the opportunity to 
interpret the debates as both rhetorical and political. In 
this chapter, I will formulate an appropriate tool for this 
study by combining Habermas's notions of political 
legitimacy crises and his ideal speech situation.
ORIGINS OF LEGITIMACY CRISIS 
Max Weber (1968) argued that legitimacy can be 
guaranteed in two fundamental ways. First, through 
"subjective" means, which may take the form of an emotional 
surrender to a charismatic figure, religious belief that 
salvation depends on obedience to authority, or belief in 
the absolute validity of the social order as an expression 
of ultimate values. Second, legitimacy may be quaranteed 
through the expectation of specific external effects, that 
is, the promise of tangible benefits that will result from 
the efficient performance of a political system. In either 
case, rhetoric plays an essential and vital role in order 
to articulate political benefits to the people, in 
formulating the means to bring about the realization of the
109
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benefits, and in mobilizing the people on behalf of 
societal goals. Rhetoric also, as Bensman (1979) noted: 
"performs a vital socio-political function by bridging the 
gap between legitimacy as claimed by those who would 
exercise authority and legitimacy as believed by those who 
would obey it" (p. 17).
Later, Jurgen Habermas "democratized" Weber's concept 
of emphasizing the participatory and forensics dimension. 
Habermas (1975) defined legitimacy as "An ongoing process 
of reason giving, actual and potential, which forms the 
basis of the right to exercise authority as well as the 
willingness to defer to authority" (p. 43). In 1979, 
Habermas offered an extended definition for legitimacy of 
political order: "Legitimacy means a political order's
worthiness to be recognized. This definition highlights 
the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; 
the stability of the order of domination (also) depends on 
its (at least) de facto recognition" (p. 178). Both 
definitions argue that legitimacy must include an implicit 
requirement of a rationality of good reasons. The reason 
giving process must involve a value system which has been 
socially constructed and which provides meaning by creating 
ties between individuals and socio-political orders. 
Francesconi (1982) explained that these ties, or bonds, 
create a "justification for the actions taken by
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authorities and the very right to exercise authority [and] 
are weighed against the requirement of rationality" (p.
50).
RHETORIC AND LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Francesconi (1986) argued that Habermas's definition 
of legitimacy of political order contained three claims 
important for rhetoric (p. 16). First, the legitimacy of 
political order can be examined as a rational claim.
Second, such a claim is contestable and, therefore, capable 
of discursive redemption or rejection. And third, a claim 
of legitimacy rests upon a normative evaluation of 
worthiness. From these three claims, Francesconi (1986) 
argued that four crucial terms emerge for understanding the 
role of rhetoric in legitimacy.
The first crucial term is "normative evaluations." 
Habermas (1979) explained: "Legitimation crises are based
upon a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by 
the state and motivations percolating up from the normative 
framework defining the collective social identity" (p.
180). A social body contains norms which are inseparable 
from its identity. These norms contain truth and the 
people must be able to inform the political "experts" of 
these norms to believe they are being represented. The 
political order must identify, acknowledge, and appear to 
support these norms to maintain legitimacy.
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The second term is "contestable validity claims." In 
order to believe in legitimacy, there must be some relation 
to truth, by which he means a consensual or societal truth. 
Habermas (1973b) argued: "In the realm of social and
political action, truth must find consensus through 
justification" (p. 75). A political system is justified 
and maintains legitimacy if it can communicate a social 
identity, or represent the norms of the society.
The third term is "discourse." For Habermas (1970) 
discourse is a reflective, interest free dialogue aimed at 
producing social consensus (p. 373). Normal communicative 
action rests upon fundamental norms of rational speech that 
are prerequisites for communicative competence. This 
concept is reflective of the public good. A legitimate 
political system will engage in discourse containing 
"interest free dialogue" reflecting the norms of the 
culture, indicating that the political system understands 
"truth."
The fourth, and final term, is "worthiness of 
recognition." Again, the notion of public good is thrust 
to the forefront. Habermas (1975) explained: "the
legitimacy of political order is based upon the norms of 
trust and expectation" (p. 43). Citizens expect legitimate 
order to act in accord with the norms established by social 
identity and trust that authority will act in the general 
interest. The political order must earn its legitimacy.
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James Aune (1994) argued that the political order must 
select from two rhetorical traditions which reflect the 
relationship between rhetoric and politics (p. 121). The 
political order can select the conception of rhetoric as 
mythmaking for the masses, where the elite inform the 
people of what they need. Or, the order may select the 
Sophistic and Ciceronian view of rhetoric wherein all 
citizens possess the skills necessary to engage in 
discourse which informs the experts of the needs of the 
people. The Ciceronian view is historically associated 
with American civic discourse. Jefferson admired Cicero 
both as a style model and as a republican martyr. The 
public believes that they live in a society where they are 
able to inform the experts about "their" needs. However, 
as the state intervenes, the political leadership become 
members of an administrative elite and are strongly tempted 
to consolidate their prerogatives into a permanent 
structure of privilege. Then a dilemma arises between 
private and public interests. While the leadership may 
acknowledge a public good, they must also maintain the 
stable political order —  and the two ideologies often 
conflict. Consequently, an advanced industrial society is 
simultaneously political order and world sphere. Aune 
(1994) explained that this dichotomy leads to the existence 
of contradictions. However, as long as the people believe 
that they are able to inform the experts of "their" needs,
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then legitimacy of the political order is upheld. Should 
the administrative actions of the elected officials 
indicate a control of information —  the experts shaping or 
selecting the social reality of the people —  then the 
legitimacy of the system becomes suspect. As Aune (1994) 
puts it: "One cannot colonize the lifeworld without
exacting a cost" (p. 122). The cost is generally a lack of 
political participation by the people who no longer believe 
that the political order is committed to upholding the 
"public good."
IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION 
Aune (1994) articulated the limits of Habermas's 
theory for the examination of particular specimens of 
discourse:
Truth is what we would rationally agree to 
in a situation of undistorted communication, 
one in which manipulation as well as errors 
of fact, wishful thinking, rationalization, 
and ideological positioning would not occur.
(P. 124)
To achieve this level of truth, Habermas developed the 
concept of an ideal speech situation which is constructed 
through three steps: an analysis of types of speech acts,
a description of the validity claims each act implies, and 
a description of the ideal situation in which the claims 
could be redeemed (Aune 1994, p. 124).
Habermas described four types of speech acts. First 
is "communicatives," which express the meaning of an 
utterance as an utterance. Second is "constatives" which
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explicate the meaning of a statement with reference to the 
external world. Third, "representatives," explain the 
meaning of the self-representation of the speaker to the 
hearer. And fourth, "regulatives," which explain the 
relationship of the speaker and hearer in reference to 
moral and social rules that can be followed or broken (Aune 
1994 p. 124).
Once a speech act is identified, the promise, or 
validity claim, which each act carries, can be identified. 
Given the right set of circumstances, the promises 
contained in each act can be followed through to 
completion. A communicative speech acts validity claim is 
comprehensibility. The validity claim of a constative 
speech act is truth. A representative speech act finds 
validity in truthfulness. And rightfulness is the validity 
claim of a regulative speech act.
While any one or more of these standards can be 
violated in a communication exchange, by entering into a 
communication act, the speaker presupposes a commitment to 
abide by these standards. Aune (1994) explained that the 
social situation which would most likely guarantee the 
fulfillment of these values is one in which the following 
four standards prevail: 1) Each speaker must have an equal
opportunity to initiate and perpetuate communication; 2) 
Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to employ 
regulative speech acts, without having to obey one-sidedly
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binding norms; 3) Each speaker must have an equal 
opportunity to employ constative speech acts —  no 
proposition statements are immune from criticism; and 4) 
Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to employ 
representative speech acts —  to be able to express 
feelings and attitudes (pp. 124-125).
DEBATE
No other communication format provides as much 
potential for realizing the ideal speech situation than 
debate. Debate, in the Anglo-American tradition, provides 
an opportunity for the confrontation of ideals wherein each 
speaker has equal opportunity to initiate the types of 
speech acts which Habermas presented. In a debate, the 
validity of Habermas's speech acts can be cross-examined 
and tested for comprehensibility, truthfulness, and 
rightfulness.
A debate format such as a televised presidential 
debate can also serve as a litmus test for the legitimacy 
of a political system. By polling the public and seeking 
decisions as to a winner and loser of a televised 
presidential debate, an audience decision is achieved.
This process allows the public to inform the [political] 
experts of what they think and ultimately of what they 
want. By employing this type of feedback the debate 
contributes to determining the legitimacy of the political 
order.
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METHOD: RHETORICIZING HABERMAS
Although Habermas privileged communication in his 
social theory, he has not developed a rhetoric. He has not 
adopted his scheme of ideal communication for the analysis 
of particular discourse. He has provided criteria for a 
vision of community. He has not yet developed norms for 
judging a situated debate.
In order to move from a universal theory of 
communication to the rhetorical analysis of actual 
legitimation appeals, we must "methodize" Habermas. First, 
rhetoric (as opposed to a theory of ideal communication) 
presupposes an opponent and an audience. Second, rhetoric 
is agonistic and governed by social conventions. In a 
debate, issues are frequently argued in terms of their 
rhetorical status. That is to say, opponents marshal their 
claims and evidence in terms of an established sequence. 
This sequence is a series of struggles over the facts, 
definitions, qualities, and procedures associated with an 
issue (i.e. what are the facts about a policy or action? 
What nature, kind or category of act is it? Is it good or 
evil? What procedures or implementations are being 
followed?).
The presidential debates of 1992 will not be analyzed 
for their overt positions or stock issues but for their 
embedded legitimate appeals. For example, two candidates 
might both want similar welfare reform, but one would
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consign the solution to government "experts" whereas 
another would advocate a return to neighborhood decision 
making. Thus, both might express the same fiscal and 
humanitarian goals, but the means of attaining these goals 
might suggest differing orientations toward legitimacy.
One might express faith in government expertise and reform 
from the "top" whereas the other candidate might appeal for 
a return to direct participation by the people.
THE TOPOI OF LEGITIMACY 
In the spirit of Habermas, filtered through the lens 
of American ideology, three legitimation themes have been 
selected:
D Citizenship: Restoring Citizen Participation. Both
Habermas and American civic humanism posit a basic human 
need for participation in community affairs. The citizen, 
not the expert or the interest group, must be the primary 
actor.
2)Virtue: The Public Good. This topos addresses the 
restoration of the concept of a public good, a moral 
community. The government should seek to promote respect 
for virtues in its people (defined as education, civil 
order, family, property, and piety). Virtue becomes the 
conception of a larger public good compatible with 
individual rights.
3)Authority: The Role of the Government. The goal of this 
topos is to restore accountability. Governments must be
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made accountable to the people. The source of its 
legitimacy is the will of the people.
My selection of topoi is not arbitrary. Topoi are 
stock expressions of commonplace beliefs, general political 
recipes for an ideal order. Their relationship to myth is 
that of a moral to a story. Thus, the Jeffersonian myth 
narratizes the "ideas" of agrarian virtue and the 
centrality of the yeoman.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Three themes, long hallowed as axioms of legitimate 
civic culture, figured prominently in the discourse of the 
presidential elections. They did not appear as direct 
overt statements so much as what Kenneth Burke (1945) has 
called representative anecdotes: statements of warning or
admonition that thread across a whole body of discourse, 
acting as a synecdoche for the whole and giving many 
disparate statements a larger coherence and meaning. These 
themes are seldom stated nakedly and literally, rather they 
undergird whole issues and sets of issues as a general 
imperative or orientation. They make implicit sense of 
diverse and seemingly conflicting statements.
My order of procedure will be to review the debaters 
in a sequential fashion throughout. I will chart the three 
legitimacy themes as they are used as strategic rhetorical 
appeals during the discussion of the contested issues.
Next I will attempt a summary statement for each candidate
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detailing his apparent position on these themes and his 
skillful use of them in the debates. Finally, I will 
attempt to evaluate the impact of the legitimacy theme on 
the campaign in particular, and presidential discourse in 
general.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the origin of a legitimacy crisis has 
been identified as the byproduct of the existence of 
contradictions arising from an advanced industrialized 
society. When the notion of the public good is questioned 
or threatened, a legitimacy crisis emerges and the 
authority of a political system is questioned. A 
Ciceronian style of rhetoric has been identified as the 
appropriate rhetorical response for a system experiencing a 
legitimacy crisis. Habermas's ideal speech situation has 
been shown as the best rhetorical tool for achieving the 
values outlined by Habermas and the debate format was 
argued as the most appropriate method for executing 
Habermas's theory. Finally, Habermas's ideal speech 
situation was translated into a series of thematic appeals. 
The following chapter will examine the strategic use of 
these appeals within the presidential debates of 1992.
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CHAPTER 5
LEGITIMACY CRISIS RHETORIC 
IN THE 1992 TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will begin with a description of the 
debates, detailing their general procedures and their 
particular settings and differences in format. Then the 
chapter will proceed to a sequential analysis of each 
debate using the legitimation topoi identified in Chapter 
Four.
THE COMMUNICATION ECOLOGY OF THE DEBATES 
The 1992 televised presidential debates were staged 
over a nine day period beginning on Sunday October 11, 1992 
and concluding on Monday October 19, 1992. Their impact 
upon the overall election has been documented. CBS 
election coverage on November 3, 1992 reported that of all 
the possible influences on voters decisions, the 
presidential debates were the most important element 
(Crawford, 1993). Sandell, Mattley, Evarts, Langel, and 
Ziyati (1993) also observed that when asked what influenced 
their decision in selecting a candidate, voters most often 
cited the economy (the central focus of all three of the 
debates); the second most mentioned influence was the 
debates. Only the 1960 televised debates attracted similar 
notoriety. Neither the 1976, 1980, 1984, nor the 1988 
televised debates were determined to have as much influence 
upon the outcome of the elections.
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The 1992 debates were unique in that they placed three 
presidential candidates together on the same stage.
Although the effect of this unique format has yet to be 
ascertained, Prysby and Scavo (1993) speculated that the 
presence of three candidates changed the dynamics of the 
election campaign and the debates in favor of a particular 
candidate. The authors opined: "Perot's focus on the
deficit and the economy meant that there were two 
candidates criticizing Bush's performance, and the three 
candidate debate format may have prevented Bush from 
focusing more heavily on Clinton's personal 
characteristics" (p. 9).
Several different debate formats were employed.
Debate one consisted of a series of direct questions from a 
panel of journalists with specific amounts of time 
designated for each candidate's answer and response time. 
Debate two was a town hall meeting with the audience 
members —  average citizens —  being allowed to ask 
questions of any candidate. Debate three was split into 
two parts. For the first half of the debate, a single 
moderator was allowed to ask any candidate any question he 
desired. For the second half, a panel of journalists were 
introduced and allowed to ask the candidates questions of 
their choice. For the last half, the debates returned to 
the structured time formulas of the first debate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
123
Debate One
The first televised presidential debate, held Sunday 
October 11, 1995, took place on the campus of Washington 
University in St. Louis, Missouri. The debate was 
moderated by Jim Lehrer and consisted of a series of 
questions asked of the candidates by three journalists:
John Mashek of the Boston Globe, Ann Compton of ABC News, 
and Sandy Vanocur, a freelance journalist. When a 
candidate was asked a question, he would have two minutes 
to answer. Following his answer, the other two candidates 
would each have one minute to respond. All three debaters 
were fairly reserved in the first debate with no 
significant or memorable exchanges taking place between 
them.
Ross Perot was declared the winner of the first 
televised debate by 47 percent of the viewers polled. Many 
critics attributed his victory to the fact that he was 
relatively unknown and provided the most "new" information 
of the three candidates. Bill Clinton placed second, 
carrying 30 percent of the viewers polled, while George 
Bush finished a very distant third, carrying only 16 
percent of the vote (Hahn 1994, p. 194).
Debate Two
The second televised presidential debate was held 
Thursday October 15, 1992 at the University of Richmond in 
Richmond, Virginia. The debate was moderated by Carole
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Simpson and the debate formate consisted of a town hall 
meeting where members of the audience were permitted to ask 
the questions. While the moderator attempted to allow each 
candidate equal answer and response time, since several of 
the audience's questions were directed specifically toward 
a single candidate, equal time was not always possible.
This was the only debate in which Perot was not declared 
the winner. He finished last carrying only 15 percent of 
the votes. George Bush was able to finish in second place 
but only by one percentage point over Perot, gathering just 
sixteen percent of the viewers polled. Bill Clinton was 
the runaway winner of the second debate with a whopping 58 
percent of the public vote (Hahn 1994, p. 201). Clinton's 
victory in the second debate is particularly noteworthy 
because he lobbied heavily for, and insisted upon, the use 
of the town hall format for the televised debates (Fouhy 
1992). When the public response to the second debate was 
extremely favorable, Clinton made sure that the public knew 
the format was his idea.
The town hall format allowed the citizens to confront 
the candidates with some very tough questions. Many of the 
questions forced the candidates to have to provide hard, 
truthful answers for the audience. Of particular note was 
President Bush stumbling and searching for an answer to a 
question of how had the national debt affected him 
personally.
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Debate Three
The third debate was held on Monday October 19, 1992 
at Michigan State University in East Lansing, Michigan.
The debate was moderated again by Jim Lehrer and the format 
consisted of two parts. In the first half of the debate, 
moderator Lehrer would ask the candidates questions with 
follow-up answers allowed by each candidate. The second 
half of the debate consisted of a panel of three 
journalists —  Susan Rook of CNN, Gene Gibbons of Reuters, 
and Helen Thomas of United Press International —  who would 
ask the questions. Time constraints of two minutes for an 
answer to a question and one minute for a rebuttal were 
used for the second half of the debate.
The format of the third debate produced some very 
heated exchanges between the candidates. Of interest was 
Ross Perot's challenge to President Bush to provide for the 
American public papers containing his exact orders to U.S. 
Ambassador Glaspie on the Eve of the Gulf War. Bush took 
exception to the question and a heated debate ensued. 
Governor Clinton capitalized on Perot's attack and used the 
opportunity to challenge Bush's integrity.
After scoring poorly in the second debate, Perot 
rebounded and was declared the winner of the third and 
final debate by 37 percent of the viewers. While this 
number was not particularly high, it was enough to propel 
Perot past both Bush and Clinton who tied for second with
   i
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28 percent each. The scores represented a significant drop 
for Clinton from his 58 percent victory in debate two, and
a significant increase for Bush who had scored only 16
percent in both debates one and two.
ANALYSIS: THE DEBATES
Debate One
The first debate began with each candidate being asked
by Jim Lehrer to provide an opening statement in which they
would explain what separated them from the other candidates
in the presidential race. Ross Perot, as determined by a
drawing, spoke first. He defined himself as a unique sort
of leader, the true people's candidate. Perot explained:
I think the principle that separates me is 
that 5 million people came together on their 
own and put me on the ballot. I was not put 
on the ballot by either of the two parties.
I was not put on the ballot by any PAC money,
by any foreign lobbyist money, by any special 
interest money. This is a movement that came 
from the people. This is the way the framers 
of the Constitution intended our government 
to be, a government that comes from the people.
Over time we have developed a government that 
comes at the people, that comes from the top 
down, where the people are more or less treated 
as objects to be programmed during the campaign 
. . . I go into this race as their servant, 
and I belong to them. So this comes from the 
people.14
From the very beginning, Perot set his keynote; he 
placed himself squarely within the Jeffersonian myth.
4A11 excerpts from the debates in this dissertation 
are taken from transcripts of the debates received through 
Prodigy Services Company, Prodigy Interactive Personal 
Services, 1992, downloaded the day following each debate.
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Perot argued that his candidacy would place government back
in the hands of the people, that his presidency would be
accountable to the people for their actions, that the needs
of citizens would set the agenda, and that his campaign
would be clear of "interests." All three of the topoi of
legitimacy, citizenship, accountability, and virtue, are
touched upon in Perot's opening statement.
Bill Clinton was second to speak in the debate, being
the first to respond to Perot. Clinton did not address any
of Perot1s comments and stayed with his prepared text in
which he used the word "change" five times. Despite this
word, Clinton never indicted the system to the extent that
Perot had done. Instead, Clinton used reformer's stock
idioms. It was just "time for a change" and he would be
the competent agent of change for the American people:
The most important distinction in this
campaign is that I represent real hope for
change, a departure from trickle-down 
economics, I must challenge the American 
people to change and they must decide . . .
Its time to change. I want to bring that 
change to the American people, but we must 
all decide first we have the courage to 
change for hope and a better tomorrow.
Except for the partisan attack against "trickle-down
economics," Clinton never defined what he meant by change.
However, he did refer to the topos of citizenship by
claiming that "we must all decide." Citizens had a
participatory role as agents of the change.
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President Bush's opening statement also responded to 
the question of what separated him from the other 
candidates: "I think the one thing that dramatically
distinguishes is experience. I think we've dramatically 
changed the world . . . and the changes are mindboggling 
for world peace." Bush cast himself as an expert in a 
difficult, frightening and mysterious world. Experience 
was the key to national survival, and the more experience a 
person had working within the expert system, the more 
qualified he was to be president. Of the three candidates, 
Bush believed that he was the only person to possess this 
type of experience in full measure. Ironically, the 
experience he praised was within a system which Perot had 
already identified as corrupt and self serving.
In the same opening statement, Bush indicated that the 
present political system, despite questions about its 
effectiveness, size, and scope, could be fine-tuned given 
the best personnel. Bush used the word "change" seven 
times in his opening statement. However, he was not 
referring to the type of change which the other candidates 
wanted. For Bush, "change" meant placing new people in the 
same old jobs and changing the dominant party affiliation 
of the Congress. He explained: "And the way we are going
to get it done is we're going to have a brand new Congress.
. .I'll sit down with them and work for my agenda..." 
According to Bush, the old system was not fundamentally
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flawed, it just needed to be given a chance with some new 
players. Bush's position ignored the legitimacy topoi with 
the exception of accountability. Bush identified the 
expert as the primary actor rather than the citizen. He 
appeared to believe that the role of the government was to 
lead from above; his public virtue consisted of efficiency 
and effectiveness.
To ensure equal time throughout the debates, Clinton 
was given two minutes to address the same opening question 
while Bush and Perot then received one minute for response 
statements. Clinton used his opening statement to respond 
to Bush's claim that his administration was essentially 
sound. He made a significant attack against the old 
"expert" system. Clinton told the audience "My wife gave 
me a book in which the author defined 'insanity' as just 
doing the same old thing over and over again and expecting 
a different result." The direct argument was never made, 
but Clinton implied that the old system was insane because 
it never got anything done. An insane system, by 
extension, cannot be reformed, it must be smashed. Clinton 
also attacked expert political insiders when he declared 
that what worked in the new world order was not "government 
for the benefit of the privileged few." This statement 
exemplified the topos of accountability and virtue: 
Government of the people and a broad sphere of public good.
  .
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After Clinton completed his opening statement, Bush
interrupted and stated that he had something else to add to
what he felt distinguished him from the other candidates.
He noted that earlier in the campaign, Clinton had made a
reference to America "falling apart at the seams" and
needed to be overhauled:
I think he said that the country is coming 
apart at the seams. Now I know that the only 
way he can win is to make everybody believe 
the economy is worse than it is, but this 
country's not coming apart at the seams, for 
heaven's sakes. We are the U.S. of America.
In spite of the economic problems, we're the 
most respected economy around the world. Many 
would trade for it . . .  I would hate to be 
running for president and think that the only 
way I could win would be to convince everybody 
how horrible things are.
This statement presented Bush as a defender of the
legitimacy of the present system and condemned the use of
de-legitimizing rhetoric as strategic and insincere. He
hinted that the perception of economic woes had been
manufactured. Bush indicated he believed complaints were
largely illusory, placing him above and away from the
experience of ordinary people.
At the close of his statement, Bush would again make a
reference to the essential soundness of the system and that
a mere change in party hegemony would redeem it. Bush
exclaimed: "I believe we can get it done now. You're
going to have a whole brand new bunch of people in Congress
that are going to have to listen to the same American
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people I'm listening to." This gesture to the primacy of 
the citizen was rather pale.
When allowed an opportunity to respond to the other 
candidates' opening statements, Perot humorously reiterated 
his outsider status, he was one of the people, not a member 
of the corrupt political system which the public had come 
to distrust. Perot declared: "Well they've got a point.
I don't have any experience in running up a $4 trillion 
debt. I don't have any experience in gridlock government •
. . ." Thus, Perot discredited the experience arguments 
which the other candidates had made by identifying the 
consequence of their experience. Perot portrayed himself 
as a non "expert" and as an advocate for the topoi of 
legitimacy.
During the volley of opening statements about 
candidate character (an issue played upon very heavily by 
George Bush), Perot seized the opportunity to dramatize his 
citizen status. He was not a part of the typical dirty 
politics of character defamation which members of the 
system usually get caught up in. Perot supported his 
promise of putting political decision making back into the 
hands of the public by asserting: "I think the American
people make their own decisions on character . . . "  Thus, 
Perot showed that he trusted the competence and moral 
authority of the people. They, not the candidates, would
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judge who was a good person and who was a bad person. This 
comment exemplified the topos of citizenship.
During the series of statements and responses 
regarding candidate character, Clinton made a statement 
which contradicted his previous criticism of the political 
system. He responded to an attack by Bush regarding his 
patriotism and military service: "I honor all those who
serve our country, including Admiral Crowe who was your 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs and who's supporting me." The 
system might be insane and in need of change, but Clinton 
now claimed to have ties with experts who supported him. 
While seemingly contradictory, this statement 
supported the nation and its survival (public good) rather 
than the particular policies of the present administration.
However, Clinton may have weakened his citizenship 
theme in his discussion of his plan to reduce the deficit. 
Clinton declared: "Nine Nobel Prize winning economists and
500 others, including numerous Republican and Democratic 
business executives have endorsed [my plan] because it 
offers the best hope." Clinton implied that he was not 
just offering vain promises to the people, but he had the 
approval of experts who knew about economic issues.
Clinton cast himself as well connected with political 
experts.
In discussing deficit reduction proposals, Bush 
criticized a gas tax proposed by Perot and declared that
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his plan was better. Bush argued that even though his 
plans may not have worked in the past, they would now. He 
would go through the proper channels and get his ideas 
passed through Congress. The reason Bush would be able to 
do this was because of the new officials who would be 
elected to Congress. Bush explained: "And with this new
Congress coming in, gridlock will be gone, and I'll sit 
down with them and say let's get this done." While Bush 
offered no explanations other than superior partisan 
competence, as to why the new Congress would be any better 
than the old, he continued to support the system and 
claimed that even though it had failed to work in the past, 
it would work now, we just had to believe in the system.
For Bush, there was no need to restore citizen 
participation or government accountability.
John Mashek asked the next question which concerned 
converting military jobs to private industry. Mashek made 
reference to an article in that day's St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch in which a woman had written a letter and inquired 
if she could ask the candidates about the lack of a plan to 
convert defense-oriented industries to other purposes, an 
issue she was very concerned about. Bush returned to his 
previous statements regarding the state of the economy and 
stated: "But we are not coming apart at the seams. . .But
tell her [the woman] it's not all that gloomy; we're the 
United States of America!" Bush relied on national pride
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and rebukes to console a person afraid of losing their job. 
By not addressing the voter as an individual, Bush violated 
the topoi of citizenship and accountability.
While Clinton had formerly attempted to demonstrate 
his ties with the experts, his response to the problem of 
converting military jobs now criticized the current system 
as slipshod and unresponsive. Clinton complained: "This
administration may say they have a plan, but the truth is 
they have not even released all the money, the paltry sum 
of money, that Congress appropriated." The attack was 
meant to be directed as discrediting the Bush 
administration, but he also attacked Congress in the 
process as lacking accountability.
The next question came from Ann Compton who asked 
Perot how he would use the powers of the presidency to get 
more people back into good jobs? Perot began his answer 
with a statement designed to frame him as a tribute of the 
people rather than a professional politician. Perot began: 
"Step one, the American people send me up there 
. . . "  The only way Ross Perot was going to be president 
was if the people sent him —  not "elected" him —  but 
"sent" him. The topos of citizenship was supported because 
the people were making the decisions and the choices, not 
the experts.
When addressing the issue of job creation, Clinton 
presented an uncharacteristically conventional plan by
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working within the current political system. Clinton 
stated: "On the first day I was inaugurated, I would meet
with the leaders of the Congress, and we would present a
jobs program." The same Congress that had previously
allotted a "paltry sum of money" would now sit down with 
him and work on a jobs program. This statement could 
potentially identify Clinton as an expert whose presence 
was crucial to success. If that was the case, then Clinton 
had affirmed the legitimacy of the system he had just 
finished bashing.
When Bush responded to a question regarding how he 
would use the office of the presidency to create jobs, he 
explained: "What I ’m going to do is say to Jim Baker when
this campaign is over, all right, you do in domestic
affairs what you've done in foreign affairs." Bush was 
going to hire the appropriate technician to do the job 
which the public perceived to be his responsibility. This 
type of action would remind the public of their perception 
of wealthy people who hire others to do their work for 
them. Bush continued to cast himself as a wealthy elite 
insider.
At the end of his answer regarding the hiring of 
Baker, Bush once again made a reference to how well the 
system would function with a new Congress in place. Bush 
stated: "We’re going to have a new Congress, and we're
going to say to them, you've listened to the voters the way
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we have. Nobody wants gridlock anymore, and so let's get
the program through."
The focus of the debate turned next to foreign
affairs. Bush seized the opportunity to list all of his
accomplishments. He felt that his experience in this area
was what qualified him to be president. In responding to a
question regarding what the U.S. should do in the post cold
war world, Bush exclaimed:
Well, we are still the envy of the world in 
terms of our military . . .  I worked out a 
deal with Boris Yeltsin to eliminate —  get 
rid of entirely —  the most destabalizing 
weapons of all, the SS-18 . . . so, we've got
a good military . . . But we're so —  turned
inward we don't understand the global picture.
Bush's identification of his personal relationship with
Yeltsin and his discourse scolding the American public for
focusing too much upon domestic affairs indicated that he
was not just an expert, but Bush knew what was better for
the country then the people did. Bush failed to identify
with any of the topoi.
Next, Ann Compton asked the candidates what they
thought America should do to address problems in Somalia
and Bosnia. In particular, she wanted to know if we should
engage in military action to preserve human rights. Bush
spoke first and stated that he would act based upon what
the experts told him, not based upon what the people
wanted. Bush explained: "I am not going to commit US
force until I know what the mission is, till the military
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
tell me that it can be completed, and till I know how they
can come out." Bush seemed consumed with experts, not the
fighting spirit of America as Reagan might have been. The
role of citizen input in government affairs and the
citizen-soldier in combat seemed a distant reality to him.
Perot responded with a statement demonstrating that he
would never act outside the will of the people and
recognized how military action hits the working middle
class the hardest:
If we learned anything in Vietnam is you first 
commit this nation before you commit the troops 
to the battlefield. We cannot send our people 
all over the world to solve every problem that 
comes up . . . our all-volunteer armed force 
is not made up of the sons and daughters of 
the beautiful people; it's the working folks 
who send their sons and daughters to war.
While not implicit, Perot did imply that the experts, or
insiders, had the ability to protect their children while
the hard working middle class did not. Perot was promising
to protect those children because he would never send them
to a war which the people had not agreed to. Once again,
Psrot indicated that the public would dictate what the
government would do.
At this point, the panel of journalists asking 
questions turned the focus of the debate to domestic 
affairs. Clinton seized this opportunity to shift 
direction again and attempted to now identify with the 
common citizen. Clinton declared: "I know a lot about
family values. I was born to a widowed mother who gave me
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family values, and grandparents. I've seen the family 
values of my people in Arkansas . . . "  Clinton did not 
come from a family of means but worked his way to the top 
just like every other hard working American. He was one of 
the people, not an elite insider born into means. He 
seemed to imply that political virtue was located in the 
typical American.
Bush responded to the question by attempting to 
emphasize the need for a good strong family unit and 
criticized the high divorce rate in the country. Bush 
scolded the public: "I'm appalled at the highest
outrageous numbers of divorces —  it happens . . . but it's 
gotten too much." This statement cast Bush as seeing 
himself as superior to a large majority of people in the 
country who had experienced divorce. His family intact and 
a good healthy family unit appeared to be the golden 
standard. While his response did uphold virtue, it implied 
that the people were wanting and had to be lectured to by a 
politician.
Next, Sandy Vanocur asked the candidates a question
regarding the legalization of drugs in the United States.
Perot used this opportunity to criticize the poor job that
the past "insiders," the political experts, had been doing
about the problem:
Now, let's look at priorities. You know we 
went on the Libyan raid . . . because we 
were worried to death that Gaddafi might be 
building up chemical weapons. We've got
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chemical warfare conducted against our 
children on the streets in this country all 
day every day, and we don't have the will to 
stamp it out.
Perot indicated that when the insiders could do something 
that was simple and would make them look good and get re­
elected, they did. However, when they needed to do 
something really hard and tough, they did not. Perot cast 
the experts as not being committed to upholding any type of 
virtue for this country at all, but merely personal 
success.
Perot also used the drug question to extend his theme 
of putting people in charge again: "Now, if I get up
there, if you send me . . ." Perot does not state that he 
would "win" the election, or he would even be "elected."
He communicated that if he went to Washington it would be 
because the people had spoken and had sent him.
Clinton responded to the legalization of drugs 
question by extending his "I am one of the people" claim. 
Clinton stated: "I know more about this [drugs], I think,
than anybody else up here because I have a brother w h o 1s a 
recovering drug addict. If drugs were legal, I don't think 
he'd be alive today." Clinton indicated that he had 
suffered with many of the same problems and many of the 
same pains which the average person had.
The next question was from John Mashek and addressed 
the problems of racial division in this country. Perot 
used his answer to criticize the old expert system and
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promote his new system controlled by the people:
The first thing I'd do is, during political 
campaigns, I would urge everybody to stop 
trying to split this country into fragments 
and appeal to the differences between us 
. . .  We are all in this together. We ought 
to love one another because united teams win 
and divided teams lose . . . Our diversity is 
our strength . . .  We have got to unite and 
pull together.
Perot advocated that the government needed to be more
accountable to the people for their actions and should
strive for a more moral community.
When Clinton was asked to address the issue of racial
strife in the country, he responded: "I grew up in the
segregated South, thankfully raised by a grandfather with
almost no formal education but with a heart of gold who
taught me early that all people were created equal in the
eyes of God." Clinton tried to show that he had strong
ties to grassroots America and that he came from a moral
environment and community. With these words, he endorsed
the virtue of ordinary people.
Following the racial division question, Bush was asked
why he felt his administration was being criticized for not
doing enough about AIDS. In his answer, Bush openly
criticized a sports hero and a gay rights group. Regarding
Magic Johnson's decision to resign from the President's
AIDS Commission, Bush exclaimed: "I was a little
disappointed in Magic . . . "  Considering Magic Johnson's
enormous following of sports fans and the sympathy he had
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received since his public announcement regarding being HIV 
positive, criticizing Johnson cast Bush as divisive, 
immoral and not committed to the public good. Following 
his comment about Magic Johnson, Bush further alienated 
another segment of the public by declaring that AIDS was a 
result of immoral behavior and that ACT-UP, a gay rights 
movement, was wrong to engage in some of the efforts they 
did:
And the other thing is part of AIDS —  it's 
one of the few diseases where behavior matters.
And once I called somebody, "Well, change your 
behavior. Is the behavior you're using prone 
to cause AIDS? Change the behavior . . . You 
can't talk about it rationally. The extremes 
are hurting the AIDS cause. To go to a 
Catholic mass in a beautiful cathedral in New 
York under the cause of helping in AIDS and 
start throwing condoms around in the mass,
I'm sorry, I think it sets back the cause.
If Bush was attempting to be virtuous, his attempt excites
partisan comparisons between segments of the community
rather than a vision of a moral community.
Perot responded to the AIDS question by indicating how
the system was flawed and not helping the people. Perot
expressed compassion in his answer and identified with the
sentiments of many of the members of the electorate:
If you're going to die, you don't have to go 
through this ten-year cycle that FDA goes 
through on new drugs. Believe me, people with 
AIDS are more than willing to take that risk.
We could be moving out to the human population 
a whole lot faster then we are on some to 
these new drugs.
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Thus, Perot envisioned a society in which citizens would be
empowered to take direct action.
In his response to the question about AIDS research,
Clinton appeared to abandon his previous grassroots
solution in favor of a top down general staff solution, one
run by experts who placed citizens in the position of
clients or participants. Clinton outlined several plans
which he felt should be implemented, but all of them would
be executed under federal auspices:
We need to put one person in charge of the 
battle against AIDS to cut across all the 
agencies that deal with it. We need to 
accelerate the drug approval process. We 
need to fully fund the act named for that 
wonderful boy Ryan White to make sure we're 
doing everything we can on research and 
treatment.
The model was clearly Sgt. Shriver and the War on Poverty, 
the results of which Clinton had earlier criticized.
The next question came from Ann Compton who asked Ross 
Perot how he intended to execute the many controversial 
changes he had proposed during his campaign. Perot 
reversed the conventional wisdom of consultants who speak 
in terms of constituency and interest. Perot spoke of a 
public or people who existed as a coherent force. Thus he 
invoked a concept dear to the hearts of believers in the 
tradition of civic discourse:
If I get there it will be because the people, 
not the special interests, put me there . . . 
w e ’re going to inform the people in detail on 
the issues through an electronic town hall so
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that they really know what1s going on . . . 
the lobbyists, the PAC guys, the foreign 
lobbyists, and what have you, they'll be over 
at there in the Smithsonian . . . because we 
are going to get rid of them. And then the 
Congress will listen to the people.
Thus, Perot described a binary tension of good and evil
terms. On one side were the interests and on the other,
"the people." His rhetorical formation was reminiscent of
W. J. Bryan's "masses vs. classes" dichotomies. Later in
his answer on the same question, Perot attacked the
government's lack of accountability to "the people:" "This
is a town where the White House says, Congress did it;
Congress says, the White House did it . . . Then when they
get off by themselves, they say nobody did it." Perot's
formula for attaining a legitimate political system will
follow from his restoration of a public sphere. The
authentic voice of the people will run the government and
the government will be accountable to the people for what
they do.
In responding to Perot's answer, Bush did not pursue 
systematic attacks. He used his time to attack the 
Democratic party. Bush stated: "Every 4 years, the
Democrats go around and say, Republicans are going to cut 
Social Security and Medicare. They started it again . . . 
whether it's Mondale, Dukakis, whoever else it is." In 
other words, legitimacy is threatened by diverse 
strategies. Bush did not rise to the opportunity to affirm
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the transcendent theme of the public good and the virtue of
a reinstated citizenry.
When the candidates were asked to provide their
closing statements, Perot spoke first and concluded the
debate by reinforcing his platform of servanthood to the
people and the need to clean out the failed experts:
I love this country. I love the principle 
it's founded on. I love the people here 
. . .  We just have a bad system . . . I'm 
doing this for your children . . .  I owe you 
this, and I'm doing it for you . . . I'll 
give you everything I have, if you want me 
to do it.
Perot endorsed patriotism and piety as public virtue.
Although he had spent a great deal of time in the
first debate identifying himself as one with the people,
Clinton's closing statement concerned his actual political
practice, strategies, and tactics. These resembled those
of a policy wonk who would "fix things" rather than one who
would energize and inspire the people:
I'd like to thank the computer executives 
and the electronics executives, 2/3 of whom 
are Republicans, who said they wanted to sign 
on to a change in America. I'd like to thank 
the hundreds of executives who came to Chicago,
1/3 of them republicans, who said they wanted 
a change.
While rising out of the people, Clinton argued that he had 
the support of many of the leaders of industry, commerce, 
and high technology. His message was mixed. His discourse 
in the first debate indicated that he was both well 
connected with the experts, yet his heart belonged to the
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people. His call for the restoration of legitimacy (re-
invention of government) sounded a note of virtue, but
lacked a strong element of civic participation, and too
often it addressed constituent needs as opposed to a
transcendent public good.
Bush was the final candidate to speak and in his
closing comments he returned to his accomplishments in
foreign affairs as having given him the experience needed
over the other candidates to be president. Bush made
several references to his past four years as President with
an air of an insider, an uncommon man whose vision was
international. It did not include the local and immediate
human concerns of the citizenry:
Let me tell you a little what it's like to 
be president . . . you need a philosophical 
underpinning. Mine for foreign affairs is 
democracy and freedom, and look at the 
dramatic changes around the world. The Cold 
War is over. The Soviet Union is no more 
and we're working with a democratic country.
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltics 
are free. Take a look at the Middle East.
We had to stand up to a tyrant.
Bush appeared to set his claim upon foreign policy, an
issue in which the citizenry had least input and control.
Casting himself as an historic personality, Bush also took
a great deal of credit for success abroad with little
acknowledgement of the role of the people. With so much
attention in the debates focused on how the political
system of experts had failed the people, Bush's arguments
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seemed a paradigm case of one who was out of touch with the 
system.
Debate Two
The second televised debate began with a question from
an audience member directed specifically to Ross Perot.
The audience member asked: "What will you do as president
to open foreign markets to fair competition from American
business?" Perot indicted the expert political system and
reminded the people that they would control the system in
his political order:
That's right at the top of my agenda. We've 
shipped millions of jobs overseas and we have 
a strange situation because we have a process 
in Washington where after you've served for 
awhile, you cash in, become a foreign lobbyist, 
make $30,000 a month, then take a leave, work 
on presidential campaigns, make sure you've 
got good contacts and then go back out . . .
If the people send me to Washington the first 
thing I'll do is study that 2000-page agreement 
[NAFTA] and make sure its a two-way street.
Perot appealed to the topos of authority by attacking the
experts system which was corrupt. A by-product of his
indictment was to implicate his opponents as being a part
of that system. Additionally, Perot included the topos of
citizenship in his answer when he reminded the people that
they would have to decide to send him to Washington. The
public would have to take charge and decide which political
system they wanted.
President Bush responded to the audience member's
question about foreign markets and American jobs by using
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the jargon of the political insiders. He stated:
I have just negotiated with the president of 
Mexico the North American Free Trade Agreement 
—  and the Prime Minister of Canada . . .  I 
believe in free trade . . .  so I will keep on 
as president trying to get a successful 
conclusion to the GATT Round, the big Uruguay 
Round of trade . . .  I want to get one with 
Eastern Europe, Chile . . .
Only experts would be familiar with these terms and
understand the full impact which these issues had upon a
global market. Also, only a true insider could claim to
have ties with other world leaders. As a result of his
answer, Bush began the second debate by reminding the
audience that he was a political expert, an insider, and
the role of the citizen was deferred to the experts in his
political order.
The next question was directed at Governor Clinton and
an audience member asked:
In the real world, that is, outside of 
Washington DC, compensation and achievement 
are based on goals defined and achieved. My 
question is about the deficit. Would you 
define in specific dollar goals how much you 
would reduce the deficit in each of the 4 
years of a Clinton administration and then 
enter into a legally binding contract with 
the American people, that if you did not 
achieve those goals that you would not seek 
a second term? Answer yes or no and then 
comment on your answer.
Governor Clinton's first response to the question was "no,"
he would not make such an agreement and then he proceeded
to explain why. In his answer, Clinton returned to the
tactic he employed in the first debate of name dropping
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experts who supported his plans and his candidacy. Clinton 
reminded the people: "Nine Nobel prize winners and over
500 economists and hundreds of business people, including a 
lot of Republicans said, this [his plan] is the way you've 
got to go." Clinton demonstrated that he was well 
connected and supported by experts.
In addressing the reduction of the deficit, Perot 
asserted that he would assume direct responsibility 
(accountability). He further noted that he had been 
"drafted" by the people because others had failed: "I'm
just a businessman . . . The American people asked me to 
get into it [the race] . . . Now it's not the republicans' 
fault, and it's not the democrats', and what I'm looking 
for is who did it? . . . Somebody somewhere has to take 
responsibility for this."
Bush responded to the deficit question with a 
technical-legal solution, the passage of a balanced budget 
amendment:
Give us a balanced budget amendment. He 
[Clinton] always talks about Arkansas having 
a balanced budget, but he has a balanced 
budget amendment. I'd like to have what 43 
governors have - the line item veto, so if 
Congress can't cut, let the president have a 
shot at it.
Bush attributed Clinton's success to legal compliance. He 
argued that passage of a similar law would produce a 
similar result. Legal coercion rather than voluntary and 
creative action was the order of the day. The answer
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appeared to indicate that Bush did not believe that the 
government could not be accountable to the people unless 
forced to by law. The topos of moral authority was not 
upheld.
Bush further muddied the government accountability 
issue when during his answer to the budget deficit 
question, he proposed an additional solution to balancing 
the budget. Bush indicated that he would like to offer the 
American public the chance to pay off the debt by checking 
a box on their income tax forms which would force Congress 
to put a specified amount of money toward the debt. This 
proposal made Bush appear as if he was trying to pass his 
responsibility off on the public perhaps already cynical 
about the "off-budget" financing of Congress. The audience 
was left wondering in what way Bush saw himself and the 
government accountable beyond legal necessity and technical 
fixes.
The next question came from an audience member who
urged the candidates to stop attacking one another's
character and stick to issues. The audience member asked:
The amount of time the candidates have spent 
in this campaign trashing their opponents' 
character and their program is depressingly 
large. Why can't your discussions and 
proposals reflect the genuine complexity and 
the difficulty of the issues to try to build 
a consensus around the best aspect of all 
proposals?
While Perot promised that he would not mud sling and stick 
to the issues, he did incorporate an attack message which
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seemed to diminish the others while praising his candidacy
and bashing the present system. Perot stated:
I couldn't agree with you more. Let's get 
off mud wrestling, let's get off personalities 
and let’s talk about jobs, health care, crime, 
the things that concern the American people.
I'm spending my money, not PAC money, not 
foreign money my money to take this message 
to the people."
Bush had a difficult time handling the request from 
the audience member asking each candidate to stop the 
character assassinations and mud slinging and to just stick 
to the issues of the campaign. Rather than agree to the 
request or acknowledge any wrong doing on his part, Bush 
defended his actions. He began his answer by saying "In 
the first place, I believe that character is a part of 
being president." This statement implied that if he could 
prove that he was the only candidate with the appropriate 
character required to be president, then his negative 
campaign attack messages would be justified. Bush then 
pointed his finger at Clinton as having started the 
exchanges of negative attacks in the first place. He 
explained: "I think the first negative campaign run in
this election was by governor Clinton, and I'm not going to 
sit here and be a punching bag; I'm going to stand up and 
say, hey, listen, here's my side of it." Bush seemed 
unable to manage the transcendent gesture.
Clinton used his response to the request to stop the 
negative campaigning to demonstrate how he had spent the
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past year offering town hall meetings and thus engaged in 
offering issues rather than images to the people. He might 
be well connected with leading experts, but he was still 
one of the people. Clinton explained: "I suggested this
format tonight. I started doing these formats a year ago 
in New Hampshire and I found that we had huge crowds 
because all I did was let the people ask questions and I 
tried to give very specific answers." Thus, Clinton 
endorsed the topos of citizenship, placing the citizens at 
the heart of the political process. He had sought their 
ideas and shared in their deliberations.
Unsatisfied with the candidate's answers, a second 
audience member stood and pressed the candidates to make an 
even stronger commitment of just sticking to the issues.
The audience member exclaimed: "Could we cross our hearts?
It sounds silly here but could we make a commitment? You 
know, we're not under any oath at this point but could you 
make a commitment to the citizens of the US to meet our 
needs, and not yours. Its a real need that I think we all 
have."
President Bush was the first to respond to the pledge 
request and stated: "I think it depends how you define
it." Bush appeared to quibble over definitions before a 
weary electorate. In so doing, he completely violated the 
topos of virtue. His needs and his agenda were more 
important than what was good for the people.
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When Perot was pressed to take the pledge he quickly
affirmed a portrait of the public as a long suffering body,
tired of bickering and demanding serious action: "Just no
hedges, no ifs, ands or buts. I'll take the pledge because
I know the American people want to talk about issues and
not tabloid journalism. So I'll take the pledge and will
stay on the issues." Perot was the only candidate to step
forward and make such a pledge.
Perot did, however, follow up his statement by noting
that he could remain more virtuous than his rivals:
Now just for the record, I don't have any 
spin doctors. I don't have any speech writers 
. . . but you don't have to wonder if its me 
talking . . .  I don't have any foreign money 
. . .  no foreign lobbyists . . .  no PAC money 
. . . I've got 5.5 million hard-working people 
who put me on the ballot and I belong to them."
And he was, after all, only running for president because
the people had asked him to.
The next question from the audience regarded the
infrastructure of the nation. The audience member asked:
"What are your plans to improve the physical infrastructure
of this nation, which includes the water systems, the sewer
systems, our transportation systems, etc?" The question
indicated that the citizen believed there to be a problem.
President Bush preferred to accept the implicit indictment
of the question: "We passed the most furthest looking
transportation bill in the history of this country - $150
billion for improving the infrastructure." The failure of
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other infrastructure bills were blamed on a bad Congress.
Bush declared:
We go to Washington and its very difficult 
to get it [bills] through Congress. But 
there’s going to be a new Congress. No one 
likes gridlock. There's going to be a new 
Congress because the old one [was full of 
scandals]. You're going to have a lot of 
new members of Congress. And then you can 
say, help me pass these programs.
Bush invalidated the citizen's concerns by implying that
the indictment was exaggerated. Inadequacies were not his
fault; the blame rested with Congress. Bush came closer
to attacking the legitimacy of the system, but minimized
his own accountability in the process.
Clinton used his response to the infrastructure
question to attack the "experts" who had corrupted the
political system. Clinton referred to an infrastructure
bill being presented to Congress at that time which
addressed an issue referred to as enterprise zones.
Clinton declared: "That bill pays for these urban
enterprise zones by asking the wealthiest American to pay a
little more. And that's why he wants to veto it, just like
he vetoed an earlier bill this year." The relationship of
this response to legitimation is complex. On the one hand
it attacked prevailing practices as ignoring the public
good; on the other hand it played the old class card,
acknowledging that Americans are deeply divided by income,
residence, and interest. No transcendent or consensual
note is sounded.
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The candidates were next asked to state their position
on gun control. The audience member queried:
As you are aware, crime is rampant in our 
cities. And in the Richmond area —  and I'm 
sure it's happened elsewhere —  12-year-olds 
are carrying guns to school. And I'm sure 
when our Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution 
they did not mean for the right to bear arms 
to apply to 12-year-olds. So I'm asking:
Where do you stand on gun control, and what 
do you plan to do about it?
Clinton used his response to endorse civil order and
condemn partisanship. Clinton explained: "There is a
crime bill which would put more police on the street, which
was killed this session by a filibuster in the Senate,
mostly by Republican Senators, and I think it's a shame it
didn t pass. With his answer, Clinton appeared to be
advocating a basic coalition of community: civil order and
safety while placing republicans on the side of special
interests. He could not, however, resist an attack which
may have sounded too fluent and professional to the
disaffiliated millions outside of either party and to the
Perot loyalists who were beginning a new world.
In his response to the question of gun control, Perot
referred to his platform for letting the people decide.
According to Perot: "This is going to take, first,
building a consensus at grassroots America. Right from the
bottom up, the American people have got to say they want it
. . . take it to the people." For Perot, the citizens
would have to decide first, then he [the government] would
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be accountable to execute the will of the people. Citizen
wisdom and virtue would set the agenda, force the issue,
and sit in judgement on their execution.
Next, an audience member stood and asked: "Please
state your position on term limits, and, if you are in
favor of them, how will you get them enacted?" Bush
responded first and provided a very interesting response.
He began by stating that he strongly supported term limits
for members of Congress. Bush then explained his answer.
Placing term limits on Congress was a way of getting the
Democrats out of the House of Representatives and filling
it with Republicans. If that would happen then Bush could
accomplish all sorts of plans. Bush stated: "For 38 years
one party has controlled the House of Representatives, and
the result, a sorry little post office that can't do
anything right and a bank that has more overdrafts than all
the Chase Bank and Citibank put together." While Bush
appeared to be in support of the will of the people, he had
framed his answer in terms of partisan advantage.
Clinton's response to the question of term limits
provided one of the best examples of his platform of an
essentially "fix-it-up" attitude toward the system.
Clinton explained that small changes might be effective:
I'm against them [term limits] . . . Now let 
me tell you what I favor instead. I favor 
strict controls on how much you can spend 
running for Congress, strict limits on 
political action committees, requirements that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
people running for Congress appear in open
public debates like we're doing now.
Clinton's remedy did not match his earlier critique of 
government, but it was uttered in a style that sounded bold 
and reminded this writer that legitimacy is a feeling, not 
wholly rational or consistently definable. Under Clinton's 
remedy, career politicians could stay in office as long as 
they wanted or could get elected, but the people could rest 
comfortably knowing that all of the elections would be fair 
and honest because the candidates would always debate the 
issues publicly. Legitimacy appeared to be an uneven 
affair for Clinton. On one issue it was irretrievable, on 
another easily recoverable.
In his response to the issue of term limits, Perot was 
very clear and straightforward in his answer stating that 
he would set an example of how a true servant of the people 
should act. Perot declared: "If the American people send
me up to do this job, I intend to be there one term. I do 
not intend to spend one minute thinking about re-election 
. . . I would take absolutely no compensation; I go as 
their servant." He concluded his answer by pointing out 
that the people in Washington were basically good people, 
they were just "in a bad system. I don't think there are 
any villains, but, boy, is the system rotten." Perot took 
a firm stand regarding how he viewed the government's 
accountability to the people. The government was to serve 
the people, and he would go to Washington as the ultimate
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example of a true servant, taking no pay and serving for 
just one term. Perot consistently separated system from 
people. People equaled good, virtue, wisdom, and 
competence. The system equaled evil, corruption, short 
sightedness, and foolishness.
The next question in the debate came from an audience 
member who wanted to know: "Do you attribute the rising
costs of health care to the medical profession itself, or 
do you think the problem lies elsewhere? And what specific 
proposals do you have to tackle this problem?"
In Perot's response, he cleverly noted that the 
question itself was symptomatic of citizen alienation:
You own this country but you have no voice in 
it the way it's organized now. You have a 
government that comes at you. You're supposed 
to have a government that comes from you .
Now, you've got to have a government that 
comes from you. You've got to reassert your 
ownership in this country and you've got to 
completely reform our government.
Perot used his answer to remind the audience that the
present system did not conform to a Jeffersonian ideal
type, and he proposed they reclaim it.
At this point in the debate an audience member stood
and asked each of the candidates: "How has the national
debt personally affected each of your lives? And if it
hasn t, how can you honestly find a cure for the economic
problems of the common people if you have no experience in
what's ailing them?" Perot responded that the size of the
national debt had acted as a call, it had caused him to
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leave his private life and get involved in the campaign. 
Evoking the old Roman ideal of Cincinnatus, who had left 
the plough to save his country and then returned to his 
farm, Perot had left his affairs to save his country from 
danger too. Perot appeared selfless, truly committed to 
the pubic good.
Bush had difficulty framing the question and his 
answer was nearly incoherent. The questioner and Bush 
engaged in a tense exchange:
Bush: Well, I think the national debt affects
everybody.
Audience Participant: You personally.
Bush: Obviously it has a lot to do with interest
rates . . .
Simpson (Moderator): She's saying, You personally.
Participant: You, on a personal basis - how has it
affected you?
Simpson: Has it affected you personally?
Bush: I'm sure it has. I love my grandchildren...
Participant: How?
Bush: I want to think that they're going to be able
to afford an education. I think that's an 
important part of being a parent. If the 
question —  maybe I —  get it wrong. Are 
you suggesting that if somebody has means 
that the national debt doesn't affect them?
Participant: What I'm saying is . . .
Bush: I'm not sure I get - help me with the question
and I'll try to answer it.
Participant: Well, I've had friends that have been
laid off from jobs.
Bush: Yeah.
Participant: I know people who cannot afford to pay
the mortgage on their homes, their car 
payment. I have personal problems with the 
national debt. But how has it affected you 
and if you have no experience in it, 
how can you help us, if you don't know what 
we're feeling?
Bush: Well, listen, you ought to be in the White
House for a day and hear what I hear and see 
what I see and read the mail I read . . .
But I don't think it's fair to say, you
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
haven't had cancer. Therefore you don't 
know what’s it like. I don't think it's 
fair to say that if you haven't been hit by 
it personally . . .
Bush responded as if he were under personal attack. In his
clumsiness, he lost an opportunity to identify his own fate
with that of ordinary citizens and to make their struggle
one with his struggle.
Clinton used his response to the question to attack
the incompetence of past administrations:
I'll tell you how it's affected me. Every
year Congress and the president sign laws
that make us do more things and gives us less 
money to do it with. I see people in my 
state, their taxes have gone up in Washington 
and their services have gone down while the 
wealthy have gotten tax cuts.
Clinton's response depicted an institution fundamentally
illegitimate in the sense that it was no longer doing the
job it had been licensed to do. With more money, it
provided fewer services to the average person while making
more laws to protect their own economic interests.
The candidates were next questioned about the future
of social security and pension funds. The audience member
stated: "I would like from each of you a specific response
as to what you intend to do for retirees relative to these
issues [social security and pension funds], not
generalities but specifics because I think they're very
disturbing issues." President Bush used the question to
affirm the solvency of present arrangements. In his
response, Bush made such statements as: "The Social
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Security system was fixed about 5 years ago, and I think 
it's projected out to be sound beyond that . . . .  The full 
faith and credit of the United States, in spite of our 
difficulties, is still pretty good." Bush indicated that 
the experts had already fixed the problem and everything 
was under control. Citizen input was not sought.
The candidates were next asked by an audience member: 
"We've come to a position where we're in the new world 
order, and I'd like to know what the candidates feel our 
position is in this new world order, and what our 
responsibilities are as a superpower?" President Bush 
seized the opportunity to remind the audience that he had 
been conspicuously active in creating the new order. Bush 
informed the audience that "Since I became president, 43,
44 countries have gone democratic, no longer totalitarian .
. . NATO has kept the peace for many." While his 
experience in foreign policy was much stronger than the 
other two candidates, Bush's answer celebrated past 
achievement rather than envisioning the future role of the 
US in the new order. Nor did his remarks indicate a place 
for youthful adventure or endeavor as Kennedy had 
articulated in 1960 or Reagan's vision of a beacon of hope 
in the 1980's.
Yet an audience member stood and asked "How can we 
create high paying jobs with the education system we have 
and what would you do to change it?" In his response,
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Perot emphasized the need to do the best for the children 
and that meant that education reform should not be a 
Federal job, but a matter for committees, even 
neighborhoods to decide. Perot declared: "By and large,
it [reform] should be local —  the more local the better .
. . You need small schools, not big schools." Perot 
celebrated the tradition of parent participation and local 
school governance. By allowing schools to be governed 
locally, Perot demonstrated one of the ways in which he 
intended to return the prerogatives of government back to 
the people.
Each of the candidates was then asked: "When do you
estimate your party will both nominate and elect an Afro- 
American and female ticket to the presidency of the US?" 
President Bush appeared uncomfortable and his non-verbal 
cues suggested he regarded the question as an unjust 
accusation. After struggling awkwardly to provide names of 
minorities or women whom he felt could be on a presidential 
ticket in 1996, Bush observed: "This is supposed to be the
year of the woman in the Senate. Let's see how they do." 
While Bush may not have intended this statement to be 
flippant, viewers of the debate might easily have 
interpreted it that way.
Perot's closing statement for the second debate was 
less coherent than his closing remarks in the first debate. 
In the second debate he used his closing statement to
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address several loose ends regarding policies and plans 
which he apparently had not been able to complete during 
the debate. His characteristic Jeffersonian appeal 
celebrated the amateur ideal of the citizen-statesman: "If
the American people want to do it and not talk about it, 
then they ought to —  you know, I'm the person they ought 
to consider . . .  I am action oriented . . .  I didn't 
create this mess. I ’ve been paying taxes just like you." 
Perot attempted to identify himself as a regular citizen 
who wanted to give the government back to the people. His 
energetic demeanor recalled "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," 
a no-nonsense tribute of the people confident he could 
overhaul the system.
In his closing statement, Governor Clinton began by 
taking credit for suggesting the format for the evening, 
hoping the people now felt more in touch with the 
candidates and reminding them that they already had a 
little more say in their government. This allowed Clinton 
to demonstrate respect for the people by facilitating their 
role as questioner and judge. Clinton spent the reminder 
of his closing statement detailing his experience as 
Governor of Arkansas. Clinton highlighted such 
accomplishments as better schools, ranking first in the 
country in job growth, fourth in the country in income 
growth, and having balanced twelve consecutive budgets. 
Clinton was banking on his political experience in Arkansas
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to convince the public that he had the experience needed to 
be president because he knew how to work within political 
systems. Clinton also added that "we've had 24 retired 
generals and admirals, hundreds of business people, many of 
them republican, support my campaign." His experience in 
politics had left him well connected with the experts 
across a broad range of domains and backgrounds. He could 
marshall the experts on our behalf. Clinton appeared to 
present himself as both favoring and opposing the expert, 
while addressing the ordinary citizen alternately as 
partner and client.
Debate Three
The third debate began with moderator Jim Lehrer
asking Governor Clinton about his budget deficit plans.
Lehrer's question seemed phrased in a way that would force
the governor to deal in specific terms:
You are promising to create jobs, reduce the 
deficit, reform the health care system, 
rebuild the infrastructure, guarantee college 
education for everyone who is qualified, among 
many other things, all with financial pain 
only for the very rich. Some people are having 
trouble apparently believing that is possible.
Should they have that concern?
Clinton began his response by criticizing the present tax
structure as unequal and unjust:
Middle-class Americans are basically the only 
group of Americans who've been taxed more in 
the 1980's and during the last twelve years, 
even though their incomes have gone down.
The wealthiest Americans have been taxed much 
less, even though their incomes have gone up 
. . .  My plan is a departure from trickle-
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down economics . . . it's also a departure 
from tax-and-spend . . .  my plan proposes 
that we invest and grow.
Clinton argued that the present system had been run by and
for the wealthy, while it hurt the average middle-class
taxpayer. He also attempted to define himself as a new
type of Democrat, not associated with past Democratic
presidencies which had supported a tax-and-spend mentality,
a philosophy which Bush had tried to associate Clinton with
all through the campaign.
Bush was provided one minute to respond to Clinton's
opening comments and used the time to engage in negative
attacks against Clinton. Bush attempted to associate
Clinton with past Democratic presidencies: "Remember what
it was like under Jimmy Carter and inflation was 15
percent?" Bush then criticized Clinton's record in
Arkansas. His direct assault on the governor's record
appeared gratuitous in the generally positive debate: "I
think its time I start putting things in perspective. It's
not dirty campaigning because h e 's been talking about my
record for a half a year, so we've got to do it. I gotta
get in a perspective."
Finally, Ross Perot was provided an opportunity for
his opening statement, and responded to what Clinton and
Bush had said in their opening comments. Perot simply
noted that he did not think that the other candidates'
plans would balance the budget and then used the rest of
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his time to remind the audience that his own plan would
develop as a result of public deliberation. Referring to
his several infomercials he had sponsored, Perot stated:
The one thing I have done is lay it squarely 
on the table in front of the American people.
You've had a number of occasions to see in 
detail what the plan is, and at least you'll 
understand it. I think that's fundamental 
in our country, that you know what you’re 
getting into.
Perot continued to identify the present government with 
exclusivity and arrogance, characteristics inimical to 
institutional legitimacy.
The next question in the debate came from moderator 
Jim Lehrer who asked President Bush to respond to criticism 
regarding Bush's character. Lehrer explained: "You have
been criticized to have begun focussing on the economy, or 
health care, or racial division in this country, only after 
they became crises. Is that a fair criticism?" Bush 
responded that it was not fair and explained why it was 
not. After Bush responded, Lehrer turned to Ross Perot and 
said "Do you think that's true Mr. Perot?" Perot 
immediately responded "I'd like to just talk about the 
issues." Mr. Leher rephrased the question, still goading 
Perot to seize the opportunity to attack Bush. Perot 
responded a second time, "I will let the American people 
decide that. I would rather not critique the two 
candidates." Citing his pledge in the second debate not to
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attack the other candidates, Perot appeared serious and
statesmanlike.
Perot was next challenged with a question regarding
his dedication and commitment. Having walked away from
General Motors when he could not get his way, and having
withdrawn from the presidential race in mid-July, only to
re-enter in late September, Perot was asked to explain if
those actions indicated how he would act as a President.
After providing a long list of services he had rendered to
the United States as examples of his commitment to the
Nation, Perot managed to use his withdrawal and return to
the presidential campaign as a way to further his argument
as a response to the call of the people:
I never quit supporting you as you put me on 
the ballot in the other 26 states; and when 
you asked me to come back in, I came back in.
And talk about not quitting, I'm spending my 
money on this campaign; the two parties are 
spending your money, taxpayer money. I put 
my wallet on the table for you and your 
children.
The next question in the debate regarded the auto 
industry and CAFE standards. Jim Lehrer asked Ross Perot 
"Just for the record, I take it you do not have a position 
on whether or not enforcing CAFE standards will cost jobs 
in the auto industry?" Perot quickly responded that yes, 
it would cost jobs. President Bush spoke after Perot and 
led the debate topic from CAFE standards to NAFTA. When 
Bush completed his statements, Lehrer turned to Governor 
Clinton and sought his response to the topic. Clinton
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indicated that he thought NAFTA was a good idea but he 
could make it better. Bush re-entered the conversation at 
this point and tried to use Clinton's answer to suggest 
Clinton lacked vital experience to negotiate the agreement. 
Bush's past experience as president (expert), qualified him 
to know what the system required. As Bush described it: 
"See, he made my case. On the one hand its a good deal but 
on the other hand I'd make it better. You can't do that as 
president, you have to take clear positions on one side or 
the other." President Bush attempted to reaffirm public 
identification with one of his on-going administrative 
goals.
Responding to an attack on his character, Clinton
attempted to justify his apparent fluidity on positions as
a deep respect for the American people and a concern for
the complexity of difficult regulations:
That's what's wrong with Mr. Bush. His whole 
deal is you've gotta be for it or against it, 
you can't make it better. I believe we can 
be better. I think the American people are 
sick and tired of either/or solutions, people 
being pushed in the corner, polarized to 
extremes. I think they want somebody with 
common sense who can do what's best for the 
American people . . . this election ought to 
be about the American people.
Clinton framed his reputed uncertainty as willingness to
seek out and ascertain the will of the people. Clinton
defined the public as unsure of the future of NAFTA and
indicated that their uncertainty required respect.
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Following the exchange between Governor Clinton and
President Bush, Perot was given an opportunity to respond
to the volley of arguments. Perot spent a majority of his
response arguing that the other candidates1 pro-NAFTA
positions were motivated by hidden agendas created by
influence from foreign lobbyists:
Our country has sold out to foreign lobbyists.
We don't have free trade. Both parties have 
foreign lobbyists on leaves in key roles in 
their campaigns. And if there is anything 
more unwise than that, I don't know what it 
is. I would like for them to look you in the 
eye and tell you why they have people 
representing foreign countries working on 
their campaigns . . . One country spent $400 
million lobbying in 1988, our country. And 
it goes on and on. And you look at a who's 
who in these campaigns around the two 
candidates. They're foreign lobbyists.
Perot implied that the other candidates did not have the
interest of the American people as their first priority,
but were influenced by secret insider deals. This implicit
attack seemed an ironic counterpoint to Perot's pledge to
forgo explicit attacks of his competitors.
Moderator Lehrer then turned to Bush and asked: "Mr.
President, how do you respond to that? Mr. Perot's made
that charge several times. The fact that you have people
working in your campaign who are paid foreign lobbyists."
Bush responded: "Most people that are lobbying are
lobbying Congress. And I don't think there's anything
wrong with an honest person who happens to represent an
interest of another country for making his case. That’s
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the American way." Bush openly defended lobbyists, a group
who had been presented as a symbol of corrupt government.
Bush defended lobbyists as a part of the system, which
despite the attacks had long been a part of the "American
way." If Perot had raised any suspicion regarding
lobbyists in the minds of the audience with his constant
attacks against them, Bush may have fed those suspicions
with his comments and alienated many voters. Bush's
position could easily be interpreted as a violation of the
topos of accountability and fairness in striking contrast
to Perot's rejection of floating careerists as the
antithesis of accountability.
Assuming a reformer's stance on the issue of
lobbyists, Governor Clinton took a position representing
the apparent middle ground:
I think we need more restrictions on 
lobbyists. We ought to make them disclose 
the people they've given money to when 
they're testifying before congressional 
committees; we ought to close the lawyers' 
loopholes; they ought to have to disclose 
when they're really lobbying.
By requiring lobbyists to be more accountable, Clinton
appeared to attempt to make professional and citizen
politics seem compatible. The current system would remain
the same with lobbyists influencing decisions, but the
public need not be afraid because lobbyists would practice
full disclosure. His position smacked more of the
information society than Jeffersonian America.
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At the midpoint of the third debate, the format 
switched from a moderator asking questions to a set of 
questions proposed by a panel of journalists. While the 
moderator was trying to move to the second format, Perot 
quickly interrupted to respond to a final statement Bush 
had just made regarding domestic affairs. Perot 
interjected: "I was put on the ballot by the people, not
special interests, so I have to stand up for myself . . . "  
Perot claimed that even though he should not interrupt, the 
people's interests transcended polite format and expedient 
agreements.
The second half of the debate began with UPI writer 
Helen Thomas who asked the candidates to comment on 
Governor Clinton's military record and his behavior during 
the Vietnam War. After Bush and Clinton had expressed 
their views, Perot was given one minute to respond. He 
simply stated: "I look on this as history. I don't look
on it personally as relevant, and I consider it really a 
waste of time tonight, when you consider the issues that 
face our country right now." Perot cast himself as 
presidential, future oriented and focussed on issues rather 
than personalities. Apparently his mission was to listen 
to and obey the will of the people.
The next question in the debate regarded President 
Bush's reversal on the tax increases of 1991. Perot used 
his answer to launch a systematic indictment:
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Leadership is to be accountable for what you 
do - . . Nobody ever told the American people 
that we increased spending $1.83 for every 
dollar of taxes raised. That's absolutely 
unconscionable. Both parties carry a huge 
blame for that on their shoulders. This is 
not a way to pay down the deficit. This was 
a trick on the American people . . . Nobody 
takes responsibility for anything. We've 
gotta change that.
Perot vilified the government as mendacious and even
dangerous. His words amount to a promise to restore
legitimacy.
Perot was then confronted by CNN Correspondent Susan
Rook who asked him how he would lead if he was forever
seeking consensus before he acted. In fact she came close
to questioning the existence of a coherent and careful
public opinion. Perot responded that his presidency would
clean out the old corrupt system and all of the negative
influences which presently prohibited the government from
getting anything done. The government would then be placed
back into the hands of the people and that would stimulate
action. Perot explained:
How do you get anything done when you've got 
all of these political action committees, all 
of these thousands of registered lobbyists —
40,000 registered lobbyists, 23,000 special 
interest groups . . . and the average citizen 
out here is just working hard every day.
You've got to go to the people . . . The 
public goes bonkers over town hall meetings 
. . . they'll decide what to think . . . 
because they want the details . . . that's 
going back to where we started. That's having 
a government from the people.
Throughout the debate, Perot’s rhetorical construction of
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"the people" was that of a long suffering citizenry, 
unified in their disgust, and ready to mobilize around 
common sense objectives.
Bush appeared annoyed by the next question asked of 
him regarding why there were so few women in key positions 
in his administration and his campaign. Rather than 
provide a list of names of women who were very influential 
in his administration, Bush appeared to become defensive 
and stated: "This is a little defensive on your part,
Susan, to be honest with you. We've got a very good record 
appointing women to high positions of trust." Bush 
appeared to feel threatened, as if he were demeaned by 
having to undergo examination in a public forum.
When asked about women and minorities in his campaign, 
Clinton politely and courteously provided the names of 
women in key positions in his administration and various 
awards he had received from women's groups for his 
sensitivity and involvement of women in high levels of 
government. By listing the names of women involved in his 
campaign and awards he had won, Clinton appeared to 
demonstrate his deep compassion for, and sensitivity 
towards the needs of the people.
Perot used part of his response time to the "women in 
your campaign" question to make various claims regarding 
how the Bush administration had handled Saddam Hussein. 
Perot accused the Bush administration of creating Hussein
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and covering up their actions by refusing to release papers 
which contained orders sent to Ambassador Glaspie on the 
eve of the Persian Gulf war. Bush interrupted and said 
Perot had attacked national honor and he had to reply. The 
exchange went as follows:
Bush: We did not say to Saddam Hussein you can take
the northern part of Kuwait.
Perot: Well, where are the papers?
Bush: That is absolutely absurd.
Perot: Where are the papers?
Bush: Glaspie has testified, let's be factual.
Perot: Talk to any head of any of those key
committees in the senate. They will not let 
them see the written instructions given to 
Ambassador Glaspie. And I suspect that 
in a free society owned by the people, 
the American people ought to know what we 
told Ambassador Glaspie to tell Saddam 
Hussein . . .I ' d  like to see those written 
instructions.
The verbal exchange was followed by very loud applause and 
cheers from the audience indicating that the people did 
indeed want to know what went on behind closed doors.
Perot appeared to dramatize the suspicion of "the people" 
toward their leader.
During his next response time to a question, Perot 
returned briefly to his clash with Bush and stated: "Now I
say whose country is this? This is ours. Who will get 
hurt if we lay the papers on the table? I just object to 
the fact that we cover up and hide things." This statement 
further indicated Perot's commitment to an informed and 
participative electorate.
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Clinton capitalized on Perot's attacks regarding Bush
and Hussein by emphasizing the incumbent president's status
as an elite insider, an effective leader who nonetheless
made secret deals without informing the American public:
But in late 1989 the president signed a secret 
policy saying we were going to continue to try 
to improve relations with him [Hussein], and 
we sent him some sort of communication on the 
eve of his invasion of Kuwait that we still 
wanted better relations . . .  It was wrong 
to coddle Saddam Hussein when there was no 
reason to do it and when people at high levels 
in our government knew he was trying to do 
things that were outrageous.
Clinton's description separated Bush from the tradition of
the open society while tarnishing his image as a stainless
leader.
In defending his actions with Hussein, Bush responded:
Yes, we tried, and, yes, we failed to bring 
him into the family of nations; he had the 
4th largest army. But then when he moved 
against Kuwait, I said this will not stand.
And it's hard to build a consensus. We went 
to the UN . . . Congress was dragging its 
feet . . .  A president can't always vote 
with the majority. Sometimes he has to act.
Bush appeared to endorse the idea that a president must act
without the consensus or support of the people. Indeed, a
president had enjoyed a crisis mandate, but the end of the
Cold War had weakened their mandate. It must now be
"argued for" to an extent that would have seemed not
necessary a few years previous. Thus his reply seemed more
defensive than magisterial.
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The next question asked Ross Perot what policies he
would change? He seized this opportunity to preach the
Jeffersonian ideology in nearly undiluted form:
In a nutshell, we've got to reform our 
government or we won't get anything done.
We have a government that doesn't work.
It's supposed to come from the people, it 
comes at the people. The people need to 
take their government back. You've got to 
reform Congress, they've got to be the servants 
of the people again . . . but very specifically 
the key thing is to turn the government back to 
the people and take it away from the special 
interests and have people go to Washington to 
serve . . . The American people have had enough.
If I get up there, we're going to clean that up.
You say, how can I get Congress to do that?
I'll have millions of people at my shoulder.
Perot argued a legitimate government would return power to
the people.
In his final response of the night prior to his
closing statement, Clinton engaged in the harshest attack
against Bush which he had made in all three debates.
Clinton criticized Bush for ad hominem attacks noting that
Bush had made the Arkansas Governor's character and trust
the central focus of his campaign:
I really can't believe Mr. Bush is still 
trying to make trust an issue after "read 
my lips" . . .  He still doesn't get it 
. . . they don't want us talking about each 
other. They want us to talk about the 
problems of this country . . . Look at the 
Republicans that have endorsed me. High tech 
executives in Northern California. Look at 
the 24 generals and admirals, retired, that 
have endorsed me, including the deputy 
commander of Desert Storm . . .we've got a 
broad based coalition that goes beyond party 
because I am going to change this country and
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make it better, with the help of the American 
people.
Clinton used his attack to construct a legitimacy so
powerful that it transcended party.
Ironically, Perot, who gave the first opening
statement in the first debate, provided the final closing
statement of the final debate. In his closing remarks,
Perot exclaimed:
To the millions of fine decent people who 
did the unthinkable and took their country
back in their own hands and put me on the
ballot, let me pledge to you that tonight is 
just the beginning. These next two weeks we 
will be going full steam ahead to make sure 
that you get a voice and that you get your 
country back . . . Then the question is, can 
we govern? I love that one. The "we" is you 
and me. You bet your hat we can govern . . . 
you won't tolerate gridlock, you won't tolerate 
endless meandering and wandering around, and 
you won't tolerate non-performance . . . I ' m  
doing this for you: I want you to have the
American dream. I'm doing this because I love 
you. Thank you very much.
Just as he had begun the debates, Perot ended them with
statements advocating a people run government. Perot
argued that the people of the United States deserved a
legitimate government, one in which the citizens were the
primary actors, virtue and public good motivated every
decision, and the government was clearly accountable to the
people. Ross Perot was going to give that type of
government to the people of the United States.
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DISCUSSION
Ross Perot
Throughout the debates, Ross Perot stood steadfastly 
by his platform of restoring the control of the government 
to the people. In so doing he hoped to restore political 
legitimacy to the American political system. He planned to 
rid Washington of special interest groups and lobbyists and 
do only that which the public instructed him to do.
Perot's vision was to establish a political order in which 
all elected officials were true public servants, executing 
only the desires of the people. His concept of the people 
was simplistic but coherent. When "the people" took the 
government back into their own hands they would rid the 
system of all of the corrupt influences, articulate a moral 
and common sense political agenda, and support a leader who 
served that agenda or reject one who did not. By 
developing discourse which highlighted the topoi of 
legitimacy, Perot argued that under his leadership the 
political order would restore citizen participation, 
restore the concept of a public good and nurture a moral 
community, and the government would be completely 
accountable to the people for everything they did.
The televised debates provided Perot with an 
opportunity to expose his political orientation to the many 
members of the electorate who were largely unaware of his 
position. Zhu, Milausky, & Biswas (1994) noted: "The
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audience learned the most about the least known candidate, 
Perot . . . and that helped him improve his image 
considerably" (p. 325). The authors further reported that 
the debates not only informed the viewers about Perot, but 
"it substantially changed the viewers' minds" (p. 326).
Perot's success at attracting viewers' attention may 
have come from his unique approach to the election. Hahn 
(1994) explained that Perot's consistent theme throughout 
the debates was "I'm not a politician, but I want to be 
president —  rather —  you the people want me to be 
president" (p. 192). This ideological approach might have 
seemed primitive or ingenuous in previous elections, but 
the perception of weakened legitimacy of American 
institutions gave his approach saliency and bite. His 
outsider stance appealed to roughly one-fifth of the 
electorate on election day.
Perhaps an additional reason for Perot's success was 
stylistic. Leon (1993) suggested that "Perot's language 
[usage] was the strongest [of the three candidates] in its 
illustration of character. Perot's language revealed the 
greatest indication of human interest and slightly more 
powerful words" (p. 99).
Regardless of whether it was what he said, or how he 
said it, Ross Perot was the dominant candidate in the 1992 
televised debates winning two of the three debates. These 
victories were significant, but could not overcome the
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handicap of his third party status. Perot also failed to 
win a single Electoral College vote. While the public may 
have liked what Perot said, they appeared hesitant to trust 
his ideas enough to give him the opportunity to put them 
into practice.
George Bush
Throughout the debates, Bush largely supported the 
system, and tried to show that not only was the system 
good, but that it worked. For Bush, the system was 
exhausted by the limits essential to a representative 
democracy. "The people" were untrained in governance and 
should accept the decisions made for them by their 
representatives. Bush appeared to believe that if a 
legitimacy crisis existed, its origins were not embedded in 
the deep structure of the system, but in technical failure 
and aberrations.
Bush attempted to capitalize upon his twelve years of 
experience in the White House. He attempted to make 
experience and character the central theme of the debates 
and the campaign. Bush reminded the audience that he had 
the most experience in political office of the three 
candidates and that his experience in foreign policy was 
central to his superior qualifications. Viewers did not 
respond well to the image which Bush attempted to create as 
indicated by the post debate polls. Bush finished last, or 
next to last in every debate.
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Bush made few legitimacy appeals during the 1992
televised debates. If a legitimation crisis existed in the
American political system, he seemed only marginally aware 
of it. The system was good and worked. The system was run 
by experts who know what was best for the public. Bush was 
proud that he was a member of the expert insider group and 
used his past experience as an insider as the factor which 
best qualified him to be president over the other 
candidates. Even if the system had flaws, those flaws are 
a small price for the people to have to pay in order to 
partake of all of the benefits derived from the system.
Leon (1993) noted that Bush's language choice only 
undermined his cause. According to Leon, "Bush's language 
was markedly weaker than his opponents [in the debate]; in 
particular, Bush used less person centered language —  an 
indicator of human interest; and his speech reflected
greater uses of hesitations" (p. 99). Bush apparently used
less person-centered language as he expressed his political 
ideology of government by experienced professional.
Whatever the specific reasons were for his demise,
Bush clearly lost both the debates. He garnered only 16 
percent of the viewers' vote in the first two debates and 
moved up to just 28 percent in the third debate. In the 
general election, Bush attracted only 38 percent of the 
popular vote. After a landslide victory over Dukakis in 
the 1988 presidential election, Bush's 38 percent
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represented a tremendous decline in both party and general 
support^.
Governor Clinton
Clinton expressed both support for, and opposition to 
legitimacy topoi throughout all three debates. Clinton's 
discourse identified him as being on both sides of the 
fence. He would boast of his political experience and 
argued that he knew how to work within the system, yet at 
the same time argued that he was one of the people and had 
suffered right along with them. Whereas Perot wanted to 
completely clean house, and Bush felt the system worked 
fine just as it was, Clinton appeared to want to do both. 
The system was good and could work, but it just needed to 
be modified, to be changed. The ideology of "change" would 
become a buzz word for his campaign and he used it 
extensively throughout the debates.
Ironically, Clinton's attempt to both affirm and deny 
institutional legitimacy was strategically sound. He 
seemed to argue that declining legitimacy in the American 
government could be reversed, and that he could restore 
legitimacy to the political system by serving as a strong 
advocate for the people when placed as the expert into the 
middle of that system.
15A s noted in Chapter One of this dissertation, based 
upon post-election polls, if Perot had not been in the 
race, Clinton still would have won the election with 53 
percent of the vote and Bush only managing 47 percent 
(Prysby & Scavo 1993, p. 9).
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Clinton asked the American public to invest a great 
deal of trust in him. Clinton had to convince the people 
that he was both an expert and an advocate of a people- 
centered legitimate political order. Like Ronald Reagan he 
was able to play the strings of rural nostalgia and modern 
technology. By making the necessary changes, Clinton 
believed the two worlds could be united. The electorate 
had to trust him, that he would not betray them by becoming 
a complete insider and abandoning his mission of healing 
and restoration.
Even in his language choice, Clinton tried to find a 
middle ground. Leon (1993) explained that "Clinton used 
much more personal language than Bush, but not as much as 
Perot. While he was more certain than Bush in his style .
. . he was never as certain as Perot, nor as oriented 
toward activity" (p. 100).
The electorate appeared uncertain as to how to respond 
to Clinton's political ideology. While all of the 
candidates' scores in post-debate polls were very volatile, 
Clinton's scores displayed the greatest range of change.
He went from 30 percent in debate one, to 58 percent in 
debate two, and crashed to 28 percent in debate three. In 
the general election, Clinton won the election, but only 
received 43 percent of the popular vote. This number could 
be considered quite low when compared to the 1988
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presidential election where Dukakis carried 46 percent of 
the popular vote but lost the election to Bush.
While the questions about institutional legitimacy 
crises may have soured the public on expert politicians 
such as Bush, they may not yet be ready for someone as 
radical as Ross Perot. As a result, while the public may 
have been relatively vague about Clinton's position on 
issues in the 1992 election, he eventually emerged as the 
most acceptable, or tolerable, option for addressing the 
legitimacy crisis in the American political order.
CONCLUSION
The televised debates provided an opportunity for the 
three candidates to present their basic positions and to 
address their perception of weakened legitimacy and 
remedies for it. Three distinct and very different 
candidates emerged. Ross Perot would promise to reform the 
entire political system radically and place the government 
back into the hands of the people, restore virtue, and 
insist on accountability. George Bush provided a 
technocratic piece meal approach claiming that the 
political order was essentially sound. Bill Clinton 
offered radical vilification and rather traditional 
solutions. Whatever the impact of their orientation, from 
these three options, the electorate chose Clinton.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION
The 1992 televised presidential debates were a unique 
combination of both media spectacle and ideological 
soapbox. All three presidential candidates used the 
debates to gain exposure to the electorate as well as 
convey their political platforms. In recent years scholars 
of political communication have decried a crisis of 
political legitimacy in Western, and particularly American 
political institutions. First coined by Jurgen Habermas, 
the term "legitimacy crisis" has become almost a shibboleth 
in recent years. In brief, scholars such as Kathleen 
Jamieson, Karlyn Campbell and Michael McGee have argued 
that the "citizen" has been largely transformed into a 
consumer of images and ideographs. They argue further that 
because the public no longer participates in the world of 
civic discourse it has withdrawn its psychic and moral 
support from state and national politics. Numerous 
scandals, evidence of resource mismanagement, and blatant 
deception by politicians have violated the long held 
Jeffersonian ideal of service and further weakened the 
social contract which has existed between the voter and the 
candidates. As a symptom of citizen withdrawal, a 
shrinking percentage of the electorate has been showing up 
on election day to cast ballots. The restoration of the
184
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citizen role and the broadening of civic dialogue has 
become a theme in presidential politics: open forums,
call-in radio show appearances, town meetings, and other 
citizen oriented formats during the past campaigns have 
shown that candidates understand the symbolic staging of 
legitimacy. This dissertation has studied the theme of 
legitimacy as it appeared in the 1996 presidential debates.
REVIEW OF STUDY
The televised debates proved to be an ideal forum for 
a rhetorical study. In televised debates, the candidates 
have the opportunity to address an extremely large portion 
of the electorate at a point in the campaign when they are 
able to present a matured, fully crafted and encapsulated 
version of their program.
Habermas' ideal speech situation outlines the needed 
components for achieving a rhetoric which properly 
addressed the legitimacy crisis in the American political 
order. However, since Habermas did not concern himself 
with concrete discourse situations, rhetorical criteria 
needed to be developed. The topoi of legitimacy were 
created from Habermas' ideology to be used as critical 
categories for this study. Presidential candidates' 
attempt to restore or simply to comment upon legitimacy of 
the political order were identified through the topoi of 
citizenship, virtue, and authority.
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STUDY RESULTS
Ross Perot's discourse was strongly marked by 
condemnations of the present political order and promised 
to restore legitimacy. Perot consistently condemned 
professional politicians and expressed a desire to return 
the functions of the government back to the people. In a 
tradition as old as Cicero, Perot outlined a narrative of 
the decline of republican virtue. A system had evolved in 
which the government ruled over the people rather than from 
the people. Plans for citizen participation, execution of 
only those functions which encouraged the public good, and 
complete government accountability to the people pervaded 
Perot's rhetoric. In his opening statement of the first 
debate, Perot exemplified his position when he declared "I 
represent a movement which has come from the people. You 
have put me on the ballot." Nearly every sentence Perot 
uttered was framed either as a lament for the loss of 
legitimacy or as a promise to execute his office in a way 
that would recapture it.
The rhetoric of George Bush in the debates contained 
the fewest legitimacy appeals. As an incumbent, the 
president had few systematic criticisms of the present 
political order; change must be prudently managed. On 
several occasions, he even seemed to offer weak 
endorsements for two of Perot's major anti-legitimacy 
targets: Lobbyists and Political Action Committees. Bush
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also indicated that he believed the president had the right 
to act independently of the will of the people in major 
undertakings. If the electorate was uneasy about the 
political order's legitimacy, the president offered very 
little to restore legitimacy. His rhetorical strategies 
were those of a manager rather than a moral leader and 
could only serve to distance him from the electorate.
Governor Clinton appeared to ride two horses at once. 
He offered rhetorical appeals which appeared to 
simultaneously support the political status quo and place 
control of government functions back into the hands of the 
people. Clinton attempted to identify himself as a 
populist candidate, a person who had arisen from the most 
humble circumstances and had remained one of them 
psychologically despite studies at Oxford and Yale, long 
considered bastions of privilege by the plain people of 
America. Despite his validation of the citizen, Clinton 
indicated that he was an experienced politician who could 
translate the inchoate desires of the American people into 
a coherent program. He was a political expert, but he was 
the people's political expert. He had internalized their 
spirit. Clinton's attempt to restore legitimacy to the 
political order straddled both sides of the political 
legitimacy fence.
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STUDY PEDAGOGY
This examination of the 1992 televised presidential 
debates provided insight into political campaigning in 
several different ways. First, a better understanding of 
the contemporary meaning and experience of political 
legitimacy was determined. Ross Perot's success in both 
the debates and the election may well be connected to the 
persistent drumfire of his legitimacy restoration rhetoric. 
Members of a contemporary electorate appear receptive to 
messages regarding the restoration of the functions of 
government back into the hands of the people. Whether 
voters believe in the possibility and effectiveness of a 
citizen driven polity is another matter. Perhaps it is 
mere Jeffersonian nostalgia in a Hamiltonian world.
Perhaps the electorate may just feel restless and not 
understand or know the source of their restlessness. If a 
candidate such as Perot is able to articulate a reason for 
that restlessness, then a certain percentage of the 
electorate may respond positively to the candidate who has 
given a name to their unease and frustration.
Second, this study provided an understanding of the 
clash between expert and Jeffersonian dialogue. Candidate 
comments in the debates can be easily identified as 
subscribing to a particular political ideology. America 
appears suspended between its reality as a modern power 
state characterized by electronically mediated discourse
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and a ghostly memory of our agrarian past. Perhaps this 
latest "crisis" is in a long tradition of cyclical 
populism, progressivism, and good government movements.
But perhaps the magnitude of alienation is greater than 
before. If this is so, then the exigence from this tension 
will have to be resolved. Political experts will either 
need to reform their ways, or the electorate may seek a way 
to regain control of the political system, whether by 
ballot box or revolution. Proposition 13 in California, 
which brought fiscal chaos for a decade, is an example of 
an armed citizenry taking back its prerogative and 
withdrawing physical as well as psychological support.
Third, this study indicated a chaotic new direction in 
American politics. When a virtually unknown candidate, 
such as Ross Perot, can engage in symbolic political 
suicide by withdrawing from the race in mid summer, return 
in early fall, score extremely well in every debate and 
attract a significant portion of the vote in the general 
election, conventional wisdom falters. It may indicate 
that a large portion of the American public are so 
discontented with current political options, that they will 
respond to appeals for a radical restoration of the power 
arrangements in the world's leading democracy. Clinton 
found a radical Jeffersonian ideology worth incorporating 
into his campaign rhetoric and used it successfully during 
the election. Bush used citizen appeals rarely. He seemed
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unconcerned with the apparent obsession to empower citizens 
and may have suffered defeat because of his insensitivity 
in this arena.
Fourth, this study provided additional tools for the 
rhetorical and political critic for the examination of 
future political endeavors. The proposed topoi of 
legitimacy may provide a useful set of analytical 
categories which researchers can use to isolate and 
critique variables unique to a specific study.
Finally, by articulating the rhetorical components of 
legitimacy appeals, an electorate might be better informed 
about political messages and then able to make more 
informed decisions. By inoculating the electorate 
regarding candidate strategies, greater listener 
discernment is possible when participating in political 
campaigns, rallies or debates.
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study provides the political communication critic 
with numerous opportunities for future research. First, 
the topoi of legitimacy can be applied to future debates.
In particular, the rhetorical messages of President Clinton 
and Perot (should he decide to run again) can be examined 
in the 1996 campaign for possible consistencies or changes. 
The critic may explore questions such as: Might Clinton
continue to use mixed appeals successfully? Or, as an
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incumbent, will legitimacy appeals be more or less salient 
in the coming campaign?
Further areas of future research might include 
examining the roots of legitimacy rhetoric. Has this 
rhetorical style slowly evolved over the past several 
decades or are its roots in the Cromwellian revolution or 
at some earlier crisis? A further research question might 
explore the use of the "expert" as an appeal in 
presidential rhetoric. In addition to televised debates, 
other forms of campaign rhetoric could be examined for the 
presence of the legitimacy topoi. Are they situational or 
are they an enduring feature of contemporary discourse. 
Finally, legitimacy topoi of particular genres could be 
identified. Generic forms such as crisis rhetoric and 
apologia might be examined. Even extreme situations must 
contain legitimacy functions and rituals for leaders. 
Additional study questions might include: How might
politicians, not just presidents, incorporate legitimacy 
topoi into their rhetoric; Do rhetorical manifestos such 
as the Republican Party’s "Contract With America" use the 
topoi as a stock of heuristic forms for their indictment of 
present leaders?
In closing, do these additional forms of attempts at 
legitimacy crisis restoration reflect a growing trend in 
American politics as a whole or is it merely temporary? 
Finally, can legitimacy crisis be reduced to a verbal tick,
wflBffpyflwy F i w mamw   .........  u iin nm w u jB J iM graHBBM M i       ,  -;------------------------------------ ------------------------------
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a mere traditional gloss like the laments of the Elder Cato 
for the loss of Roman piety and discipline?
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